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This study investigates the moderating effect of the audit committee characteristics 
(size, independence and financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. Data 
were generated from databases of annual reports for the listed companies in the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. This study covers a period of 2006 to 2015 using panel 
data analysis method. The study sample consists of 29 listed financial institutions. 
The study found that CEO, foreign and institutional ownerships positively influence 
the firm going-concern. However, executives, non-executives and block ownerships 
negatively influence the firm going-concern. Furthermore, it is found that audit 
committee size strengthens the influence of CEO, block and foreign ownership on 
the firm going-concern. Whereas, it weakens the influence of the executives and 
institutional ownership on the firm going-concern. However, it does not moderate the 
influence of non-executive directors’ ownership on the firm going-concern. 
Moreover, audit committee independence strengthens the influences of executives, 
non-executives and institutions ownerships on the firm going-concern. Whereas, it 
weakens the influence of CEO and foreign ownership on the firm going-concern. 
However, it does not moderate the influence of block ownership on the firm going-
concern. Furthermore, audit committee financial expertise weakens the influence of 
block ownership on the firm going-concern. However, it does not moderate the 
influence of CEO, executives, non-executives, foreign and institutional ownership on 
the firm going-concern. These results indicate that despite the company and allied 
matters Act and codes of corporate governance requirements, yet, shareholders doubt 
the ability of audit committee financial experts in improving firm going-concern in 
Nigeria. This is because basic financial knowledge is not sufficient enough to cope 
with the emerging financial markets challenges. This study recommends 
policymakers to set more professional qualifications for audit committee members 
for effective monitoring to improve firm going-concern. 
 








Kajian ini menyiasat kesan ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit (saiz, kebebasan dan 
kepakaran kewangan) dengan hubungan struktur pemilikan dan usaha berterusan 
syarikat di dalam institusi kewangan yang disenaraikan di Nigeria. Data telah dijana 
daripada pangkalan data laporan tahunan syarikat tersenarai di Bursa Saham Nigeria. 
Kajian ini merangkumi tempoh masa dari tahun 2006 hingga 2015 dengan 
menggunakan kaedah analisis data panel untuk 29 buah institusi kewangan yang 
tersenarai di bursa saham tersebut. Hasilan kajian mendapati bahawa pemilikan 
Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif (CEO), pemilikan asing dan pemilikan institusi secara 
positif mempengaruhi usaha berterusan syarikat. Walau bagaimanapun, pemilikan 
eksekutif, pemilikan bukan eksekutif dan pemilikan blok memberi kesan negatif 
terhadap usaha berterusan mereka. Di samping itu, didapati saiz jawatankuasa audit 
juga didapati menguatkan pengaruh pemilikan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif, pemilikan 
blok dan pemilikan asing terhadap  usaha berterusan syarikat tetapi mempunyai 
kesan sebaliknya pula ke atas pemilikan eksekutif dan pemilikan institusi. Walau 
bagaimanapun, ia langsung tidak memberi kesan ke atas pengaruh pemilikan 
pengarah bukan eksekutif bagi usaha berterusan syarikat. Manakala, kebebasan 
jawatankuasa audit juga didapati menguatkan kesan pemilikan eksekutif, pemilikan 
bukan eksekutif dan pemilikan institusi ke atas usaha berterusan syarikat yang dikaji. 
Namun pada masa yang sama, kesannya adalah lemah untuk pemilikan Ketua 
Pegawai Eksekutif dan pemilikan asing terhadap usaha berterusan syarikat. Ia juga 
tidak memberi kesan antara pengaruh pemilikan blok ke atas usaha berterusan 
syarikat. Kepakaran kewangan bagi jawatankuasa audit pula didapati melemahkan 
kesan pemilikan blok syarikat dengan usaha berterusan syarikat. Walau 
bagaimanapun, tiada kesan langsung pemilikan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif, eksekutif, 
bukan eksekutif, pemilikan asing dan institusi ke atas hubungan usaha berterusan 
syarikat. Keputusan ini menjelaskan bahawa walaupun syarikat dan syarikat 
bersekutu mengambilkira undang-undang dan peraturan tadbir urus korporat, namun  
pemegang saham masih sangsi di atas keupayaan pakar kewangan jawatankuasa 
audit dalam meningkatkan usaha berterusan syarikat kewangan dikaji. Ini kerana 
pengetahuan asas kewangan sahaja tidak mencukupi untuk menghadapi kepelbagaian 
cabaran pasaran kewangan terkini. Kajian ini mencadangkan pembuat dasar untuk 
meletakkan kelayakan profesional bagi ahli jawatankuasa audit untuk pemantauan 
yang lebih berkesan bagi mempertingkatkan usaha berterusan syarikat. 
  
Kata kunci: Syarikat Usaha Berterusan, Struktur Pemilikan, Jawatankuasa 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
A firm’s going-concern threat is a problem resulting from  financial and non-
financial issues (Iskandar, Rahmat, Noor, Saleh, & Ali, 2011; Parker, Peters, & 
Turetsky, 2005). The financial issues may be comprised of but not limited to an 
adverse current ratio, adverse acid test ratio, dependence on short-term financing for 
long-term needs, recurring operating losses, adverse cash flows from operating 
events, working capital deficits, negative significant financial ratios. Whilst the non-
financial issues of a firm’s going-concern include loss of key management or staff, 
work strikes or other labour problems, high reliance on the accomplishment of a 
specific project, unprofitable long-term obligations. legislation, and legal 
proceedings. 
Globally, the whole problem of corporate governance regarding the firm’s on going-
concern has been brought about by the business humiliations of the beginning of the 
twenty-first era, which led to the downfall of prominent businesses in the developed 
and developing nations conjointly (Manna, Sahu, & Gupta 2016). Evidently, the 
failures of the Barings Bank in 1995, Tyco and WorldCom in 2002, Parmalat in 
2003, Enron in 2007, and Wal-Mart Stores in 2012 have entirely woken-up the 
going-concern of corporations all over the world. Moreover, about 12 US companies 
went bankrupt; and, the escalation in the rate of bankruptcy was unanticipated 






Meanwhile, ownership structure is amongst the vital elements in influencing the 
corporate governance of a company (Amran & Ahmad, 2013). It is one of the 
essential corporate governance mechanisms that have been a concentration of various 
academics in the recent years (Adebiyi, & Olowookere, 2016; Alzoubi, 2016; Amran 
& Ahmad, 2013; Iskandar, Hassan, Sanusi, & Mohamed, 2017; and Kumar & 
Zattoni, 2017). It is regarded as an essential component that influences a company’s 
health (Zeitun & Tian, 2007). If ownership structure has an impact on a company’s 
health, it is expected that it will have an impact on the firm’s going-concern. The 
business ownership is an essential element in its survival as well as growth level. It is 
expected that the going-concern status of a business depends on the structure of its 
ownership (Imoleayo, Eddy, & Oluku, 2017). The ownership structure is a major 
important corporate governance mechanism because shareholders decide the 
management incentives and, thereby, the economic productivity of the companies 
they manage (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Managerial ownership is considered as a vital characteristic of the ownership 
structure, which may limit a firm’s going-concern problem (Zureigat, Fadzil, & 
Ismail, 2014b). It can align the interest of the management as an agent and owners as 
the principal; hence, reducing the total agency expenses (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Consistent with the agency theory, the managerial ownership is anticipated to have a 
significant negative connection with the firm’s going-concern threats. It is then 
probable that the larger the managerial ownership level in a business, the less the 
agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This, sequentially, would raise the 
performance of a firm or firms in order to escape from facing the firm’s going-





According to agency theorists, as long as non-executive directors’ ownership rises, 
non-executive directors’ interests are more cautiously united with the owners’ 
interests. Thus, it offers more feelings to improve earnings quality, which will, 
consequently, strengthen the performance of the firm and then assist firms to lower 
the firm’s going-concern threats (Alzoubi, 2016). Similarly, resource the dependence 
theory claims that non-executive directors convey resources and diverse skills to the 
firm that are fundamental to the business’s survival (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil, 
2014; Hillman, Canella, & Paetzold, 2000). In support of that, the Nigerian Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) requires that the non-executive directors shall be 
more than that of executive directors in number. The CBN (2014) code, additionally, 
necessitates that the board of banks shall have at least two (2) non-executive 
directors as independent directors whilst that of discount houses shall have at least 
one (1). 
Moreover, block equity holders perform a significant role in the control of 
businesses; this is because the bulk of their contributions inspires them to observe 
and affect the policy of the corporation they have financed (Yeo, Tan, Ho, & Chen, 
2002). Similarly, the resource dependence theory has debated that shareholders 
connote a basis of power that could be employed to support or to contradict the 
company management, in relation to the level of their block holdings. Whereas, the 
CBN (2014) code advocates that all shareholders shall be treated equally, the board 
shall make sure that minority shareholders are sufficiently safeguarded from the 
domineering influence of block equity holders. Any shareholding above a 5% 





for a no objection letter from the CBN, instantly, after the procurement if such stocks 
are attained from the capital market. 
As stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), more external ownership of a company is 
expected to reduce the agency problem that occurs amongst the management and the 
owners. Grounded on the resource dependence theory, foreign ownership usually 
offers the managerial and organisational skills through providing organisational 
resources and knowledge accompanied by financial investment. Therefore, Chibber 
and Majumdar (1999) and Singla, George, and Veliyath, (2017) claimed that foreign 
ownership may offer more resources for knowledge transmission. Foreign ownership 
is also likely to carry out proper corporate governance practices in the businesses in 
which they participate. However, in the Nigerian environment, an individual foreign 
shareholder is not permitted to obtain above 10% of the financial institution’s shares 
which have a high number of shareholdings (CBN, 2014).  
The agency theory advocates that institutional owners can play a vital role in 
monitoring the firm’s activities as part of the control mechanism. Indeed, 
institutional owners may provide a strong monitoring role which may be difficult for 
minor, inactive or less-educated investors to do (Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 2005). 
Likewise, resource dependence theorists offer an effort on the choice of institutional 
investor agents as a channel for achieving contact with resources which are vital to 
the company’s achievement and survival. Nevertheless, with the aim of restraining 
many institutions from becoming controlling shareholders in Nigerian banks, the 
CBN 2014 code of corporate governance has ordered that the institutions’ direct and 





Likewise, the agency theory, resource dependence theory, and some researchers, 
such as(Farooqi, Jory, & Ngo (2015); Jafarinejad, Jory, & Ngo (2015); and Sakaki, 
Jackson, & Jory (2016), advocated that more institutional ownership is essential to a 
company’s achievement and survival. The CBN in Nigeria, on the other hand, is 
discouraging institutional ownership in the Nigerian listed financial institutions, 
hence, there is a need to explain the impact of institutional ownership on the going-
concern of the listed Nigerian financial companies. 
Furthermore, an audit committee works to increase the trustworthiness of firm 
accounting and financial information. The audit committee plays a significant part in 
guaranteeing the firm’s quality of financial reporting and responsibility (Al Daoud, 
Al-Sraheen, & Alslehat, 2015). More truthfulness in the reported accounting and 
financial information assures that the board is informed with the potential going-
concern troubles of the firm on time to deal with the possible going-concern 
problems (Chapple, Kent, & Routledge, 2012). The audit committee also plays a key 
part in guaranteeing the independence and quality of the external audit. An active 
audit committee efficiently monitors financial reporting disclosure practices 
associated with agency costs and the firm’s going-concern issues (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986).  
All Nigerian financial institutions have two audit committees; a statutory and a board 
audit committee. The statutory audit committee is provided by the Company and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990. This committee should have at least 3 board 
members and 3 shareholders. Whereas, the board audit committee is a board sub-
committee recommended by the CBN (2006, 2014), SEC (2011, 2014), and 
NAICOM (2009) Codes of Corporate Governance. For the purpose of this study, a 





and other shareholders. Furthermore, it has the support of the law in Nigeria. 
Moreover, both the Act and Codes require that the audit committee should monitor 
the management’s procedures for identifying the fraud risks affecting the firm and 
guarantee that the detection, prevention, as well as reporting mechanisms are ready. 
This will ensure the safeguard of the company from having an unforeseen going-
concern problem. 
The healthiness of the financial system has a vital role in every nation (Das & Ghosh, 
2007; Sunday & David, 2011) as its flop can unsettle the economic development of 
the country. Financial institutions are useful for economic improvement through the 
financial services they offer (Das & Ghosh, 2007). This includes the intervention role 
they play which is believed to be a mechanism for economic development. The 
active and efficient effort of the financial sector is, ultimately, a manifestation of the 
financial strength in every country. In addition, these institutions play essential parts 
in the external governance of non-financial institutions being the primary financial 
intermediaries in developing nations (Caprio & Levine, 2002; Polo, 2007). The 
massive use of financial instruments in financial institutions helps explicate not only 
the profitability level but also the risk level of their invested capital to the 
shareholders (Tijjani & Ajape, 2013). 
From the general overview of the Nigerian financial service sector, the sector 
contributed 80.33% and 76.23% to the total equity turnover in volume and value, 
respectively (NSE, 2017). As of July 2015, the Nigerian financial sector consisted of 
24 banks, 793 micro-finance banks, 5 development finance institutions, 40 primary 
mortgage institutions, and 58 insurance companies (KPMG, 2016). However, as of 
2017, only 20 Banks, 31 insurance companies, and 4 development finance 





indicates a going-concern alarm in the Nigerian financial sector and the Nigerian 
economy at large. 
Moreover, the Nigerian economy has undergone a financial crisis, specifically in the 
Nigerian financial sector. Mohammad (2012) posits that poor governance practices, 
as well as agency conflicts, have added immensely to the meltdown of many 
Nigerian financial institutions. Furthermore, 45 financial institutions were liquidated 
between 1994 and 2006; whilst in 2007, 14 financial institutions were liquidated, 
including Afri-bank Plc., Assurance Bank, Bank PHB, Gulf Bank of Nigeria, 
Hallmark Bank, Intercontinental Bank Plc., Metropolitan General Insurance 
Company, Oceanic Bank International Plc., Presidential Insurance Plc., Security 
Assurance Plc., and Sun Insurance Nigeria Plc. Hence, the continued survival of the 
firms in the Nigerian financial sector can be interrelated with good corporate 
governance.  
Furthermore, in November 2011, the CBN had given some banks orders to 
recapitalise until June 2016 as a result of their failure to meet the target of the 10% 
minimum capital adequacy rate (CAR). Similarly, in 2016, the CBN advocated that 
there was a need for recapitalisation as some banks had failed to meet the lowest 
target of 10% CAR (Nweze, 2016).  
Likewise, recently, the CBN in July 2016 dismissed board members of the Skye 
Bank because of the failure to meet the CAR, which was evidence of the corporate 
governance and firm’s going-concern problems in the Nigerian financial institutions. 
These upbeat gestures have become inevitable considering the constant 
disappointment of the Skye Bank towards meeting the minimum edges in serious 





at the lending window of the CBN. To be precise, the Skye Bank’s Liquidity and 
Non-performing loan ratios have been lower and higher than the prerequisite edges, 
respectively. A non-performing loan of Nigeria’s banks, in general, rose to 4.65% as 
of June 2016 caused by a drop in asset quality resulting from the naira devaluation 
and in the middle of increasing inflation (Nweze, 2016).  
Similarly, the Nigerian banking and insurance sector’s recapitalisation in 2006 and 
2007, respectively, led to business consolidation and the entrance of foreign 
shareholders with the anticipation that stronger hands would arise in the industry. 
However, NAICOM confirmed that as of 2008, 21 failed insurance companies had 
undergone the rigours of liquidation before they failed the recapitalisation test (Duru, 
2008). Similarly, in 2010, NAICOM revoked the operational licence of Spring Life 
Assurance Plc. due to its failure to meet up with the statutory minimum requirement. 
As well, in 2011, NAICOM replaced the management team of Investment and Allied 
Assurance Plc. with an intervening management team, for abuse of corporate 
governance provisions, financial misappropriation, and insolvency (Popoola, 2016).  
Additionally, in 2012 NAICOM stated that 10 insurance companies were facing 
financial issues. Therefore, these companies had been placed under surveillance to 
avoid a worsening of the situation (Sotunde, 2012). The commission, 
correspondingly, suspended Alliance & General Life Assurance Plc. for corporate 
governance manipulations and other financial scandals. In the same year, the 
commission dissolved the board of Goldlink Insurance Plc. and set up a 7-man 
interim board of directors to watch over the affairs of the company after it observed 





Recently, in 2015, NAICOM dismissed the board of International Energy Insurance 
Plc. and set up an interim board to administer the affairs of the firm for financial 
reporting failures. More recently, in 2017, NAICOM claimed that the level of 
expenses of several insurance institutions was becoming a cause for alarm, therefore, 
it would pay extra attention to the reasonableness of the management costs to 
guarantee that all of the firms’ expense levels were appropriate for their business 
models and did not harmfully upset their capital adequacies, liquidities, and 
profitability (NAICOM, 2017). 
Based on the notation above, it can be emphasised that managerial ownership, non-
executive directors’ ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign 
ownership have become the major considerations for the going-concern of the 
Nigerian financial institutions. Hence, this study has attempted to explore the 
interactive roles of the audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and 
financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership structure and the going-
concern of the registered Nigerian financial institutions. In addition, this research has 
been able to draw conclusions on how the audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) strengthen or weaken the relationship between 
the ownership structure variables and firm’s going-concern. 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Clashes of interest concerning the management and shareholders of firms arise 
because managers control company resources but usually do not have a substantial 
equity stake in the firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because of these clashes, major 
firms, globally, have collapsed. These clashes cannot be fixed entirely through 
agreements for the fact that they are outrageous. Therefore, in a situation of 





safeguard their investments and guarantee the firm’s going-concern (Alzoubi, 2016; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Ownership structure as a critical corporate governance 
mechanism diverges in relation to its costs and benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Although delisting (specifically involuntary) is not completely a bankruptcy, it has a 
weighty damaging effect on both the firm and the shareholders (Malik, Xinping, & 
Shabbir, 2014). Habitually, involuntary delisting is revealing of a firm's poor 
financial strength or poor corporate governance (Malik et al., 2014). Moreover, low 
share liquidity and high ownership concentration and control, may be other reasons 
for involuntary delisting (Bortolon & Da Silva Junior, 2015). 
In Nigeria, currently, the figure of distressed firms filing for restructuring and 
bankruptcy has significantly increased (Enofe, Mgbame, Otuya, & Ovie, 2013). As a 
sign of the firms’ going-concern question, about 85 quoted firms had been delisted 
from the Nigerian Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2016 (excluding relisted firms) 
as shown in Figure 1.1 below. Only 13 out of 85 had been delisted voluntarily. 
Whilst the remaining 72 firms were compelled to do so by the relevant authorities. 
The reasons for involuntary delisting consist of violating guidelines and failing to 






Figure 1.1  
Delisted Firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2002-2016 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange  
Like other global firms, Nigerian financial institutions have undergone a financial 
crisis. Poor corporate governance has been considered as the main issue that has led 
to the crisis (Marshall, 2015). Furthermore, the Nigerian financial sector, 
specifically, has witnessed a series of liquidations of firms. As of 2016, 56 Deposit 
Money Banks (DMBs), 187 Microfinance Banks (MFBs), and 46 Primary Mortgage 
Banks (PMBs) have been closed down. Thirty-five (35) DMBs were closed prior to 
the banking sector consolidation in 2005, as well as for the thirteen (13) DMBs that 
failed to meet the regulatory recapitalisation deadline as they could not recapitalise 
or merge during the exercise. Eleven (11) of the thirteen (13) DMBs were closed 
using the Purchase and Assumption (P&A) Resolution Option. Whereas, all 187 
MFBs and 46 PMBs had been closed down after the 2005 banking sector 
consolidation as presented in Table 1.1 below: 
Table 1.1  
Closed Nigerian Financial Institutions 
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1994 4 4 
1995 1 1 
1998 27 27 
1999 0 
2000 2 2 
2001 0 
2002 0 
2003 1 1 
2004 0 
2005 0 




2010 103 103 
2011 3 3 
2012 23 23 
2013 1 1 
2014 84 21 105 
2015 0 
  52 187 44 283 
Source: Claims Resolution Department, NDIC 
Moreover, the former CBN governor, Soludo (2009), exposed that Nigerian financial 
institutions have undergone a series of difficulties, which steered towards the 
alteration of the economic development and growth comprising weak corporate 
governance, particularly, ownership structure. The Nigerian Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (2003) exposed that corporate governance was at its elementary 
phase in Nigeria because only 40% of the financial institutions had acknowledged 
the code of corporate governance.  
Similarly, in 2009, the CBN complained that 13 of 25 banks failed to comply fully 
with the 2006 Nigerian code of corporate governance on the implementation plan. 





with corporate governance issues, particularly, insider abuses and shareholders’ 
influences, which were marked as a danger for the survival of the banks. Having 
observed the loopholes in the previous codes, the CBN released a revised corporate 
governance code for Banks and Discount Houses in 2014 with the aim of addressing 
the vagueness in the previous code, containing that of the ownership structure. 
However, despite this development, in 2015, the CBN tactfully ran stress 
assessments which found that no less than 9 banks had proven a level of distress. 
These levels of distress showed a need for further recapitalisation to prevent the 
banks’ possibility of sinking into further distress, which was evidence of the 
corporate governance and firm’s going-concern problems in Nigerian Banks. 
In recent times, the overall Nigerian equity market capitalisation had fallen by 
10.99% in the NSE market in the second quarter of 2016. Simultaneously, the 
foreign investment flow on equity decreased from 57.50% to 46.21% in 2014 and 








Figure 1.2  
Domestic-Foreign Ownership pattern on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2011-
2016 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange  
Furthermore, the ownership pattern of equity in the Nigerian listing was slowly 
shifting from the foreign to domestic shareholdings from 2011 to 2016. It can be seen 
clearly from Figure 1.2 that the overall foreign inflow declined from 66.80% in 2011 
to as low as 44.95% in 2016. Likewise, the overall Nigerian financial institutions’ 
capitalisations dropped by 21.18% in the second quarter of 2016 (NSE, 2016). These 
declines have compelled the study of the ownership structure of the Nigerian 
financial institutions. 
Moreover, empirically, many studies on the relationship between ownership structure 
and firm’s going-concern problems focused either on earnings management (Alves, 
2012; Alzoubi, 2016; Guo & Ma, 2015; Gonzalez & Garcia-Meca, 2014; Kurawa & 
Saheed, 2014; and Ramadan, 2016) or profitability (Amran & Ahmad, 2013; Chou, 
2015; Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, & Nemec, 2004; and Ogega, 2014) with very few 
focused on Bankruptcy (Iskandar et al., 2011; Parker et al., 2005; Zureigat, Fadzil, & 
Ismail, 2014a; and Zureigat et al., 2014b) as the determinate of firm’s going-concern 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Domestic (% ) 33.20% 38.60% 49.10% 42.50% 53.79% 55.05%
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status. This study gives more highlights on the effect of ownership structure 
(managerial, non-executive, block, institutional, and foreign) on the overall 
combination of all 3 determinates of firm’s going-concern (bankruptcy, earnings 
management, and profitability). 
A group of scholars (Ali et al., 2008; Alves, 2012; Amran & Ahmad, 2013; Iskandar 
et al., 2011; Parker et al., 2005; and Ramadan, 2016) believe that managerial 
ownership is negatively related with the firm’s going-concern. That is, the higher the 
amount of managerial ownership, the higher the going-concern threats of the firms. 
Whereas, another group (Chou, 2015; Davidson et al., 2004; Farouk & Hassan, 2014; 
and Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012) are of the view that managerial ownership is 
positively related to firm’s going-concern. That is, an increase in managerial 
ownership reduces the firm’s going-concern threats. Thus, there is a need to address 
this gap created by the above studies, by presenting a variable that has a robust 
contingent effect on this relationship. 
With regards to the relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership and 
firm’s going-concern variables, empirically, Ali et al. (2008); Alzoubi (2016); 
Beasley (1996); Bhagat and Black (2001); Hashim (2009); and Hashim and Devi 
(2008) established a negative relationship between non-executive directors’ 
ownership and the possibility of firm’s going-concern problems. That is, as the non-
executive directors’ ownership of the company increases, the firm’s going-concern 
decreases. However, Darko, Aribi, and Uzonwanne (2016) displayed positive 
relations between non-executive directors’ ownership and the possibility of the 
firm’s going-concern problems. That is, an increase of non-executive directors’ 
ownership of the company increases its firm’s going-concern. Thus, there is a need to 





Concerning the relationship between block ownership and firm’s going-concern 
variables, some scholars, such as Gulzar and Wang (2011); Farooq and El Jai (2012); 
Waweru and Riro (2013); and Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) indicated a positive 
relationship. That is, an increase in block ownership will result in an increase in the 
profits of the businesses. Notwithstanding that, some scholars, for example, Parker et 
al. (2005); Alves (2012); Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014); Kurawa and Saheed 
(2014); and Ramadan (2016) postulated that there is a negative relationship between 
block ownership and firm’s going-concern variables. Hence, this necessitates 
addressing the above findings’ gaps by introducing a variable that can moderate the 
relationship. 
So, also, in regards to the relationship between foreign ownership and firm’s going-
concern variables. Some researchers, such as Aydin, Sayim, and Yalama (2007); 
Ogega (2014); Paik and Koh (2014); and    Guo and Ma (2015) claimed that there is 
a positive relation between Foreign Ownership and firm’s going-concern variables. 
However, Alzoubi (2016); Guo, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou (2015); Klai and Omri 
(2011); and Zureigat et al. (2014a) argued that there is a negative relationship 
between firm’s going-concern variables and foreign ownership. Hence, this study has 
intended to justify the above position, by presenting variables that will influence this 
relationship in order to strengthen or weaken the effect. 
Likewise, concerning the relationship between institutional ownership and firm’s 
going-concern variables, some studies have provided empirical evidence that 
institutional ownership can improve a firm’s going-concern through efficient 
institutional ownership. There is, however, inconsistent findings by the researchers 
regarding how institutional ownership affects a business’s going-concern. For 





(2012); and Agyei and Owusu (2014) claimed that an increase in institutional 
ownership improves firm’s going-concern variables. Conversely, Yang, Chun, and 
Ramadili (2009) and Iskandar et al. (2011) showed that increasing institutional 
ownership leads to decreasing the firm’s going-concern variables. As a result, this 
study has been proposed to justify the above situation, by presenting variables that 
will affect this relationship. 
Like most of the global studies of ownership structure, in Nigeria, many studies that 
have examined the relationship between ownership structure characteristics and 
performance, such as Adenikinji and Ayorinde, (2001); Sanda et al. (2005); Tijjani 
and Dedor, (2010); and Mohammed (2012), focused mainly on the extent of the 
relationship between ownership structures on financial performance. Whereas, 
Farouk and Hassan (2014); Isenmila and Afensimi (2012); Kurawa and Saheed 
(2014); Omoye and Eriki (2014); and Usman and Yero (2012) focused mainly on the 
extent of the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management.  
However, based on the available literature, not many past studies have considered the 
bankruptcy model in Nigeria (Olaniyi & Muhammad, 2017). Of the whole of these 
studies, none of them has examined the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm’s going-concern (combining all 3 firm’s going-concern determinants). As well, 
this study specifically adopted the Altman (2017) bankruptcy model as a proxy as it 
is mainly for financial institutions. Hence, this study covers the gap created by the 
previous studies by examining the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm’s going-concern using the bankruptcy prediction model (Zureigat et al., 2014a; 
Zureigat et al., 2014b), earnings management (Alves, 2012; Alzoubi, 2016; and 
Ramadan, 2016), and profitability (Amran & Ahmad, 2013; Chou, 2015; and 





It is appropriate to introduce the moderating variable, when inconclusive and mixed 
findings are involved (Frazier et al., 2004). Considering the inconclusive findings of 
different scholars about the relationships between ownership structure variables and 
firm’s going-concern variables, in which some scholars found a positive correlation, 
whereas others found a negative relationship, there is a need to introduce a 
moderating variable to ascertain the specific effect of the ownership structure 
variables on firm’s going-concern variables.  
Based on the agency theorist’s viewpoint, inside board committees, such as audit 
committees, reduce the agency conflicts. The inside committees are essential in 
observing and checking a business’s principal operation (Abdullah, 2015). The 
committees are necessary for checking the crucial actions of the firm that are serious 
to the firm’s going-concern. In Nigeria, each firm must have inside committees 
(CBN, 2014; SEC, 2014; and NAICOM, 2009). Moreover, Section 359 (3&4) of the 
CAMA 1990 mandates, explicitly, that public companies establish audit committees. 
An audit committee has an active overseeing role towards assuring a company’s 
financial reporting quality and accountability (Al Daoud et al., 2015). This 
overseeing financial reporting role of the audit committee raises the prospect of 
directors and external auditors reaching an agreement regarding the firm’s going-
concern risks (Chapple et al., 2012). 
Equally, the CAMA (1990), CBN (2014), SEC (2014), and NAICOM (2009) codes 
of corporate governance have recommended that an audit committee should fulfil the 
minimum membership (at least 6), a majority of which should be independent 
members (at least 3 should be from shareholders) and have at least 1 member with 
financial knowledge. These requirements are essential elements in guaranteeing the 





audit committee shall apprehend the management’s practices for the identification of 
significant fraud threats in the organisation and ensure that enough prevention, 
detection, and reporting mechanisms are in place, which will protect the business 
from having an unexpected going-concern problem.  
In line with the CAMA 1990, it is mandatory for all Nigerian firms to have statutory 
audit committees. Equally, the CBN 2014, NAICOM 2009, and SEC 2014 corporate 
governance codes recommended all firms to have additional board audit committees. 
This will make the audit committee more effective in ascertaining the firms’ 
financial activities which is essential to the firm’s going-concern. Hence, audit 
committee characteristics, particularly, in relation to its size, independence and 
participants’ expertise, both financial and business expertise, may play a role in 
influencing the outcome of companies operating in Nigeria, and this study 
empirically tested the moderating role of audit the committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm’s going-concern. 
1.3 Research Questions 
An agency problem in a firm is aggravated by not only the separation of ownership 
and control, but other mechanisms, such as stocks with higher voting rights and 
different types of ownership structure (Elson, Ferrere, & Goosen, 2015). This study 
has chosen a combination of ownership structures (managerial, non-executive, 
institutional, foreign, and block ownerships) to see whether they can help the 
companies in controlling the clashes between management and shareholders so as to 





Generally, bankruptcy cases were endorsed, amongst other reasons, for the poor 
corporate governance practices (Iskandar et al., 2011). Such unexpected bankruptcies 
of the Nigerian financial institutions would not affect the owners only, but, as well 
as, all financial statement consumers, such as depositors, lenders, potential investors, 
and the general public. Accordingly, a timely cautionary bankruptcy can be taken as 
a safety measure to establish and reduce the possibility and threat levels of a 
company’s bankruptcy or distress. Therefore, a firm’s going-concern is one of the 
furthermost essential concepts underlying financial reporting. Thus, this study gives 
more light on the role of firm’s going-concern due to its importance in financial 
accounting and its responsibility for ensuring that the companies will continue their 
activities without any problems in the foreseeable future. Despite that, the firm’s 
going-concern is a crucial underlying assumption for the financial statement 
preparation, but the company’s capability to remain a going-concern is still a 
problematic issue (Iskandar et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, the economic situation in Nigeria is moving from a bad situation to 
worse. This is because many financial institutions have encountered failures and 
bankruptcies, and there was no indication in the annual reports about the probability 
of those failure (Adebiyi, & Olowookere, 2016). The question as to whether an 
efficient ownership structure can reduce the possibility of companies having a 
perpetual existence remains to be addressed. Therefore, this study has attempted to 
study the moderating effect of the audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm’s going-concern. In light of the above-mentioned problems, the 





i. Is there any relationship between managerial ownership in the listed Nigerian 
financial institutions and firm’s going-concern? 
ii. Is there any relationship between non-executive director ownership in the 
listed Nigerian financial institutions and firm’s going-concern? 
iii. Is there any relationship between block ownership in the listed Nigerian 
financial institutions and firm’s going-concern? 
iv. Is there any relationship between foreign ownership in the listed Nigerian 
financial institutions and firm’s going-concern? 
v. Is there any relationship between institutional ownership in the listed 
Nigerian financial institutions and firm’s going-concern? 
vi. What is the moderating role of the audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm’s going-concern in the Nigerian financial 
institutions? 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The study’s target has been to assess the effect of the audit committee characteristics 
(size, independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership 
structure and the going-concern in the Nigerian listed financial institutions. This 
study considered a combination of ownership structures (managerial, non-executive, 
block, foreign, and institutional) to help the financial institutions in their firmness by 
adjusting the clashes between the management and shareholders. In line with the 
research questions raised and the primary aim of the study, this study has evaluated 





financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership structure and the going-
concern in the Nigerian listed financial institutions. In order to accomplish this aim, 
other specific objectives were: 
i. To examine the impact of managerial ownership on the going-concern in the 
listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
ii. To examine the impact of non-executive director ownership on the going-
concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
iii. To examine the impact of block ownership on the going-concern in the listed 
Nigerian financial institutions. 
iv. To examine the impact of foreign ownership on the going-concern in the 
listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
v. To examine the impact of institutional ownership on the going-concern in the 
listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
vi. To examine whether the audit committee characteristics (size, independence, 
and financial expertise) moderate the relationship between ownership 
structure and the going-concern in the Nigerian financial institutions. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study has concentrated on evaluating the moderating effect of the audit 
committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) on the 
relationship between ownership structure (managerial, non-executive directors, 
block, foreign, and institutional) and the going-concern of the Nigerian listed 





and ownership structure were not considered due to the lack of data accessibility and 
the absence of a disclosure in the Nigerian financial sector within the period of the 
study. 
Financial institutions were chosen because of their importance to the Nigerian 
financial system and economic development. Likewise, the financial sector was 
chosen because the sector had undergone highly serious going-concern related issues 
within the study period as discussed in the background of the study. Moreover, the 
Nigerian financial sector has distinct and separate regulations (such as the Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions Act [BOFIA] 1991, CBN Act 2007, and NAICOM Act 
1997) from the non-financial sector which make the ownership structure different 
and unique.  
The population covered all the 55 listed financial institutions that were operating in 
the Nigerian Capital Market for the period starting from 2006 to 2015. The year 2006 
was justifiable as this was the era in which the Nigerian financial sector had 
experienced various changes. It was during this period that, both the Nigerian 
banking and insurance sub-sectors underwent recapitalisation which led to some 
changes in their ownership structure. Moreover, it was during this period that the 
CBN 2006 code of corporate governance was issued due to the significant 
weaknesses of corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector. The code made 
relevant provisions to tackle the problems of poor audit committee system, poor 
operational and financial controls, the insufficient information disclosure, and many 
more issues. Furthermore, it was within this period that the National Pension 
Commission (PENCOM) and National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) issued 





2009, respectively, to support the CBN 2006 code in tackling the problems of 
corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector.  
Furthermore, it was during this period that the SEC issued the 2 revised corporate 
governance codes in 2011 and 2014, respectively, in which the codes called for the 
active shareholders’ participation in good corporate governance. Besides that, the 
codes requested that firms should embark on improving disclosure beyond the 
CAMA constitutional requirements. Similarly, in this period, the CBN issued the 
2014 revised code to tackle the various flaws in controlling the activities of a 
financial institution which the previous codes had not addressed. Moreover, the CBN 
2014 code attempted to strengthen the governance framework through enhanced 
information disclosure, such as on the audit committee characteristics, ownership 
structure, and going-concern issues.  
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The results of this study can benefit from different points. This study specifically 
introduced audit committee characteristics as a moderator of the relationship between 
ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern. Therefore, this study contributes 
to the existing literature and offers more evidence on the interaction effects of the 
ownership structure and audit committee characteristics on the firm’s going-concern, 
especially in Nigeria. 
Moreover, this work has used the agency theory and the resource dependence theory 
on the ownership structure elements in relation to the measured going-concern. A 
series of studies deliberated on the importance of the agency in achieving an 
ownership structure with fewer regards to the resource dependence theory. In line 





greater valuation because firms with better corporate governance have good contacts 
with valuable resources. In other words, the agency opinion claims that better 
corporate governance is connected to greater valuation because many of the 
prospective values of the business are apprehended by its owners, instead of being 
taking out by management or monitoring investors (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). When 
the agency theory is related, it possibly shows  that governance aids as a value-
protection instrument for minority investors. Therefore, adopting these theories, 
provides a dynamic theoretical contribution. 
According to the Report of the Corporate Governance National Technical Working 
Group in 2009, the corporate governance practices in various public businesses in 
Nigeria have made substantial developments in recent years. Nevertheless, some 
issues continue to obstruct the growth of shareholder prices and create an obstacle to 
good corporate governance practices. These include concentrated ownership of firms, 
overriding chairman or MD/CEO, conflict of interest, weak internal control structure, 
and lack of active internal audit functions, inadequate disclosures, and weak 
enforcement and disclosures mechanisms. 
Putting into practice corporate governance is related more to self-regulatory work 
than constitutional patronage in Nigeria and globally as a huge number of 
institutional investors brings pressure to bear on corporations to strengthen the 
ownership structure. This matter encourages voluntary compliance, largely, and 
wherever it becomes needed, and relevant, suitable penalties must be applied. This 
was the point embraced by the SEC and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) in the 
implementation of the corporate governance code of best practices in Nigeria. 
Particularly, the SEC and CAC should offer due attention to conformity with the 





In Nigeria, Banks are mandated to preserve a minimum regulatory capital adequacy 
ratio of 10% to 15% on a continuing basis. The CBN considers related risk factors 
and the internal capital adequacy evaluations of every bank to certify that the capital 
held by a bank is adequate in regards to the bank’s complete risk profile. For that 
reason, the CBN considers prescribing a greater level of the minimum capital ratio 
for all banks based on their individual risk profiles. This study can serve as a 
supporting role to the CBN’s formulation and implementation of the policies in the 
financial sector. 
Therefore, government agencies, such as the CBN, NSE, and SEC, would find the 
outcome of the study beneficial as it would give them some hints on how the 
ownership structure helps in influencing and strengthening the going-concern of the 
listed financial institutions in Nigeria. It would also guide them in the formulation 
and implementation of the policies that concern the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions and would be intimated by the SEC and CBN codes of corporate 
governance compliance level. 
In Nigeria, the financial sector is an essential sector of the economy. Despite that, the 
capitalisation of the banks dropped by 21.18% in the 2nd Quarter of 2016. Several 
factors led to the decrease, and one of them was the ownership structure, and this has 
affected the Nigerian economy, and Africa at large. Specifically, this work 
contributes to reducing the firms’ going-concern problems in the Nigerian financial 
industry by suggesting appropriate ownership structures in the sector. Therefore, this 






Likewise, the outcomes of this study will be of great significance to users of 
accounting information (annual reports), such as creditors, financial analysts, the 
public, government agencies, owners, potential investors, and other stakeholders. 
Stockholders of Nigerian listed financial institutions would derive benefit from this 
study by appreciating the significance of ownership structure in improving the going-
concern of their companies. This will implore them to enhance their responsibilities 
and monitoring of the board of directors and to observe due diligence in the 
appointment of the members of the board. As well, this will protect the interest of all 
the stakeholders and ensure the corporate existence of the company. It will also 
enable all of the stakeholders to evaluate the financial viability and strength of the 
firm. Thus, making it easier for their investment decisions. 
Moreover, the study contributes to the body of existing knowledge by adding a 
moderating variable, which is audit committee, on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm’s going-concern, which other prior studies have 
neglected. Therefore, this study will be significant by considering the audit 
committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) as a 
moderator on the relationship between ownership and the firm’s going-concern in the 
financial institutions. 
Lastly, the findings of this research may also be useful to the prospective researchers 
in their academic and non-academic endeavours. This research study will be 
significant in the sense that, the research works on ownership structure in Nigeria, 
such as that of Adenikinji and Ayorinde (2001); Hamid (2008); Mohammad (2012); 
Okpara (2010); Sanda et al. (2005); and Tijjani and Dador (2010); none has been 
able to address the impact of ownership structure on the firm’s going-concern. Thus, 





pace in which the Nigerian businesses have been collapsing over the past years and 
will provide awareness on the scale of the relationship between the ownership 






1.7 Definitions of the Key Terms 
The definitions for the selected key terms in this study are as follows: 
Firm’s Going-Concern: is an assumption that a firm will remain in business for the 
foreseeable future. 
Bankruptcy: is a situation when a firm cannot repay its outstanding liabilities. It is 
the likelihood that a firm will not be capable of servicing its debt anymore and, 
thereby, wind-down. 
Delisting: is the removal of a listed security from a stock exchange. It can be 
voluntary or involuntary and, habitually, lead to a firm terminating its operations or 
announcing bankruptcy. 
Earnings Management: is the act of management to deliberately manipulate the 
financial reporting process of the company to gain some personal benefits. It may 
include the modification of financial information to mislead stakeholders in regards 
to the firm's underperformance. 
Profitability: is the metric used to determine the scope of a company's profit in 
relation to the business size. It is a measurement of a firm’s efficiency and success or 
failure. 
Ownership Structure: is the sharing of equity in relation to votes as well as capital 
but, similarly, to the uniqueness of the different equity holders. 
Managerial Ownership: is a portion of the executive directors’ ownership of the 
shares of the total number of shares issued 





Executive Director Ownership: is the percentage of equity ownership held by the 
executive directors of the company. 
Non-Executive Director Ownership: is the percentage of equity ownership held by 
non-executive directors of the company. 
Block ownership: is the percentage or ratio of the equity stakes of a company, which 
is 5% or beyond, that is held by investors, this may comprise managerial, non-
executive, foreign, institutional, or any other type of shareholder. 
Foreign ownership: the percentage of the total equity stakes possessed by foreign 
shareholders. 
Institutional Ownership: is the percentage of the total equity stakes possessed by 
institutions’ shareholders. 
Audit Committee: is one of the major operating committees of a company's board 
of directors that is in charge of overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure. In 
Nigeria, there two types of this committee; a board audit committee and a statutory 
audit committee. 
Board Audit Committee: is one of the board sub-committees of a company in 
charge of overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure. 
Statutory Audit Committee: in Nigeria, it is a committee of a company's statutory 
body compelled by the Act of Law to be established by the public company to 
oversee the financial reporting and disclosure. 





Audit Committee Independence: is the percentage of non-executive audit 
committee members to the overall audit committee members. 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise: is the percentage of audit committee 
members with finance-related academic or professional qualifications to the total 
number of the audit committee members. 
Financial Institutions: are institutions that undertake financial dealings, such as 
loans, deposits, and investments. They are intermediary firms between consumers 
and the capital or the debt markets that provide banking and investment services. 
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into six main chapters. Chapter One has introduced the thesis 
by deliberating on the practical and theoretical issues regarding ownership structure, 
firm’s going-concern, and audit committee characteristics. It, as well, comprises the 
research questions and objectives of the study amongst others. Chapter Two reviews 
the literature on the concept of a firm’s going-concern and the usage of the statistical 
model in predicting the firm’s going-concern. The chapter also discusses the concept 
of corporate governance, along with a discussion on the relevant code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Likewise, the concept of ownership structure, as well as the 
related provisions for the audit committee in Nigeria, are also discussed. It then, 
concludes with the research’s underpinning theories. Chapter Three presents the 
research framework, as well as the Research hypotheses and frameworks, which are 
developed in this chapter based on the relationship between the dependent, 





Chapter Four presents the methodological approach implemented in the conduct of 
this research. The chapter continues with the research philosophy where the research 
paradigm and research design for this study are presented. Furthermore, the 
population and sample of the study are explained in the chapter. Similarly, the 
chapter covers the measurement of the research variables. The chapter then 
concludes with the techniques of the data analyses and the model for the 
relationships of the ownership structure, firm’s going-concern, and audit committee 
characteristics.  
Chapter Five presents the results and discussion of the ownership structure, firm’s 
going-concern, and audit committee characteristics. The results and coefficients of 
the linear and hierarchical regressions conducted for the ownership structure, firm’s 
going-concern, and audit committee characteristics are discussed in the chapter. 
Finally, Chapter Six is the conclusion of the thesis, providing the overview of the 
thesis, summary of the findings, contributions of the study, practical implications of 
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1.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter began with a justification of the background of the study by giving an 
overview of the present situation of ownership structure and firm’s going-concern in 
the world as well as the Nigerian financial sector. Subsequently, the chapter 
highlighted the problem statement of the study, which had also been pointed out and 
deliberated on in relation to past studies. Research gaps were derived from the 
existing literature. Consequently, in line with the stated problems, the research 
questions were raised. As well, in corresponding with each research question, the 
objectives of the study were identified on a one to one basis. It was then concluded 
with the significance of the study, which included the theoretical, methodological, 








This chapter evaluates the literature connected to the problem under investigation. It 
begins with reviews of related concepts, which are the concepts of going-concern, 
bankruptcy predictions models for assessing firm’s going-concern, corporate 
governance, issuance of relevant codes of corporate governance in Nigeria, 
ownership structure, and audit committee characteristics in the Nigerian financial 
sector. Then, it explains the agency theory and resource dependence theory as the 
underpinning theories of the study. 
2.2 Firm’s Going-Concern 
2.2.1 The Definition of Firm’s Going-Concern 
Firm’s going-concern is a business that functions without the danger of insolvency 
for the predictable future, normally considered at least one year. It indicates, for the 
firm, the simple testimony plan to keep running its undertakings no less than the 
succeeding year, which is a primary postulation for the preparation of financial 
accounts given the IFRS. Therefore, the statement of firm’s going-concern means 
that the entity has no plan for liquidation, and there is no necessity to liquidate or 
decrease its production significantly (Peixinho, 2009; Rouhi, Keighobadi, & Touski, 
2012; and Seyam & Brickman, 2016). 
It is one of the important concepts of accounting mentioned in the Statement of 
Accounting Standards (SAS) No. 1 as “An assumption that the business unit will 





The firm’s going-concern concept suggests that the management of the business will 
consider the corporation as a going-concern if the firm can make a moderate net 
income. Moreover, firm’s going-concern is when there is no danger from whatever 
source or purpose by anybody to decrease its route of business significantly within a 
short period (Rouhi et al., 2012).  
2.2.2  The Concept of Firm’s Going-Concern 
The firm’s going-concern assumption offers a conceptual foundation for various 
classifications used in accounting. For instance, assets and liabilities are categorised 
as either short term or long term based on this assumption. If the firm’s going-
concern is not anticipated, the discrepancy between the short-term and long-term 
misses its impact; entire assets and liabilities turn into the current (that is short-term) 
(Bauer, 2015). The firm’s going-concern maintains the measurement and recording 
of assets and liabilities at a historical cost (Bauer, 2015). The firm’s going-concern 
assumption of the conventional accounting would not be appropriate if a business 
entity is expected to be liquidated in the very nearest future. Such liquidation 
circumstances rather, call for the use of liquidation accounting instead of continuity 
assumption, which values assets and liabilities at estimated net realisable amounts 
(Iskandar et al., 2011; Peixinho, 2009; and Rouhi et al., 2012). 
In line with the firm’s going-concern assumption, the firm’s going-concern belief is 
unique and has the ultimate impact on most of the financial reporting all over the 
world. Be it centred on the US General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
IAS/IFRS, or whichever domestic GAAP like the uniformity standard, substance 
over form standard, conservatism standard, cut off standard (Achim, Pop, & Achim 





clarifies this by stating that the firm must be capable of converting its assets besides 
resolving its liabilities in a usual way of business (Achim et al., 2008; Rouhi et al., 
2012). Assets will be utilised sufficiently and so on, using actual costs, and utility 
values are merely the appropriate possibilities (Kuruppu, Laswad, & Oyelere, 2003; 
Rouhi et al., 2012). Fair value reflected from a liquidating perspective is terminated. 
International Accounting Standards (IAS 1) for the provisions of the presentation of 
financial statements oblige that management must evaluate the firm’s capacity to 
remain as a going-concern upon every preparation of the financial reports. The 
management should highlight this in the accounting books, which should not be 
prepared on a going concern basis. Except if the management either expects to 
liquidate the business or to stop transactions or has no convincing substitute; 
however, doing so, simply means that the management evaluates the actions and 
uncertainties in the view of indications of ceasing operations, instead of exactly 
testing or proving the firm’s going-concern assumption (IAS 1). 
According to IAS 1, the firm’s going-concern is the default basis whilst making 
financial reports, and whichever incident or ambiguity is acknowledged by the 
management that emanates in conflict with the default firm’s going-concern 
assumption needs to be offered in the notes for the financial accounts (IAS 1). The 
firm’s going-concern standard articulates the confidence that the company remains in 
survival for and beyond the near future, taking the balance sheet to replicate its worth 
given this assumption. Since the financial accounts are published once in a year, the 
usual time limit is 12 months (Kuruppu et al., 2003).  
IAS 1 precisely states that the near future ought to be no less than, but not restricted 





International Standards of Audit (ISA 570) point out that, the further keen on the 
prospect a decision is made, the further some ambiguity rises. Moreover, the firm’s 
going-concern is a perception of the future, that is, continuity is impossible without a 
future (Kuruppu et al., 2003; Rouhi et al., 2012; and Salvary, 1996). 
The firm’s going-concern is intended to compromise a resolution to the difficulty 
that financial statements posture, proposing evidence from time to time about 
continuing operations. Therefore, the business is supposed to be in a continuous 
operation through value creation. Moreover, the financial accounts are examined 
through the criterion that the GAAP offers, therefore, leading to helpful expectations 
and clarifications. With respect to the firm’s going-concern postulation, for most 
companies, it is considered understood, and the ambiguity connected to it is at low 
levels not to permit irregular attention by preparers, examiners or users of the 
financial accounts (Martin, 2000). 
The firm’s going-concern principle has been acknowledged as one of the principal 
concepts underlying financial reporting, which validates the accounting process like 
periodic reporting, asset valuation, and accrual accounting (IFAC, 2000). Asset 
amortisation is an extra significance of relating a firm’s going-concern standard. It 
assumes that the firm will survive its assets, estimation of the property is consistent 
with its utility value, which postulates that the degree of the firm’s activities will not 
be reduced intensely in the near future (Rouhi et al., 2012). Established with the 
same standard, historical cost is seen as an appropriate valuation basis (Adrian & 
Livia, 2009). 
The firm’s going-concern assumption accepts that the business will persist for a 





financial commitments in its usual course of action (Kuruppu et al., 2003). If the 
firm’s going-concern’s postulation fails, both accrual and periodic reporting 
assumptions will similarly lose their applicability as defining assets; as prospect 
economic benefits at that point become invalid (Kuruppu et al., 2003).  
In line with the above concepts, the firm’s going-concern principle can be viewed as 
the assumption that the business entity in question is expected not to liquidate but to 
continue operation for the near future without any threat, financially, legally, or 
otherwise. That is, it is expected to endure in business for a period adequate to 
discharge its expected operations, agreements, and obligations. 
The relationship regarding the firm’s going-concern and bankruptcy is well known in 
the accounting and auditing literature (Loftus & Miller, 2000). Due to the perceived 
expectation gap between the auditors and users of the financial report that have 
higher expectations concerning the auditors’ responsibility of revealing the firm’s 
going-concern threats, statistical business bankruptcy models are considered as 
instruments that could assist auditors in establishing the correct going-concern 
conclusion of the firm (Kuruppu et al., 2003). 
Those bankruptcy models can support auditors in making comprehensive 
assessments of the firms’ going-concern positions, and the costs related to the wrong 
audit opinions, such as legal action from the investors (Kuruppu et al., 2003). 
Moreover, statistical proof is recognised as evidence in a court of law (Lowe, 
Recker, & Whitecotton, 2000; Kuruppu et al., 2003). This permits an object model to 
be considered as a justification in court cases suing for audit failure (Lowe et al., 
2000). Furthermore, because of the efficiency of statistical business bankruptcy 





different bankruptcy models to choose the most appropriate bankruptcy model for 
predicting the going-concern status of the firms under consideration.  
2.2.3 Usage of the Forecasting Models in Assessing the Firm’s Going-Concern 
Previous studies show that the objective statistical models can surpass auditors in 
estimating business failure (Kuruppu et al., 2003). Even though several bankruptcy 
studies have been undertaken, only a limited number of them study the importance of 
bankruptcy failure prediction models for evaluating the firm’s going-concern status 
(Holiawati & Setiawan, 2016; Kuruppu et al., 2003; Zureigat et al., 2014a, b).  
Hence, in this study, some studies that have utilised diverse statistical bankruptcy 
prediction models have been reviewed. This includes the Beaver (1966), Altman 
(1968), Ohlson (1980), Altman (1983), Zmijewski (1984), Dopuch, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich (1987), Shumway Hazard (2001), and Altman (2017) models.  
2.2.3.1 Beaver’s Model (1966) 
As a pioneer in the literature on bankruptcy prediction, Beaver’s (1966) study was 
designed to be a benchmark for prospective studies into alternative predictors of 
failure using a sample of 79 failed corporations for which the figures were acquired 
for the preceding failure year, and 79 non-failed corporations for the period of 1954 
to 1964. Beaver (1966), using the univariate analysis, established a failure prediction 
model that contained 7 dimensions which were cash flow to the total debt, current 
ratio, net income to total assets, no-credit interval, total debt to total assets, along 
with working capital to total assets. 
As a limitation of his study, Beaver (1966) stated that many factors had barred a 





established that the cash flow to debt ratio remained the paramount ratio forecaster, 
Altman (1968) argued that there was an inconsistent presentation of the depreciation 
data. Moreover, the results of Altman (1968) were better than the results Beaver 
achieved with his paramount ratio. Likewise, Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005) 
observed the shortcoming of Beaver’s (1966) model by adding the ROA variable to 
the net income, before interest, taxes, depreciation, depletion, and amortisation were 
divided by the beginning total liabilities, and the ‘‘cash flow’’ to the total liabilities 
ratios. 
2.2.3.2 Altman’s Model (1968) 
Altman (1968) made an effort to introduce a new analytical method of business 
bankruptcy prediction. Exactly, a series of ratios, both financial and economic, were 
examined using the multiple discriminant statistical approach. The statistics utilised 
in his work were restricted to manufacturing firms only. Altman’s (1968) advanced 
failure prediction model comprised 5 measurements, which were the earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets, market value of equity to book value of total debt, 
retained earnings to total assets, sales to total assets, as well as working capital to 
total assets. 
Thus, the model was developed as: 
“Z-score = 1.2 WC/TA + 1.4 RE/TA + 3.3 EBIT/TA + 0.6 MV/TL +.999 Sales/TA” 
Where: 
Z-Score = Financial condition of the firm (Strong >2.99; Moderate >1.98; and Weak 
<1.98); 





RE/TA  = Retained earnings/Total asset; 
EBIT/TA = Earnings before interest and tax/Total asset; 
MV/TL = Market value of equity/Total liabilities; 
Sales/TA = Total sales/Total asset. 
The model was attested to be perfect in forecasting bankruptcy, which accounted for 
an accuracy of about 94% of the original sample with 95% of the entire companies in 
the bankrupt, as well as non-bankrupt, clusters assigned to their original cluster 
grouping (Altman, 1968).  
Furthermore, Altman (1968) acknowledged that the main weakness of his work was 
that the methodology was restricted to quoted manufacturing companies with 
available financial data, ignoring financial firms despite their significance in an 
economy. Moreover, Grice and Ingram (2001), using records of US companies, 
reassessed the accuracy of the Altman Model 1968 and confirmed that its accuracy 
had significantly declined over a period. The model was sensitive to industry 
classification as it was more capable for use with manufacturing firms than for non-
manufacturing. 
2.2.3.3 Ohlson’s Model (1980)  
Ohlson (1980) utilised the 1970-1976 dataset of 105 bankrupt and 2,058 non-
bankrupt firms; applying the logit analysis, he developed his model using the 9 
measurements as follows: 
“Y = -1.3 – (0.4X1) + (6.0X2) – (1.4X3) + (0.1X4) – (2.4X5) – (1.8X6) + (0.3X7) – 






X1 = log (total assets/GNP price-level index); 
X2 = total liabilities/total assets; 
X3 = working capital/ total assets; 
X4 = current liabilities/current assets; 
X5 = one if total liabilities exceed total assets, zero if not; 
X6 = net income over total assets; 
X7 = funds provided by operations over total liabilities; 
X8 = one if net income was negative for the last 2 years, zero if not; 
X9 = measure of change in net income; 
Y = overall firm going-concern index. 
The model displayed accuracy rates that ranged from 85% to 98% using the 
estimation samples. However, Grice and Dugan (2003) claimed that the Ohlson 
bankruptcy prediction model should re-evaluate the models’ coefficients to increase 
its predictive accuracy.  
2.2.3.4 Altman’s Model (1983) 
The first Altman (1968) model considered only manufacturing firms, and it was built 
based on the companies' market values. Moreover, Altman (1983) claimed that the 
Altman (1968) model was an openly quoted manufacturing businesses' model and 





(1983) stimulated a comprehensive re-estimation of the Altman (1968) model by 
substituting the equity market value in X4 with the equity book value. With similar 
figures, Altman (1983) produced a new Z-Score model as follows:  
“Z = 0.717X1 + 0.847X2 + 3.107X3 + 0.420X4 + 0.998X5” 
Where:  
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets  
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets  
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets  
X4 = Book value of equity/Book value of total liabilities  
X5 = Sales/Total assets  
Z = Overall Index 
However, Altman (1983) was helpless to test the new model with secondary data 
because of the lack of  private firms’ databases. All the same, Altman (1983) 
evaluated the model using only 4 variables in the model, ignoring the last variable, 
which was the Sales/Total assets ratio, because of the potential industrial influence. 
The industrial influence was possible to occur once the asset turnover ratio was 
incorporated into the model. Hence, to minimise the possible industrial influence, the 
4-variable Altman (1983) model was developed as:  





The EBIT to Total Assets ratio once more showed a maximum impact on the 
discrimination power in the new version model. Altman (1983) regarded the general 
applicability of his Altman 1968 Z-Score model as being debatable. Altman (1983) 
admitted that the 1968 model ignored companies that were very large or small, as 
well, the period of observation was relatively lengthy, in addition to that, the model 
considered manufacturing firms only. Therefore, Altman (1983) recommended that 
the concerned forecasters should be careful in the utilisation of the Altman 1983 
model, practically. The recommendation also concerned the version of the original 
1968 Z-Score model. Altman’s 1983 model version has an extensive range, as it is 
projected for both private and public companies as well as manufacturing and non-
manufacturing companies (Altman, Iwanicz‐Drozdowska, Laitinen, & Suvas, 2017).  
Established on the empirical tests by Altman et al. (2017), the Altman (1983) Z-
Score model comprised the 4 dimensions with re-estimated coefficients utilising 
comprehensive observations, and it works reliably fine, universally, and as well was 
found to be friendly in the application and apprehension. Thus, Altman et al. (2017) 
recommend that all interested parties can use this accounting-based model, 
particularly international financial institutions, for the prediction of failures. 
2.2.3.5 Zmijewski’s Model (1984) 
Zmijewski established his model via the probit technique sampling of 40 bankrupt 
and 800 non-bankrupt industrial companies eliminating finance, services, and public 
administration for 1972-1978. The model demonstrated high accuracy rates that 
reached 85% to 98%. Zmijewski (1984) also tested the model using a holdout sample 





on financial ratios that determined the firm’s leverage, liquidity, and performance to 
introduce the model.  
“Zm = - 4.3 – (4.5 X1) + (5.7 X2) – (0.004 X3)” 
Where: 
X1 = net income/total assets; 
X2 = total debt/total assets; 
X3 = current assets/current liabilities; 
Zm = overall index 
By means of the latest USA registered companies’ dataset, Wu, Gaunt, and Gray 
(2010) evaluated the performance of Zmijewski’s 1984 model. Wu et al. (2010) 
created an integrated model using different models, which was multi-period logit in 
nature. The integrated model combined accounting data and market data, along with 
the companies’ features. Not only did it outshine the Zmijewski model, the 
performance of the Zmijewski model weakened over time. As well, Grice and Dugan 
(2003) reassessed the Zmijewski model and suggested that, researchers who use the 
Zmijewski models using recent data should re-evaluate the model’s measurements to 
recover the analytical accuracy of the models. Lately, Chava and Jarrow (2004) used 
the US registered firms’ periodic data for the 1962-1999 period with 1461 
bankruptcies. They found that the accuracy of Zmijewski’s model of the 





2.2.3.6 Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich’s Model (1987) 
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich’s Model (1987) reviewed the degree to which 
models grounded in the financial and market variables to predict auditors' 
conclusions to produce qualified audit reports in situations regarding uncertainties. 
Using a sample of 12 companies with the firm’s going-concern qualifications and 95 
companies with clean audit opinions for the period of 1977 to 1980. Applied a model 
with 9 dimensions as follows: 
a. Change in total liabilities to total assets over the year.  
b. Change in receivables to total assets over the year.  
c. Change in inventory to total assets over the year.  
d. Total assets.  
e. Dummy variables for the availability of income to shareholders.  
f. A dummy variable for the period quoted on the American Stock 
Exchange/New York Stock Exchange.  
g. Change in data over the year.  
h. Change in the residual standard deviation from the market model regression 
over the year.  
i. Differences between common stock returns and an equally weighted industry 
index.  
Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) extended the existing Dopuch et al. (1987) audit 





qualification or modification report. Furthermore, Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) 
claimed that Dopuch et al. (1987) was unable to discover whether the opinion issued 
was subjective to specific trade-offs facing an auditor or not. 
2.2.3.7 Shumway’s Hazard Model (2001) 
Shumway (2001) argued that static models are inappropriate for predicting 
bankruptcy failure as bankruptcies do not happen regularly. As a result, Shumway 
(2001) established a simple hazard model, which combines comprehensive model 
evidence to evaluate each business’s failure risk in a certain circumstance. 
As stated by Shumway (2001), in the Zmijewski 1984 model, only the net income to 
total asset coefficient was significant in predicting bankruptcy failure; hence, it 
appeared that the Zmijewski 1984 model was not a 3 variable model but rather only a 
1 variable model, as claimed by Zmijewski (1984). Equally, Shumway (2001) 
claimed that in the Altman 1963 model, the EBIT over total assets, as well as the 
market equity to total liabilities coefficients were the only statistically significant 
variables, thus claiming that the Altman 1963 model was not a 5 variable model but 
rather only a 2 variable model. Established on this evidence, Shumway (2001) 
debated that both the EBIT to total assets and the net income to total assets measured 
the profitability of the firm; as well, both the market equity to total liabilities and the 
total liabilities to total assets measured the business’s leverage.  
Thus, Shumway (2001) proved the hazard model’s capabilities using 2 dimensions as 
presented below: 
a. net income to total assets 





Chava and Jarrow (2004) applied an extensive US bankruptcy databank for 
registered companies to test the dominance of Shumway’s (2001) model above 
Altman’s (1968) model and Zmijewski’s (1984) model by re-estimating the models 
using 1962–1990 data to predict the bankruptcies for the 1991–1999 period. Their 
result confirmed that Shumway’s model outperformed the 2 models by having a 
74.4% accuracy against 63.2% and 43.2% for Altman’s 1968 model as well as 
Zmijewski’s 1984 model. Similarly, Wu et al. (2010), using non-financial companies 
in USA from 1980 to 2006, covering 50,611 observations with 887 and 49,724 
bankruptcies and non-bankruptcies, respectively, validated that Shumway’s hazard 
model outperformed Altman’s 1968 Model.  
2.2.3.8 Altman’s International Z-Score Model (2017)  
Altman et al. (2017) evaluated the performance appraisal of the model in predicting 
bankruptcy and other types of business distress, with the intent of ascertaining its 
efficiency for all entities, but primarily financial institutions, that are in need of 
assessing the bankruptcy risk of the businesses. As well, Altman et al. (2017) 
employed huge international companies’ representatives to appraise the performance 
evaluation of the model in the bankruptcy and distressed businesses’ forecasts.  
Finally, Altman et al. (2017) evaluated the Z-Score model’s accurateness using 32 
European plus 3 non-European countries. This sort of extensive universal study had 
not existed before. All the companies under study were private non-financial firms 
across all sectors apart from that of the United States and China. Hence, Altman et al. 
(2017) used the Altman (1983) model established for private manufacturing as well 
as non-manufacturing businesses in the analysis. Altman et al. (2017) used the main 





utilisation of the Altman (1983) 4-dimension model, in preference to the original 
Altman (1968) 5-dimension model. 
Concisely, established on the revised comprehensive models, this study has adopted 
Altman’s (2017) Model as one of the measures of firm’s going-concern evaluation of 
businesses, since it has been ascertained that the Altman 2017 Model is more 
justifiable for non-manufacturing firms instead of the original Altman 1968 Model 
for publicly traded manufacturing companies. In addition, the usage of the Altman 
2017 model has been accomplished in different countries using a vast international 
database for 31 countries, and the results have been authenticated in numerous 
countries (Altman et al., 2017).  
Similarly, the Altman 2017 model could be applied by all concerned entities, 
particularly global financial institutions, for more decision-making processes other 
than just failure or distress estimation (Altman et al., 2017). Likewise, as suggested 
by Altman et al. (2017), future studies should put more attention on additional 
modifications than the one offered; for instance, applying different modelling 
methods like panel data analysis, and evaluating its effectiveness with information 
from emerging markets like Nigeria.  
2.3 Corporate Governance 
2.3.1 The Definition of Corporate Governance 
There is no universally established definition of corporate governance, as different 
authors and institutions see the corporate governance from various perspectives. 
According to the Malaysian High-Level Finance Committee, corporate governance is 





“the process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
and affairs of the company towards promoting business prosperity 
and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of 
realising long-term shareholder value while taking into account the 
interest of other stakeholders”. 
It offers a control mechanism framework that helps the corporation in accomplishing 
its goals whilst preventing undesirable conflicts (MCCG, 2017). 
So, also, OECD (2004) posited that corporate governance is “the system by which 
businesses are directed and controlled”. More on this, Denis and McConnell (2003) 
described corporate governance as the set of mechanisms (institutional as well as 
market-based) that encourages the self-interested controls of business (decision-
makers concerned with in what manner the firm should be run) to make decisions 
that maximise the corporation value to its shareholders.  
According to Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2005), they considered corporate 
governance as an established apparatus that affects the managers’ decisions and 
control. Some of which are the institutional shareholders, block shareholders, foreign 
shareholders, and board of directors, in addition to the operation of the market for 
business control. Whereas, Sanda, Mikailu, and Garba, (2005), described corporate 
governance as being anxious with behaviours, wherein entire parties concerned with 
the safety of the company endeavour to guarantee that management and other 
employees take actions or embrace mechanisms that protect the safety of the 
stakeholders.  
Likewise, Hamid (2008) perceived corporate governance to be the prescribed 
cultures, processes, systems, and structures in which the goals and the ways of 
achieving them, as well as the performance appraisal of the companies are set, 





the level of corporate responsibility a corporation displays about accountability, 
transparency, and ethical values.  
So, also, Kurawa and Saheed (2014) described corporate governance as the 
mechanisms that safeguard the stakeholders’ interests when there is a separation 
between the owners of the business and the managers of the firm. More recently, 
Agyei-Mensah, (2016) added that corporate governance is the way firms are 
governed; it is the system through which organisations are directed as well as 
controlled in the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders. Moreover, 
Agyei-Mensah, (2016) further added that a firm should be run in the best interests of 
its stakeholders, and predominantly of its owners. 
2.3.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
Given the above definitions, corporate governance can be described as the 
mechanisms that safeguard the stakeholders’ interests necessitated because of the 
separation between the owners of the business and the managers of the company 
(Agyei-Mensah, 2016; Kurawa & Saheed, 2014; and Mohammad, 2012). The 
corporate governance structures specify the sharing of rights and duties amongst the 
diverse members of the company, for instance, the board, management, owners, and 
other stakeholders, as well spelingl out the procedures and guidelines for making 
resolutions on company activities (OECD, 2004). By undertaking this, it furthermore 
offers the structure in which the business targets are established and the way of 
accomplishing and checking them. 
Theoretically, agency theorists postulate that the common corporate governance 
apparatus used to reduce the agency conflicts exists amongst the diverse concerned 





external mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012; and Mersni 
& Othman, 2015). The internal mechanism consists of executive compensation, 
ownership structure, audit committee, and board of directors. The external 
mechanism includes but is not limited to investor protection, financial transparency, 
corporate control market, and proper infrastructure. 
2.3.3 The Concept of Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure indicates the percentage of shares held by diverse parties in the 
firm’s equity capital. Business’s ownership is a crucial element for its survival. It is 
presumed that the nature of a business’s going-concern depends exclusively on its 
ownership structure (Imoleayo et al., 2017). It is claimed that the ownership structure 
of developing economy businesses explains the companies’ strategic orientations 
which as well affect their outlooks toward growth (Cui, Meyer, & Hu, 2014; Singla 
et al., 2017). Furthermore, ownership structure is regarded as an essential factor that 
affects a company’s health (Imoleayo et al., 2017; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). If 
ownership structure has an impact on a company’s health, it is expected at that point 
to use it to forecast the firm’s going-concern. Ownership structure is one of the core 
components of corporate governance; it is amongst the corporate governance key 
mechanisms that have been a focus of numerous researchers and scholars recently. 
Despite that, globally, few studies have examined the relationship above (Parker et 
al., 2005; Iskandar et al., 2011; Ittonen, 2011; Zureigat et al., 2014a; Zureigat et al., 
2014b; and Zureigat, 2015). Therefore, the key objective of this study has been to 
narrow this gap and attempt to enhance the existing literature. 
The ownership structure is the sharing of equity concerning votes as well as capital 





significance to corporate governance because they define the incentives of managers 
and, thereby, the economic productivity of the companies they manage (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, there would be little information asymmetry as well as 
limited agency problems, which always decreases the likelihood of a firm’s going-
concern problem. 
Within this context, Pivovarsky (2003) suggested that the identity of the shareholders 
is only prevalent in environments whose ownership structure is concentrated. The 
nature of the shareholders has implications for the objectives of the companies 
(Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), which affect the relationship between the corporations 
and their environment and, therefore, for the strategies and key performances for 
their survival.  
2.3.3.1 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership is seen as a crucial characteristic of the ownership structure, 
which may limit the firm’s going-concern problem. Managerial ownership is a 
portion of the executive directors’ equity ownership out of the total number of shares 
issued (Bekiris, 2013). Put another way, managerial ownership is a proportion of the 
shares owned by corporate managers (Mustapha & Che Ahmad, 2011).  
Managerial ownership may synchronise the management’s and shareholders’ 
interests; and, therefore, decrease the overall agency conflicts. The relationship 
between managerial ownership and agency costs is linear, and the peak point for the 
business is attained once the executives obtain all the shares of the firm (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). That is to say, the higher the managerial ownership, the lower the 





Agency theorists claim that managerial share ownership has a negative relationship 
with the firm’s going-concern problems (Parker et al., 2005; Iskandar et al., 2011). 
Once managers turn out to be the business owners, they must have a similar extent of 
incentive with the other shareholders. Such managers will probably not take risks 
that will be risky for the shareholders. Therefore, it is expected that the larger the 
managerial ownership in the business, the less will be the agency problems. This 
will, accordingly, increase the performance of the company and assist companies to 
reduce the firms’ going-concern problem (Gul et al., 2003). 
The ‘convergence-of-interest/insider model’ claims that there is a relationship 
between directors’ ownership and performance as the larger the financial 
commitment, the higher the costs for not maximising investor capital (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Correspondingly, Fama and Jensen (1983) supported the idea that, 
when managers own a small portion of the companies’ stocks, they have greater 
reasons to preserve their policies in agreement with other shareholders preferences as 
they have a high relation with the business’s result. However, when managerial 
ownership reaches a particular level, they would assign business wealth for their 
personal interest irrespective of the impacts on the external investors. 
2.3.3.2 Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership 
Non-executive directors are expected to be essential board members. They ought to 
make autonomous decisions in addition to providing essential scrutiny of the 
management and executive directors’ plans and activities, particularly on strategy 
and performance evaluation matters (SEC, 2014). According to the agency theory, 
non-executive directors’ ownership is expected to reduce the agency costs connected 





executive directors have motivations to perform the monitoring responsibilities and 
not to connive with executives to expropriate shareholder capital; hence, the presence 
of non-executive directors raises the board's capability to observe top management 
activities efficiently.  
According to agency theorists, as long as the non-executive directors’ ownership 
rises, non-executive directors’ interests are more cautiously united with the owners’ 
interests, thus, offering more feeling to improve earnings quality which will, 
consequently, upturn the performance of the firm and help firms to lower the firms’ 
going-concern problems (Alzoubi, 2016).  
The resource dependence theory claims that the fundamentals to a business’s survival 
is its capability to obtain and preserve resources (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 2006; 
and Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). According to Hillman et al. (2000), non-
executive directors convey resources to the company’s access to essential elements 
that are fundamental to the business’s survival. Similarly, Al-Matari et al. (2014) 
argued that the resource dependence theory is backing an association with outside 
resources because these resources are made available to the company with various 
bases and diverse skills as the firm tries to optimise stockholder rights. They added 
that this theory ascertained that farm-out contributes to a company the ability to 
execute activities with professionalism and expertise; that is, professional non-
executive directors will help the company in obtaining the modern technology and 
innovation which will help the company to survive. 
To support this, in Nigeria, the CBN (2014), NAICOM (2009), and SEC (2014) 
codes require that the aggregate of the non-executive directors shall be beyond that 





banks shall have at least two (2) non-executive directors as independent directors, 
whilst that of the discount houses shall have at least one (1). Likewise, the CBN 
(2014) code provides that all committees of the board shall be headed by non-
executive directors. 
Agency theorists have advocated that boards occupied by many non-executive 
directors could assist in shrinking the agency problem through observing and 
governing the manager’s opportunistic behaviour (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), in addition, by warranting that executives are not the exclusive 
assessors of self-performance. Furthermore, non-executive directors may as well aid 
in decreasing the perquisites of management consumption and eliminating non-
performing board members. 
Furthermore, it is considered that boards controlled by non-executive directors could 
inspire the quality of the directors’ resolutions and deliver strategic direction as well 
as enhance performance. Non-executive directors, as well, offer extra windows into 
the world because of their connections and expertise, as well as respect. In 
distinction, having a greater percentage of non-executive directors may be negative 
to firms as they may possibly suppress strategic movements (Goodstein, Guatam, & 
Boeker, 1994), surround the business with extreme checking, possess the absence of 
the business understanding to be effective, and the absence of genuine independence. 
2.3.3.3 Block Ownership 
Controlling block owners can normally exercise influence over key business 
resolutions (Ying, Wright, & Huang, 2016). Block equity holders perform a major 
role in the internal control of companies; this is because the bulk of their 





which they have financed (Yeo et al., 2002). Block ownership can be in a different 
form, comprising individual shareholders, a private equity firm, pension funds, 
banks, insurance, and corporations (Klein, 2002; Miko & Kamardin, 2015).  
There are two opposing effects of block ownership (Ying et al., 2016). Firstly, an 
incentive alignment effect; block ownership can serve to stress managerial action to 
the advantage of the investors, with a resulting alignment of the interests of the 
minority and other controlling shareholders in a less developed legal as well as 
institutional environment (Lins, 2003; Ying et al., 2016). Therefore, block owners 
have better reasons to bring into line the shareholders’ and management’s interests, 
which will lead to better business performance as well as the firm’s going-concern 
(Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 
2008). The second effect is an entrenchment effect; the block owners are provided 
with enticements to shuffle cash flows out of the company at the expense of the 
minority shareholders (Ying et al., 2016), or to chase objectives in divergence with 
value maximisation. Furthermore, block ownership can be associated with extra costs 
for the minority shareholders as the block shareholders may possibly attempt to 
expropriate the firm’s resources.  
Furthermore, block ownership is an alternative option for reducing agency costs. 
This is achieved through shareholders taking an active role in monitoring the firm’s 
activities. However, this is determined by the sizes of their equity stakes (Morck et 
al., 2005; Young et al., 2008). It is normally expected that the greater the investors’ 





2.3.3.4 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership refers to the whole or bulk possession/control of a corporation or 
the means in a nation by persons who are not citizens of that nation, or by 
corporations whose centre of operations are not in that nation (Heyman, Sjoholm, & 
Tingvall, 2007). Foreign ownership is the proportion of the number of stocks held by 
the foreign investors to the total number of stocks outstanding at the end of the year 
(Jeon, Lee, & Moffett, 2011). Foreign shareholders play a significant role as users of 
the financial statement, who utilise the information to plan and work their 
investments. Furthermore, the foreign shareholders, being sophisticated shareholders, 
are clever in observing the activities of the companies. Foreign ownership is not 
encouraged only by financial goals; they are, as well, inspired by the passion to grow 
global competitive advantages and competencies, through apprehending new markets 
(Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Singla et al., 2017).  
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that the external ownership of a 
business is expected to reduce the agency problem that exists between the 
management and the shareholders. Correspondingly, the resource dependence theory 
supports the idea that foreign ownership habitually provides the managerial and 
organisational proficiencies by contributing organisational resources and expertise in 
conjunction with financial funds. Furthermore, from the same view of the resource 
dependence theorists, emerging market companies form coalitions with foreign 
corporations to increase access to technology and transnational dealings, besides 
knowledge linkages (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Singla et al., 2017). Companies with 
foreign ownership can, as well, influence their domestic and international 
connections to provide foreign technology in domestic markets (Kock & Guillen, 





Foreign owners have certain abilities like worldwide value creation and promotion 
skills (Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999; Singla et al., 2017) that permit them to produce 
distinguished goods and services for which the range can be improved by placing 
these skills in developing economy companies that have comparatively skilled 
workers and lower wage levels. Because of that, companies with foreign ownership 
have less production cost (Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999; Singla et al., 2017). This 
makes the goods and services of a company with foreign ownership meet the global 
competitive goal (Alzoubi, 2016; Manna et al., 2016; and Vural-Yavas & Erdogan, 
2016). Such a practice, as well, supports developing market companies in globalising 
their businesses, thereby, benefitting both the companies and the foreign investors. 
2.3.3.5 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional shareholders are comprised of banks, insurance companies, investment 
houses, mutual funds, as well as pension funds. The key purpose of these 
shareholders is the value creation for the investors (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; 
Singla et al., 2017) as the contributions of institutional shareholders are commonly 
decided on by their portfolio valuations. These institutional shareholders have 
diversified portfolios that permit them to take on additional risk (Singla et al., 2017). 
Institutional ownership is the size of a firm’s issued shares possessed by 
endowments, insurance firms, investment businesses, mutual or pension funds, 
private foundations, or other big bodies that manage the resources in the best 
interests of others. The consistency in institutional ownership is an essential 
component of company behaviour (Jafarinejad et al., 2015; Farooqi et al., 2015; and 





Institutional investors are reflected as experienced shareholders who have easy 
access to monitoring and obtaining information (O’Neill & Swisher, 2003; 
Wasiuzzaman & Lim, 2017), may possibly be capable of assisting in decreasing 
information asymmetry, and increasing information disclosure. It is one of the 
important types of company ownership globally (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999); for that reason, they affect security appraising and, sometimes, 
company monitoring (Bricker & Markarian, 2015; Wasiuzzaman & Lim, 2017). 
Furthermore, institutional shareholders are usually considered as up-to-date 
shareholders. They have contact with resourceful data that different shareholders do 
not own; besides that,  their teams are comprised of different experts (Kun, Yu, & 
Hu, 2017). These advantages can make their appraisals of businesses more correct 
than those of other shareholders, growing the amount of company-level data 
enclosed in the stock prices (Kun et al., 2017).  
It is also claimed that institutional ownership has a valuable influence on corporate 
governance practices, generally, because of the lively part of monitoring and 
resolving managerial opportunism along with the enrichment of information 
efficiency using capital market figures (Bushee, 2001; Ying et al., 2016). The 
existence of mutual funds, especially in a developing economy like Nigeria, could 
support the minority owners’ negotiating power and offer useful monitoring of a 
company’s block shareholders along with the management in the business decision-
making process (Ying et al., 2016). 
Agency theorists advocate that institutional ownership can be a usual control 
mechanism for observing a business’s activities (Young et al., 2008). Certainly, 





minority, inactive, or less knowledgeable shareholders (Almazan et al., 2005; Young 
et al., 2008) which helps in minimising the firm’s going-concern problem. Likewise, 
resource dependence theorists offer an effort on the choice of institutional investor 
agents as a networking for achieving contact with resources, which are vital to the 
company’s achievement and survival. 
2.4 Previous Studies on Ownership Structure and Firm’s Going-Concern 
The effect of ownership structure on the firm’s going-concern variables is an 
important issue in the literature of the finance theory (Zeitun & Tian, 2007). The 
literature on the agency problem, which is based on widely held equity ownership, 
has shown that a separation of ownership from control gives rise to agency conflicts 
between managers and outside shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995).  
Previous studies on the relationship between ownership structure and the firm’s 
going-concern variables have produced mixed results. The review has been made to 
expose the gaps existing in the current literature with a view to making an additional 
contribution in this area, which is in line with the objective of this study. Therefore, 
this study considers the ownership structure variables (CEO, executive, non-
executive, block, foreign, and institutional) in relation to the firm’s going-concern.  
2.4.1 Previous Studies on Managerial Ownership and Firm’s Going-Concern 
Previous studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern have been underpinned by the conflicting hypotheses in the agency 
theory. These conflicting hypotheses are the alignment of the interest hypothesis 





The alignment of the interest hypothesis postulates that managers and owners share 
similar interests and perceive a higher value from the alignment of their interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) instead of protecting self-centred interests. Moreover, the 
alignment of the interest theorists believe that high managerial ownership can align 
the interest of the executives and the shareholders; hence, reducing the total agency 
costs (Said, Zainuddin, & Haron, 2009). This, ultimately, increases the performance 
and going-concern status of a firm. Several empirical studies have provided evidence 
supporting the alignment of interest hypothesis. 
In agreement with the alignment of interest hypothesis, that higher managerial 
ownership may increase firm performance, Davidson et al. (2004) found a significant 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and profitability. Likewise, 
Elsayed (2007) used a sample of 92 Egyptian public limited firms from 2000 to 
2004. He found a significant positive relationship between executive director 
ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, Chou (2015), using 1,156 firm-year 
observations, found that managerial ownership had a positive influence on firm 
performance.  
Moreover, under the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, managerial ownership can 
mitigate earnings management in firms (Alves, 2012; Warfield et al., 1995) which 
will lower the firm’s going-concern problem. In line with this argument, many 
studies have found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. For instance, Ali et al. (2008), using panel data for the period 
between 2002 and 2003 in Malaysia, found that managerial ownership was 
negatively related to earnings management. Furthermore, in Portugal, Alves (2012), 
utilising 34 non-financial registered firms from the 2002 to 2007 period, discovered 





Moreover, Alzoubi (2016), using the 69 listed firms in Jordan, found that managerial 
ownership reduced earnings management. Likewise, in Jordan, Ramadan (2016) 
applied the panel regression analysis from 2000 to 2014. The study found that 
managerial ownership was related inversely to earnings management practices. In 
Nigeria, Adebiyi and Olowookere (2016) used 9 listed Nigerian banks between 2005 
and 2013, and established that managerial ownership increased the earnings quality 
by decreasing the levels of financial reporting manipulation.  
Besides that, some researchers have empirically supported the convergence-of-
interest hypothesis which claims that a high level of managerial ownership minimises 
the likelihoods of bankruptcy. For instance, Parker et al. (2005) used 161 financially 
distressed firms between 1988 and 1996, and established that managerial ownership 
was negatively related to a firm’s frequent going-concern problems. Likewise, in 
Malaysia, Iskandar et al. (2011) established that the managerial ownership had 
significant negative relationships with the firm’s going-concern problem. In the same 
line, Ittonen (2011) took a sampling of 3,193 firms between 2002 and 2008, and 
found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the firm’s going-
concern problem  
On the other hand, based on the entrenchment effect hypothesis, it is postulated that 
high managerial ownership may decrease financial performance, which could 
eventually increase the firm’s going-concern problems. This is because, executives 
with a high share ownership will possibly be so influential that they do not have to 
consider the interests of the other shareholders (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
This ultimately changes the traditional principal-agent problem to a principal-





Consistent with the entrenchment effect prediction, some empirical studies found that 
firms with higher managerial ownership were characterised by low firm performance. 
For instance, in Malaysia, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), using 347 registered firms in 
Malaysia between 1996 and 2000, found a significant negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and financial performance. Similarly, Amran and Ahmad 
(2013), using a sample of 420 listed non-financial firms, discovered that higher 
managerial ownership decreased firm performance. In addition, Iskandar et al. (2017) 
found that managerial ownership had a significant negative relationship with the firm 
performance of the Malaysian small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Furthermore, in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions, Ahmed and 
Hadi (2017) found that managerial ownership affected firm performance negatively. 
So, also, Patel (2018) in Pakistan found a significant negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and a firm’s performance. 
Similarly, the entrenchment effect postulates that firms with high managerial 
ownership are more likely to experience earnings manipulation. Some empirical 
studies have supported this postulation, for example, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
found a positive relationship between executives’ ownership and earnings 
management. Moreover, Velury and Jenkins (2006), utilising 4238 observations from 
1992–1999, found that higher managerial ownership was related to higher earnings 
management. Likewise, Hashim (2009), using a sample of 277 non-financial firms in 
Malaysia for the period from 1998 to 2006, found that managerial ownership 
increased earnings management. Moreover, Waweru and Prot (2018) used 48 firms 
listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange and the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange over 
the period of 2005-2014. They found that director share ownership was positively 





Similarly, in Nigeria, Isenmila and Afensimi (2012), using a sample of 10 banks, 
found a significant positive relation between managerial ownership and earnings 
management. Moreover, in Nigeria, Farouk and Hassan (2014), using Nigerian 
chemical and paint firms from 2007 to 2011, found a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management. Likewise, Imoleayo et al. (2017), 
using a sample of 137 Nigerian firms, found a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management.  
Correspondingly, in line with the entrenchment effect, some empirical studies have 
found that firms with higher managerial ownership were related to a higher 
bankruptcy likelihood. For example, Zureigat et al. (2014b), using a sample of 113 
non-financial sector firms in Jordan with 2011 data, found a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and the firm’s going-concern problem. Likewise, in 
the same Jordan economy, Zureigat (2015) used a sample of 339 non-financial sector 
firms from 2009 to 2011 and found a significant positive relationship between 
managerial ownership with the firm’s going-concern problem.  
To the point, based on the alignment of interest and entrenchment effect arguments, 
as well as the mixed findings from the previous studies, there has been found a need 
to introduce a moderating variable. Therefore, this study has investigated the 
moderating effect of the audit committee characteristics on the relations between 
managerial ownership and the going-concern in the Nigerian listed financial firms. 
Additionally, in this study, managerial ownership has been split into CEO and 
executive directors’ ownerships as an additional dimension to see the individual 
effects of each on the firm’s going-concern. Table 2.1 summarises the selected 






Table 2.1  
Summary of Selected Published Empirical Studies on the Managerial Ownership and Going-Concern Variables 
S/N Country Authors (Year) Sample Year of Study Going-Concern Variables Main Result 
1 China Gong and Li (2013) 27,069 observations  1993-2008  Earnings management  A negative relationship between CEO 
ownership and earnings management. 
2 China Gulzar and Wang (2011)   1009 firms 2002-2006 Earnings management  No significant relation between managerial 
ownership and earnings management. 
3 Egypt Elsayed (2007)  92 public limited firms  2000-2004 Profitability A significant positive relationship between 
executive director ownership and firm 
performance. 
4 Ghana Darko et al. (2016)  20 listed companies  2008-2012 Profitability Significant negatively between 
independent non-executive directors and 
firm performance  
5 Jordan Alzoubi (2016)  69 listed firms 
excluding finance 
sector 
2003 Earnings management  *Executive directors’ ownership can have 
an inverse effect on the company.  
6 Jordan Ramadan (2016)  77 Industrial firms 2000-2014 Earnings management  Managerial ownership relates inversely to 
earnings management practices  
7 Jordan Zureigat (2015) 339 firms after the 
exclusion of financial 
sectors 
2009-2011 Altman's Bankruptcy 
financial ratios of 1968 
A positive and significant relationship 
between managerial ownership with 
going-concern evaluation. 
8 Jordan Zureigat et al. (2014b) 113 firms excluding 2011 Altman's Bankruptcy A positive relationship between 





financial sectors financial ratios of 1968 evaluation. 
9 Malaysia Ali et al. (2008)  1001 Firms excluding 
finance industry 
2002-2003  Earnings management  *A negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and earning 
management. *Executive directors’ 
ownership is negatively and significantly 
associated with earnings management.  
10 Malaysia Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006)  
347 non-financial 
registered companies  
1996-2000 Profitability A significant negative relationship 
between executive directors ownership and 
financial performance. 
11 Malaysia Hashim and Devi (2008)  280 Non-financial 
companies  
2004 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality)  
A significant positive relationship between 
outside board ownership and earnings 
quality which habitually decreases 
earnings management  
12 Malaysia Hashim (2009)  277 nonfinancial 
companies after 
excluding financial and 
utility firms 
1998-2006 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality)  
*Ownership by the executive directors is 
significantly and negatively connected to 
the quality of earnings which 
automatically increases earnings 
management.  
13 Malaysia Iskandar et al. (2011) 56 companies listed 
with going-concern 




2004 Going concern audit 
opinion 
Equity ownership by the management 
investors forms internal mechanisms to 
improve the company financial 
performance. 
14 Malaysia Amran and Ahmad 
(2013)  
420 listed firms 
excluding financial 
companies 
2003-2007 Performance Managerial ownership relates significantly 
and inversely to the returns on assets 





15 Portugal Alves, (2012)  34 non-financial 
registered companies 
2002-2007  Earnings management  Earnings management is negatively related 
to managerial ownership.  
16 Taiwan Chou (2015)  1,156 non-financial 
firms observations 
2004-2007 Profitability Managerial ownership exercises a positive 
influence on company performance 
17 Taiwan Liu and Tsai (2015)  5,788 observations  2006-2010 Earnings management  CEO ownership has an insignificant 
positive relationship with earnings 
management. 
18 USA Beasley (1996)   75 fraud and 75 no-
fraud firms 
1980-1991 Earnings management  A significantly negative relationship 
between the possibility of earnings 
management and non-executive directors’ 
ownership.  
19 USA Bergrtresser and 
Philippon (2006)  
4,671 firm-year 
observations  
1993-2000 Earnings management  Positive relationship between CEO equity 
ownership and earnings management 






1982-1992 Profitability Significant positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and profitability 
21 USA Hazarika et al. (2012)  1,895 non-financial 
firms  
1992-2004 Earnings management  CEO ownership is significantly negative 
connected to earnings management.  
22 USA Ittonen (2011) 193 first time going-
concern audit reports 
issued for Russell 3000 
firms 
2002-2008 Going concern audit report  When managerial ownership is higher, the 
going-concern audit report ought to be less 






23 USA Jiang et al. (2010)  17,542 CEO  1993-2006 Earnings management  A positive relationship between CEO 
equity incentive and earnings 
management. 
24 USA Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005)  
 275 firms that 
announced 1,621 
forecasts in 1,274 firm-
years between  
1995-2000 Earnings management  A significant positive relationship between 
executive directors ownership and earning 
management  
25 USA Parker et al. (2005) 161 financially 
distressed firms 
1988-1996 Going concern modification 
report 
Going concern modifications are inversely 
associated with insider ownership. 
26 USA Velury and Jenkins 
(2006)  
4238 non-financial firm 
observations  
1992–1999  Earnings management  Higher managerial ownership is related to 
higher earnings management 
27 USA Zhang et al. (2008)  2,532 listed firms  1996-2001 Earnings management  A negative relationship between CEO 
equity ownership and earnings 
management. 
28 Nigeria Farouk and Hassan 
(2014)  
8 Listed chemical and 
paints firms  
2007-2011  Earnings management  A positive connection between managerial 
ownership and earnings management.  
29 Nigeria Isenmila and Afensimi 
(2012) 
a sample of 10 banks 2006-2010 Earnings management A significant positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings 
management measure by the discretionary 
accruals.  
30 Nigeria Omoye and Eriki (2014) 130 registered non-
financial companies  
2005-2010 Earnings management  No significant relationship between CEO 
shareholding and earnings management. 
31 Nigeria Adebiyi and Olowookere 
(2016)  
15 listed banks 2005-2013 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality) 
Discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality is positively 





32 Nigeria Imoleayo et al. (2017)  137 sampled companies  2013 Earnings management  A significant positive relationship between 
managerial ownership of companies in 






2.4.2 Previous Studies on the Non-executive directors’ ownership and the Firm’s 
Going-Concern 
Non-executive directors usually act to align the executives and the shareholders. 
Similarly, agency theorists claim that non-executive directors bring more 
transparency and accountability to management monitoring (Cho & Kim, 2007; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). Likewise, resource dependence theorists view non-executive 
directors as critical resource suppliers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, 
according to agency theorists, provided that the non-executive director's ownership 
rises, the non-executive directors’ interests are more cautiously united with the 
owners’ interests, thus, offering more feeling to improve earnings quality which in 
turn reduces the firms’ going-concern problems (Alzoubi, 2016).  
In agreement with the alignment of interest hypothesis that high non-executive 
directors’ ownership may reduce the firm’s going-concern problem, Beasley (1996) 
found that a high level of non-executive directors’ ownership helped in weakening 
the earnings management practices which in turn reduced a firm’s going-concern 
problem. Bhagat and Black (2001) found that non-executive directors were more 
active when they had substantial ownership and improved value for the firm. 
Likewise, in Malaysia, Ali et al. (2008) used panel data from 2002 to 2003 and found 
a significant negative relationship between the level of non-executive directors’ 
ownership and earnings management, hence, reducing the firm’s going-concern 
problem. Correspondingly, Hashim and Devi (2008), using 280 Malaysian non-
financial firms in 2004, found that non-executive directors’ ownership increased the 
quality of earnings and reduced the firm’s going-concern problem. Similarly, Hashim 





executive director ownership increased the quality of earnings and reduced the firm’s 
going-concern problem. 
Non-executive directors may not be familiar with some specific matters related to the 
firm's governance. Furthermore, some agency theorists claim that an information 
asymmetry between the executive and non-executive directors can weaken the non-
executives’ abilities to perform their monitoring and supervisory functions efficiently 
(Hooghiemstra &Van Manen, 2004). This is because sometimes non-executives are 
enforced to depend on information prepared by management. Consistent with this, 
some empirical studies have found that firms with a higher non-executive directors’ 
ownership are related to  lower firm performance. For instance, Alzoubi (2016), 
using 69 Jordanian listed firms, found that non-executive director ownership was 
unable to mitigate earnings management practices and the firm’s going-concern 
problem. This is because non-executive directors exercise lower effects regarding the 
demand for lower earnings management and the firm’s higher going-concern. 
Concisely, based on the alignment of interest and information asymmetry arguments, 
as well as the mixed findings from the previous studies, there has been found a need 
to introduce a moderating variable. Hence, this study has investigated the moderating 
effect of the audit committee characteristics on the relations between non-executive 
directors’ ownership and the going-concern in the Nigerian listed financial firms. 
Table 2.2 summarises the selected empirical findings of the non-executive directors’ 





Table 2.2  
Summary of Selected Published Empirical Studies on the Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership and Going-Concern Variables 
S/N Country Authors (Year) Sample Year of Study Going-Concern Variables Main Result 
1 Ghana 
Darko et al. 
(2016)  
20 listed companies  2008-2012 Profitability 
Significant negatively between independent non-executive 
directors and firm performance  
2 Jordan Alzoubi (2016)  
69 listed firms 
excluding finance 
sector 
2003 Earnings management  
Non-executive director shareholding on the board would 
exercise minor effects compared to other members of the 
board concerning the demand for lower earnings 
management. 




2002-2003  Earnings management  
A significant negative relationship between the level of non-
executive director shareholding and earnings management 
4 Malaysia 
Hashim and 





(Earnings Quality)  
A significant positive relationship between outside board 
ownership and earnings quality which habitually decreases 
earnings management  




and utility firms 
1998-2006 
Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality)  
Non-executive director shareholding is significantly and 
positively related to the quality of earnings which usually 
decreases earnings management  
6 USA Beasley (1996)  
 75 fraud and 75 
no-fraud firms 
1980-1991 Earnings management  
A significantly negative relationship between the possibility 




Black (2001)  
780 firms 1985-1995 Profitability 
Non-executive directors are more active when they have 





2.4.3 Previous Studies on the Block Ownership and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
Theoretically, there are two opposing hypotheses about the relationship between the 
block ownership and the firm’s going-concern. These two prevailing hypotheses are 
the monitoring argument (efficient-enhancing effect) and the entrenchment effect 
hypothesis (outright expropriation argument). The monitoring argument proponents 
claim that the existence of block ownership could alleviate the agency problem as the 
block shareholders have a greater incentive to monitor the management as they bear 
large losses of shares arising from the firm’s going-concern problems (Davis et al., 
1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; and Yeo et al., 2002).  
Accordingly, in line with the monitoring argument, some empirical studies found that 
block ownership reduced the firm’s going-concern problem by mitigating the 
earnings management practices and enhancing the firm’s performance. For example, 
Parker et al. (2005), using 161 financially distressed firms between 1988 and 1996, 
found that block holder ownership was negatively related with the firm’s going-
concern problem. 
Similarly, in line with the monitoring argument, some studies found that an increase 
in block ownership enhanced a firm’s performance and reduced the firm’s going-
concern problem. This is because the greater the stockholders’ stakes, the more 
motivated they are to monitor and protect their investments. For instance, Acero, 
Serrano, and Dimitropoulos (2017) found that an increase in the level of block 
ownership to a certain level had a positive effect on performance. Likewise, Ahmed 
and Hadi (2017) discovered that block ownership had a positive influence on a firm’s 
performance. Similarly, Shan and Gong (2017), using a sample of 288 Chinese listed 





improved the long-term firm performance. Moreover, Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) 
found a significant positive relationship between block ownership and firm 
performance. Furthermore, Ozili and Uadiale (2017) discovered that firms with high 
block ownership had high financial performance. 
In the same way, based on the monitoring argument, the existence of block 
ownership could restrain the management from earnings manipulations in the firms. 
Also, the previous studies suggested that block ownership can limit manipulative 
practices by devious managers. In line with this, Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 
(1997) found that block ownership may moderate the biased activities of corporate 
managers in regards to being involved in earnings management practices. 
Furthermore, Alves (2012) found that block ownership was negatively related to 
earnings management practices. Likewise, Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) found 
that block ownership was negatively related to earnings management practices. 
Similarly, Paik and Koh (2014), employing a sample of 1,255 firms from 2000 to 
2010, found that large shareholders played an internal monitoring role for the 
managers' earnings management. Equally, Ramadan (2016), using listed firms from 
2000 to 2014, found a negative relationship between block shareholders and earnings 
management.  
Correspondingly, in the Nigerian context, Usman and Yero (2012), using a sample of 
6 Nigerian listed conglomerates between 2005 to 2010, found a significant negative 
relationship between block ownership and earnings management. Similarly, Kurawa 
and Saheed (2014), in the Nigeria petroleum firms, established that block ownership 
had a significant negative relationship with earnings management. Also, Imoleayo et 
al. (2017), using 137 Nigerian firms, discovered a significant negative relationship 





On the other hand, the entrenchment effect hypothesis (outright expropriation 
argument) proponents claim that block shareholders can redirect or consume the 
firm’s resources in ways that benefit themselves, but which may not be in the best 
interests of the other owners (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; and 
Morck et al., 1988). This is because the block shareholders have more information 
about the firm and higher control rights (Fitri, Irianto, & Mardiati, 2017). Consistent 
with this, some empirical studies have provided evidence supporting the 
entrenchment effect prediction that high block ownership will lead to the firm’s 
higher going-concern problems. For instance, Park, Chae, and Cho (2016) found that 
block ownership negatively affected firm performance.  
Likewise, Gulzar and Wang (2011), using 1009 Chinese listed firms from 2002 to 
2006, found a positive relationship between block ownership and earnings 
management practice. Likewise, using panel regression, Farooq and El Jai (2012) 
used 71 Moroccan listed firms from 2004 to 2007 and found a positive relationship 
between block ownership and earnings management. As well, Waweru and Riro 
(2013), using 37 Kenya registered firms from 2006 to 2010, found that block 
ownership had a positive effect on the earnings management incidences. Moreover, 
Bao and Lewellyn (2017) found that block ownership was positively related to 
earnings management. Similarly, Isenmila and Afensimi (2012), using Nigerian 
banks from 2006 to 2010, found a significant positive relationship between block 
shareholders and earnings management practices.  
In a nutshell, the findings of previous studies are mixed. One group is of the view 
that block ownership is negatively related with the firm’s going-concern problems, 
which is in line with the efficient-enhancing effect hypothesis. Whereas, another 





concern problems, which is in line with the outright expropriation argument. Based 
on these inconclusive results, the is a need for further research. Thus, this study has 
investigated the moderating effect of the audit committee characteristics on the 
relation between block ownership and the going-concern in the Nigerian listed 
financial firms. Furthermore, Table 2.3 summarises the selected empirical findings of 





Table 2.3  
Summary of Selected Published Empirical Studies on the Block Ownership and Firm Going-Concern Variables 








Meca (2014)  
435 non-financial 
companies 
2006–2009 Earnings management  Block shareholders are negatively 
related with earnings management 
2 China Gulzar and Wang (2011)   1009 firms 2002-2006 Earnings management  A positive relationship between block 
ownership and earnings management 
practice  
3 Jordan Ramadan (2016)  77 Industrial firms 2000-2014 Earnings management  A negative relationship between block 
shareholders and earnings management. 
4 Kenya  Waweru and Riro (2013)  37 registered firms 2006-2010 Earnings management  Block ownership has a positive effect 
on the incidence of earnings 
management 
5 Korea Paik and Koh (2014)  1,255 firms-year 
observation excluding 
financial companies 
 2000-2010 Earnings management Managers are less expected to avoid 
negative earnings surprises as block 
ownership increases which imply that 
large shareholders play an internal 
monitoring role for managers' earnings 
management.  
6 Morocco Farooq and El Jai (2012)  71 non-financial firms 2004-2007 Earnings management  A positive relationship between block 
ownership and earnings management  
7 Portugal Alves, (2012)  34 non-financial registered 
companies 
2002-2007  Earnings management  Block ownership is negatively related 





8 Tunisia Klai and Omri (2011)  22 non-financial listed firms  1997–2007 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality) 
A negative correlation between block 
holders and quality of financial 
reporting. 
9 USA Parker et al. (2005) 161 financially distressed 
firms 
1988-1996 Going concern 
modification report 
Going concern modifications are 
inversely associated with block 
ownership and insider ownership. 





1982-1992 Profitability Significant positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and 
profitability  
11 Nigeria Kurawa and Saheed 
(2014)  
6 petroleum companies  2003-2012 Earnings management  Ownership concentration found to be 
significantly negative connected to 
earnings management.  
12 Nigeria Isenmila and Afensimi 
(2012) 
A sample of 10 banks 2006-2010 Earnings management A significant positive relationship 
between block shareholders and 
earnings management practices 
13 Nigeria Farouk and Hassan (2014)  8 Listed chemical and 
paints firms  
2007-2011  Earnings management  A positive connection between 
managerial ownership and earnings 
management. 
14 Nigeria Usman and Yero (2012) 6 listed conglomerate firms  2005-2010 Earnings management  A significant negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and 
earnings management. 
15 Nigeria Imoleayo et al. (2017)  137 sampled companies  2013 Earnings management  A significant negative relationship 
between block ownership and earnings 






2.4.4 Previous Studies on the Foreign Ownership and the Firm’s Going-
Concern 
Conflicting prior research reveals that foreign ownership may either increase or 
decrease the firm’s going-concern. This is generally explained by two conflicting 
hypotheses, which are the active monitoring hypothesis and the transient hypothesis 
supported by the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
Firstly, the active monitoring hypothesis is where foreign investors play an effective 
monitoring role (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jusoh, 2015; and Park et al., 2016). 
According to the active monitoring hypothesis, foreign shareholders have more 
skills, knowledge, and experience than domestic shareholders to monitor firm 
performance and going-concern. Unlike domestic shareholders, foreign shareholders 
are independent in monitoring the firms’ reporting practices. Therefore, it is expected 
that a higher level of foreign ownership is related to better firm performance and 
going-concern.  
Consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis, Zureigat et al. (2014a), using a 
sample of 113 Jordanian non-financial firms for the year 2011, found a negative 
relationship between foreign shareholding and the firm’s going-concern problem. 
Furthermore, in line with the agency theory, Aydin et al. (2007) found a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and a firm's performance. Likewise, Ogega 
(2014), in Kenya, found a positive relationship between foreign shareholding and the 
profitability of commercial banks. Moreover, Jusoh (2015), using 730 Malaysian 
public listed firms, found that foreign ownership had a positive relationship with firm 
performance. Similarly, Manna et al. (2016), using Indian listed firms from 2009 to 





Furthermore, Vural-Yavas and Erdogan (2016), using 256 Turkish firms from 2009-
2014, found that foreign ownership increased firm profitability. Likewise, Yasser and 
Al Mamun (2017) found that the proportion of the foreign ownership was positively 
related to firm performance.  
Furthermore, active monitoring hypothesis proponents claim that foreign 
shareholders are sophisticated and clever in monitoring and detecting the activities of 
the managers. In line with that, Ali, Salleh, and Hassan (2008) found a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and earnings management in Malaysia. In 
the same way, Guo et al. (2015), using Japanese firms from 2004 to 2008, found a 
negative relationship between foreign shareholding and earnings management. 
Similarly, Alzoubi (2016), using a sample of 69 Jordanian listed firms, found a 
negative relationship between foreign shareholding and earnings management.  
However, alternatively, the transient investment hypothesis postulates that foreign 
investments are short-term in nature and the investors do not have adequate 
incentives to become effective in monitoring the firms’ activities. Furthermore, the 
information asymmetry hypothesis postulates that foreign shareholders lack 
sufficient information to efficiently monitor the firm’s going-concern due to cultural, 
institutional, and geographical barriers. Therefore, it is, alternatively, expected that a 
higher level of foreign ownership is associated with poorer firm performance and 
going-concern. Consistent with the transient investment hypothesis and information 
asymmetry hypothesis, Zureigat (2015), using a sample of 339 Jordanian non-
financial firms from 2009 to 2011, found a positive and significant relationship 





Correspondingly, the transient investor hypothesis suggests that foreign shareholders 
are transient investors that lack substantial incentives to monitor firm management. 
Foreign shareholders are likely to sell out their shares in the absence of current 
profits as an alternative to monitoring management. Consistent with that, Aksu, 
Muradoglu, and Cetin (2013), using Turkish firms, found a positive relationship 
between foreign ownership and earnings management as foreign ownership cannot 
alleviate earnings management practices. Moreover, Paik and Koh (2014), using a 
sample of 1,255 Korean firms from 2000 to 2010, found a significant positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and earnings management practices. 
Similarly, Guo and Ma (2015), using 1,176 Chinese firms between 2004 and 2010, 
found a positive relationship between foreign shareholding and earnings 
management.  
It has been shown that the findings of previous studies on the relationship between 
foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern revealed mixed results. One group is 
in line with active monitoring hypothesis claims that foreign ownership is positively 
related with the firm’s going-concern. Whereas, another group supports the transient 
and information asymmetry hypotheses that foreign ownership is negatively related 
to the firm’s going-concern. Based on these inconclusive results, there has been 
found a need to introduce a moderating variable. Consequently, this study has 
investigated the moderating effect of the audit committee characteristics on the 
relation between foreign ownership and the going-concern in the Nigerian listed 
financial firms. Moreover, Table 2.4 summarises the selected empirical findings of 





Table 2.4  
Summary of Selected Published Empirical Studies on the Foreign Ownership and Firm Going-Concern Variables 




1 China Guo and Ma (2015)  1,176 companies  2004-2010 Earnings management A positive relationship between foreign 
shareholding and earnings management.  
2 Japan Guo et al. (2015)  15,212 firm-year 
observations excluding all 
financial firms and utility 
firms  
2004-2008 Earnings management  A significant negative relationship between 
foreign shareholding and earnings 
management. 
3 Jordan Zureigat et al. 
(2014a) 
113 firms excluding 
financial sectors 
2011 Altman's Bankruptcy 
financial ratios of 1968 
A negative and non-significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and going-concern 
evaluation 
4 Jordan Zureigat (2015) 339 firms excluding 
financial sectors 
2009-2011 Altman's Bankruptcy 
financial ratios of 1968 
A positive and significant relationship between 
foreign ownership with going-concern 
evaluation.  
5 Jordan Alzoubi (2016)  69 listed firms excluding 
finance sector 
2003 Earnings management  A negative relationship between foreign 
shareholding and earnings management.  
6 Kenya Ogega (2014) 43 commercial banks 2009-2013 Profitability A strong positive relationship between foreign 
shareholding and the profitability of 
commercial banks. 
7 Korea Paik and Koh (2014)  1,255 firms-year 
observation excluding 
financial companies 
 2000-2010 Earnings management A significant positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and earnings management 
through corporate managers’ behaviours to 





8 Malaysia Ali et al. (2008)  1001 firms excluding 
finance industry 
2002-2003  Earnings management  A negative relationship between foreign 
ownership and discretionary accruals. 
9 Tunisia Klai and Omri 
(2011)  
22 non-financial listed 
firms  
1997–2007 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality) 
A negative correlation between foreign 
shareholding and quality of financial reporting. 
10 Turkey Aydin et al. (2007)  42 firms with foreign 
ownership and 259 
domestic corporations 
2003-2004 Profitability A positive correlation between foreign 
shareholding and a business's performance. 
The study claimed that foreign shareholding 
increases company's profitability higher than 
locally owned.  
11 Nigeria Adebiyi and 
Olowookere (2016)  
15 listed banks 2005-2013 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality) 
Discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial 







2.4.5 Previous Studies on the Institutional Ownership and the Firm’s Going-
Concern 
There are two opposing views concerning the relationship between institutional 
ownership and the firm’s going-concern determinants (Bushee, 2001; Lemma, 
Negash, Mlilo, & Lulseged, 2018). These are the active monitoring (efficient 
monitoring) hypothesis and the hands-off passivity (transient) hypothesis. 
The active monitoring hypothesis postulates a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern by claiming that institutions 
have sufficient capabilities, expertise, and resources to monitor the managements’ 
attitudes (Liu, Chung, Sul, & Wang, 2017; Park et al., 2016; and Pillai & Al-
Malkawi, 2017). The agency theory suggests that institutional investors can provide 
active monitoring that is difficult for smaller, more passive or less-informed 
investors (Almazan et al. 2005).  
Consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis, Iskandar et al. (2011) proved that 
the relationship between institutional shareholding and the firm’s going-concern 
problem is significant and negative. Also, Zureigat et al. (2014b), using 113 
Jordanian non-financial firms for the year 2011, established a negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern problem. Similarly, 
Zureigat (2015), using 339 Jordanian non-financial firms from 2009 to 2011, found a 
negative relationship between institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern 
problem.  
Moreover, Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehranian (2007) confirmed a significant 
relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Also, Agyei 





institutional ownership was positively related to high firm performance. Likewise, 
Manna et al. (2016), using 12 listed Indian firms from 2009 to 2013, found that 
institutional ownership had a positive relationship with the firm’s performance. 
Furthermore, Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) found that the institutional ownership 
was positively related to firm performance.  
Moreover, the literature on institutional monitoring also suggests that institutional 
investors typically constrain corporate earnings management. For example, Mitra and 
Cready (2005) reported that institutional ownership was negatively related to the 
earnings management practice. Moreover, Cornett et al. (2007) reported that 
institutional ownership was negatively related to the earnings management practices. 
So, also, Yang et al. (2009), using 613 firms for the 2001 to 2003 period, found that 
institutional ownership had a negative relationship with earnings management. 
The other view contends that institutional investors tend to be short-term oriented, 
myopic, or transient with an excessive focus on current rather than long-term 
earnings in determining stock prices. The hands-off passivity (transient) hypothesis 
claims that the ever-increasing share of ownership by institutional investors in 
publicly traded firms is making an exit from the poorly performing portfolio.  
In line with the passive hands-off assumption, which suggests that institutional 
investors may increase managerial incentives to engage in earnings management, 
some empirical studies, such as Lin & Manowan (2011), found a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management practices. 
Likewise, Alves (2012), using a sample of 34 non-financial listed Portuguese firms 
from 2002 to 2007, found a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 





relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management. Similarly, 
Emamgholipour & Mansourinia (2013) found that institutional investors had a 
significant role in earnings management. Moreover, Lemma et al. (2018), using data 
from non-financial firms in 41 countries from 1995 to 2016, found that institutional 
ownership increased earnings management practices. 
Concisely, given these opposing hypotheses and findings regarding the relationship 
between institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern, there has been found a 
need to introduce a variable that can strengthen or weaken this relationship. 
Therefore, this study has investigated the moderating effect of the audit committee 
characteristics on the relation between institutional ownership and the going-concern 
in the Nigerian listed financial firms. Moreover, Table 2.5 summarises the selected 





Table 2.5  
Summary of Selected Published Empirical Studies on the Institutional Ownership and Going-Concern Variables 




1 Iran Emamgholipour and 
Mansourinia (2013)  
140 firms 2006-2010 Earnings management  Institutional investors have a significant 
role in earning management. 
2 Jordan Zureigat et al. (2014b) 113 firms excluding 
financial sectors 
2011 Altman's Bankruptcy 
financial ratios of 1968 
A negative relationship is found with 
institutional ownership. 
3 Jordan Zureigat (2015) 339 firms after the 
exclusion of financial 
sectors 
2009-2011 Altman's Bankruptcy 
financial ratios of 1968 
A negative relationship between 
institutional ownership with going-concern 
evaluation. 
4 Kenya Ogega (2014) 43 commercial banks 2009-2013 Profitability Institutional ownership significantly affects 
the financial performance of Kenyan 
banks.  
5 Malaysia Iskandar et al. (2011) 56 companies listed 
with going-concern 
problems and 56 
companies without going-
concern problems. 
2004 Going concern audit 
opinion 
Equity ownership by the 
 institutional investors form external 
mechanisms 
to improve the company financial 
performance 
6 Malaysia Yang et al. (2009)  613 companies from 
construction, industrial 
products and 
consumer products sectors  
2001-2003 Earnings management  Institutional ownership variable has a 
negative relationship with earnings 






8 USA Geiger and Kumas 
(2016) 
650 firms receiving a 
going-concern modified 
audit report  
2002-2010 First-time going-concern 
modified audit report 
Institutional investors are surrounding first-
time going-concern modified audit reports. 
8 USA Cornett et al. (2007)  676 firm-years 
observations 
1993-2000 Profitability A significant relationship between a 
company’s operating cash flow returns and 
both the percentage of institutional 
shareholding and a number of institutional 
shareholders.  
9 USA Lin and Manowan (2012)  18,969 firm-years 
observations 
1996-2001 Earnings management  A significant positive relationship between 
institutional investors and discretionary 
accounting accruals 
10 Nigeria Isenmila and Afensimi 
(2012) 
A sample of 10 banks 2006-2010 Earnings management An insignificant positive relationship was 
also observed between institutional 
ownership and Earnings Management. 
11 Nigeria Adebiyi and Olowookere 
(2016)  
15 listed banks 2005-2013 Earnings management 
(Earnings Quality) 
Discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality relate negatively 






2.5 Previous Studies on the Audit Committee Characteristics as a Moderator 
Variable  
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), moderators are often introduced when the 
relationship between a predictor (independent variable) and a criterion (dependent 
variable) is unexpectedly weak or inconsistent. The moderator effect can strengthen 
or weaken a relationship, and it is even possible that the moderator effect can reverse 
that relationship (Fairchild & MacKinnon, 2009; Hayes, 2013; Judd & Kenny, 2010; 
Kenny, 2015; and Mitchell & Jolley, 2012). Likewise, several studies have been 
conducted on the issue of moderating governance issues globally (Abdullah & 
Ismail, 2016; Ahmad, Said, & Arsad, 2015; Bilal, Chen, & Komal, 2018; Liu, Qu, & 
Haman, 2018; and Nor & Ku Ismail, 2017).  
Sometimes, reviews of the previous literature have reported a lack of consensus 
regarding the relationship between ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern. 
Such inconclusive results have highlighted the need for introducing a moderator 
variable to understand the inconsistencies in these findings. Furthermore, prior 
researches have proven that the audit committee plays an effective role in enhancing 
the corporate governance standards. The audit committee role provides a means for 
the review of the firm’s processes for producing financial data and its internal control 
(Said et al., 2009). Thus, it is important to empirically examine the moderating 
effects of the audit committee characteristics because the audit committee is 
responsible for overseeing the quality of the financial reporting which affects the 
firm’s going-concern. 
The empirical evidence of the possibility that the audit committee characteristics 





can be seen from the previous studies that have investigated the moderating effects of 
the audit committee characteristics on different relationships. For example, Bukit and 
Iskandar (2009), using 155 Malaysian listed firms, examined the moderating effects 
of audit committee independence on the relationship between surplus free cash flow 
and earnings management. They found that audit committee independence supported 
firms with high surplus free cash flow to decrease earnings management practices. 
Besides that, in the United Kingdom’s economy, Sun, Salama, Hussainey, & 
Habbash (2010), using 245 UK non-financial firms, examined the moderating effects 
of audit committee meetings on the relationship between corporate environmental 
disclosure and earnings management. They found that Audit committee meetings 
positively affected the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and 
earnings management. 
Also, Sharma, Sharma, & Ananthanarayanan (2011) used 112 New Zealand listed 
firms to examine the moderating effects of audit committee best practices on the 
relationship between client importance and earnings management. They found that 
audit committee best practices moderated the relationship between client importance 
and earnings management. 
Moreover, Ismail and Kamarudin (2012) used 433 Malaysian non-financial listed 
firms to examine the moderating effects of audit committee financial expertise on the 
relationship between family firms and audit risks. They found that high audit 
committee financial expertise weakened the relationship between family firms and 
higher audit risks. Likewise, in the same Malaysian economy, Kamarudin, Ismail, 
and Samsuddin, (2012) used 455 non-financial listed firms to examine the 





and attendance rate) on the relationship between non-audit services and earnings 
quality. They found that a more effective audit committee moderated the relationship 
between the investors’ perceptions on non-audit services and earnings quality. 
Similarly, in Malaysia, Abdullah and Shukor (2017) used 395 non-financial listed 
firms to examine the moderating effects of audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, education, and meetings) on the relationship between voluntary risk 
management disclosure and firm performance. They found that audit committee 
characteristics did not have any moderating effect on the relationship between 
voluntary risk management disclosure and firm performance. 
Whilst, Al Daoud et al. (2015) used 58 Jordanian listed industrial firms to examine 
the moderating effects of audit committee existence on the relationship between non-
audit services and firm performance. They found that audit committee moderated the 
relationship between NAS and corporate performance. 
In the Nigerian economy, Badara and Saidin (2014) used five-point scale 
questionnaires in the North-West geopolitical zone’s local governments. They 
examined the moderating effects of audit committee effectiveness on the relationship 
between audit experience and internal audit effectiveness. And, they found that an 
effective audit committee moderated the relationship between audit experience and 
internal audit effectiveness. 
Similarly, Isa and Farouk (2018) used 15 listed Nigerian banks to examine the 
moderating effects of audit committee characteristics (size, composition, and 
meetings) on the relationship between board diversity and earnings management. 
They found that audit committee characteristics did not moderate the relationship 





Based on the above studies that attempted to investigate the moderating effect of 
audit committee characteristics, only the studies of Abdullah and Shukor (2017) and 
Isa and Farouk (2018) found that audit committee characteristics did not moderate 
the examined relationships. Furthermore, none of the above studies examined the 
moderating effect of audit committee characteristics on the relationship between 
ownership structure and  the firm’s going-concern variables. Hence, this study has 
tried to fill this gap. Table 2.6 summarises the selected empirical findings on the 





Table 2.6  
Summary of Published Empirical Studies on the Audit Committee as Moderator 
S/N Authors (Year) Country Sample 
Year of 
Study 




















Audit committee independence helps 
companies with high surplus free cash 
flow to reduce income-increasing 
earnings management practices. 













Audit committee meetings positively 
affect the relationship between corporate 
environmental disclosure and earnings 
management. 











Audit committee best practices 
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Family Firms Audit Risks 
High audit committee financial expertise 
weakens the relationship between family 
firms and higher audit risks. 
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Audit committee size, 
independence, meetings 
and attendance rate  
Non-audit services  Earnings Quality 
A more effective audit committee 
moderates the relationship between 
investors’ perceptions on non-audit 
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Audit committee does not have any 
moderating effect on the relationship 
between voluntary risk management 
disclosure and firm performance. 
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Al Daoud et al. 
(2015) 





Non-audit services  
Corporate 
Performance 
Audit committee moderates the 





sector firms  and corporate performance. 
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Effective audit committee moderated the 
relationship between audit experience 
and internal audit effectiveness. 
9 
Isa and Farouk 
(2018) 
Nigeria 15 listed banks 2008-2015 
Audit committee size, 
composition and 
meetings 
Board diversity  
Earnings 
Management 
Audit committee characteristics do no 
moderates the relationship between all 









2.6 Previous Studies on the Control Variables  
In this study, three control variables were included based on the review of the prior 
literature; because, the firm’s going-concern may be affected by both internal and 
external factors other than ownership structure and audit committee characteristics. 
These variables included firm size, loss, and asset tangibility. 
2.6.1 Previous Studies on the Firm’s Size 
Firm size is one of the firm attributes that vary systematically across enterprises, and 
it is often measured as a natural logarithm of the total assets (Azzali & Mazza, 2018; 
Connelly, Limpaphayom, & Sullivan, 2018; Shan & Gong, 2017; and Waweru & 
Prot, 2018).  
Some researchers expected that firm size had a positive relationship with financial 
reporting quality, leverage, earnings quality, and performance (Ahmad et al., 2015). 
Thus, affecting the firm’s going-concern positively. This is because bigger firms 
depend on external resources to finance their operations. Therefore, they have more 
incentives for revealing more information to gain investors’ confidence concerning 
their capabilities to remain in business. Likewise, consistent with the resource 
dependence theory, larger firms could, habitually, avoid distress. This is because they 
have more resources that can help them survive. Furthermore, it has been expected 
that large firms would have fewer earnings manipulations (Araújo, Lustosa, & 
Dantas, 2018; Dechow & Dichev, 2002). Whilst, small financial firms are more 
likely to have internal control deficiencies, hence, having more of a tendency to 







Empirically, some researchers have claimed that the larger the firm size, the less will 
be the earnings manipulation and thus, the higher the firm performance and going-
concern will be. In line with this positive argument, Shumway (2001), using USA 
firms from 1962 to 1992, found that bigger firms had fewer bankruptcy problems. 
Moreover, Ahmad et al. (2015), using 916 Malaysian companies, found that firm size 
positively increased firm performance. Likewise, Bhattarai (2016) found that firm 
performance was significantly positively associated with firm size. Moreover, Nor & 
Ku Ismail (2017), using 300 Malaysian non-financial listed firms in 2013, found that 
firm size had a positive relationship with firm performance. Likewise, Shan and 
Gong (2017) used 288 Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2011 and found that firm 
size had a positive relationship with firm performance. Also, Connelly et al. (2018) 
showed that there was a strong relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
Similarly, Sridharan and Joshi (2018) found that firm size had a significant impact on 
firm performance.  
Moreover, Liu et al. (2017), using Korean listed firms, found that firm size was 
negatively related to abnormal discretionary accruals. Also, Azzali & Mazza (2018). 
using 895 private Italian firms from 2010 to 2014, found that firm size was 
negatively related to abnormal accruals. Equally, Lemma et al. (2018) found that 
firm size was negatively related to earnings management using the non-financial 
firms of 41 countries for the period of 1995–2016. Similarly, Mindzak & Zeng 
(2018), using a sample of 165 Canadian listed firms from 2010 to 2015, found that 
firm size had a negative relationship with discretionary accruals. Likewise, Waweru 
and Prot (2018), using Kenyan and Tanzanian firms, found that firm size was 







Fedhila, and El Gaied (2018), using Tunisian commercial banks, found that firm size 
was negatively related to discretionary accruals.  
On the other hand, there have been some arguments that large firms may likely face 
higher agency problems and small firms may face lower agency problems (Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999; Chen, Elder, & Hsieh, 2007). This is in line with the 1small firm effect 
theory. Consistent with this, Jusoh (2015), using 730 Malaysian companies, found 
that firm size negatively increased firm performance. Similarly, Zona, Gomez-Mejia, 
and Withers (2015), using 145 Italian companies, provided support that firm size 
negatively increased firm performance. So, also, Yasser and Al Mamun (2017), using 
Pakistani listed firms, found that firm size had a negative effect on firm performance.  
Likewise, Ding, Li, and Wu (2018), using privately held firms operating in Mainland 
China between 1998 and 2012, found that firm size negatively increased firm 
performance. Similarly, Liu et al. (2018), using Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 
2016, found that firm size negatively increased firm performance. Moreover, Dou, 
Ryan, and Zou (2018) and Tran, Hassan, and Houston (2018) found that firm size 
had a positive relationship with a discretionary loan-loss provision in the US banking 
industry. 
Based on the above studies, it can be concluded that firm size may likely have a 
positive or negative relationship with the firm’s going-concern. 
                                                     
1is a theory that holds that smaller firms, or those companies with a small market capitalisation, 








2.6.2 Previous Studies on Loss-Loss 
The general purpose of every business is to make a profit and maximise the 
shareholders’ wealth. Profitability measures the firm’s profits and helps to measure, 
relatively, its success or failure (Evans, 2017). Moreover, loss-making leads to the 
firm’s going-concern problem as it leads to low retained earnings (Davidson and 
Dutia, 1991). It is also normally believed that frequent losses carried forward affect 
the future income negatively. It, as well, affects the overall performance and going-
concern in a harmful way. This is because firms that have a net loss do not 
automatically go bankrupt since they may have an option to use retained earnings or 
loans to stay in business. However, this approach is only short-term, as a business 
without profits cannot endure for a long period of time. 
Moreover, it is argued that managers perceive that their rewards for running a firm 
depend on their reported earnings. Hence, it is believed that the management of the 
firm with losses tends to engage in earnings management to evade the revelation of 
negative earnings. In line with this, Velury and Jenkins (2006) concluded that firms 
with losses take an elongated period to report their earnings.  
Correspondingly, some empirical studies have shown that loss has a negative impact 
on the firm’s going-concern determinants. For instance, Doyle et al. (2007) found 
that poorly-performing firms were more likely to use accounting discretion to boost 
income. Likewise, Park et al. (2016) found that loss had a negative impact on total 
investments. So, also, Ding et al. (2018), using privately held firms operating in 








Furthermore, Ben‐Nasr et al. (2012) found that firms with negative income had 
greater abnormal accruals. Likewise, Azzali & Mazza (2018), using 895 private 
Italian firms between 2010 and 2014, found that firm size was positively related to 
abnormal accruals. Similarly, Tran et al. (2018) found that loss had a positive 
relationship with a discretionary loan-loss provision in the US banking industry. 
2.6.3 Previous Studies on Asset Tangibility 
Asset tangibility refers to the degree to which the firm is financed by its fixed assets 
(Ansari & Gowda, 2017). Asset tangibility is also considered related to the firm’s 
going-concern. This is because that, when the firm has a higher tangible asset, it will 
have less bankruptcy risk challenges and is more flexible in making investment 
decisions. Moreover, the tangibility of an asset is one of the main determinants of the 
firm’s going-concern. This is because, it could be used as collateral as the higher the 
proportion of tangible assets, the lower the creditor’s risk and, in turn, the higher the 
value of the assets in the event of financial distress, bankruptcy or liquidation.  
Furthermore, agency theorists view that tangible assets are easily monitored and tend 
to lessen the agency conflicts between the shareholders and the creditors in the event 
of bankruptcy. Consistent with this agency theory argument, Campello (2007) found 
a positive relation between firm tangibility asset ratio and firm performance. 
Similarly, Pouraghajan, Malekian, Emamgholipour, Lotfollahpour, and Bagheri 
(2012) found a significant positive relationship between asset tangibility ratio and 
financial performance. Likewise, Dada and Ghazali (2016) found that tangible assets 
had a positive and significant relationship with firm performance. Moreover, Park et 







Conversely, the liquidity coefficient argument claims that current assets offer 
opportunities for more profits for the firms. In line with that, Vatavu (2015), using 
Romanian listed firms showed that asset tangibility had a negative and significant 
relationship with firm performance. Likewise, Bhattarai (2016) found that firm 
performance was significantly and negatively associated with asset tangibility. 
Similarly, Ansari and Gowda (2017) showed that the profitability of Indian listed oil 
and gas firms decreased as asset tangibility increased. 
2.7 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Enforcement of corporate governance is more of a self-regulatory work than 
constitutional patronage in Nigeria, and globally, as a huge number of institutional 
shareholders bring force to bear upon corporations to develop corporate governance. 
It has commonly been debated that, in this matter, voluntary compliance ought to be 
commended, and wherever it turns out to be essential and applicable, suitable 
sanctions must be useful. This is the situation embraced by the SEC and Corporate 
CAC in the execution of an agreement with the corporate governance code of best 
practices in Nigeria. The importance of a code of corporate governance in Nigeria 
can be traced to 1990 when the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) was 
promulgated. 
2.7.1 Company and Allied Matters Act 1990 
It is essential to specify that the CAMA 1990 succeeded the “Companies Act 1968” 
as the main act regulating Nigerian companies. The concept of corporate governance 







provisions that are essential to the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. It has 
made provisions relevant to accounting in addition to auditing principles, equity 
shareholding publicity, minority ownership privileges, and fairness amongst 
shareholders (CAMA, 1990). 
In a similar respect, the major structures of the CAMA involve the organisation of 
the directors’ duties as provided by Sections 279, 280, 282, and 283. The sections 
provide that a director of a corporation is in a fiduciary relationship with the 
corporation and that the director’s interest must not clash with that of the company 
(CAMA, 1990). Likewise, sections 342 and 345 of the Act orders additional 
responsibilities for the directors, which comprise the provision of the annual report of 
account, which shall contain reports of the auditors and directors, as well as the 
statement of the accounting policies (CAMA, 1990). 
Nevertheless, shortly after the promulgation of the CAMA in 1990, the corporate 
collapse, universally, brought the theme of corporate governance to the forefront. 
Consequently, various countries started revising the practice of corporate governance 
in their respective nations. This steered too many countries to produce their own 
code of corporate governance to tackle the new matters that remained insufficiently 
and implicitly enclosed in the company laws in which Nigeria is not an exception 
(Marshall, 2015). 
2.7.2 Banks and Other Financial Institutions Acts (BOFIA) 1991  
In Nigeria, the legal framework that govern the financial institutions is the Banks, 







1998, 1999, and 2002). The Nigerian government has initiated a strong deregulation 
of the financial sector since 1986 and since then, Nigerian banks have continued to 
experience speedy development, specifically regarding the number of firms, along 
with improvements of the products in the sector. Meanwhile, other financial 
companies are charged with the duty of offering an equidistant role within the 
financial system. These companies comprise insurance firms, such as life or non-life, 
in addition to those participating in both activities as well as reinsurance businesses.  
Section 9 (1) of the BOFIA 1991 requires that all banks shall, occasionally, 
determine the minimum paid-up share capital condition of each type of bank 
registered under this Act. Furthermore, Section 9 (2) of the BOFIA 1991 provides 
that, any failure to conform with the requirements of this section shall be grounds for 
the withdrawal of any licence allotted pursuant to the provisions of this Act or any 
other Act repealed by it. 
Section 10 of the BOFIA 1991 provides that the stockholder’s voting rights be 
relative to the equity holdings. Notwithstanding the provisions of the CAMA 1990 or 
any agreement or contract, the voting rights of each stockholder in a bank shall be 
proportional to his/her contribution to the paid-up bank equity capital. 
Section 13 (1) provides that, a bank shall always maintain capital funds unimpaired 
by losses, in such proportion to the entirety or some of the assets or to the total or 
some of the liabilities or to both such assets and liabilities of the bank and its entire 







Shockingly, the BOFIA 1991 did not make any provision related to the audit 
committee despite the pronouncement of such by the CAMA 1990. Meanwhile, the 
Act ignores most of the ownership structure issues as well. However, the Act 
discussed the operations of foreign banks in Nigeria in Section 8 which requires the 
authorisation of the CBN for a foreign bank to operate outlet offices or representative 
branch offices in Nigeria. 
2.7.3 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
in Nigeria 2003 
The Bankers' Committee of Nigeria issued the first code of corporate governance in 
Nigeria as a code of corporate governance for the Nigerian financial institutions. This 
Code was a reaction to the Nigerian financial crisis before the 2000s. Poor corporate 
governance was considered the key issue of concern that led to the financial 
institution's crisis during that period (Marshall, 2015). Even though a voluntary 
organisation issued the code, it addresses the key matters of corporate governance 
practices regarding the board of directors’ matters, and it split-up the chairperson and 
chief executive officer (CEO) duties. It covers other issues like directors’ 
remunerations, board performance evaluations, risk management assessments, and 
provision of the audit committee. 
2.7.4 Code of Corporate Governance for Companies Registered on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange 2003  
This code took effect in 2003 and has been applied, to all listed firms in Nigeria. It 







which include: restoring the reliability of financial reports and constrains accounting 
scandals and business failures (SEC, 2003). 
Because of the rapid development of the business environment coupled with the 
high-profile corporate scandals globally, most of the provisions of the Code are 
insufficient to handle the many corporate challenges and new developments. The 
Nigerian SEC has mades no effort to improve its existing code to handle these 
challenges and developments (Marshall, 2015). This SEC failure has offered the 
opportunity to other regulators, such as the CBN, National Pension Commission 
(PENCOM), National Insurance Commission (NAICOM), and Nigerian 
Communication Commission (NCC), to produce different codes of corporate 
governance to address the corporate challenges pertaining to their respective 
mandates (Marshall, 2015). 
2.7.5 Code of Corporate Governance for the Bank Post-Consolidation in 2006 
The CBN acknowledged the significant weakness of corporate governance in 
Nigerian banks in addition to the possible challenges for the 2006 Nigerian bank 
recapitalisation. The code has made relevant provisions to tackle the relationships 
between the directors, poor risk management systems, accounting systems and 
records, insider-related lending, poor audit committee systems, poor operational and 
financial controls, and the insufficient information disclosure (CBN, 2006). To tackle 
these issues, in 2006, the CBN issued the code, which mandates the entirety of the 







This code has addressed the CEO duality issue by mandating that no person or 
related party should serve the role of the Chairman and the CEO of the banks at the 
same time (CBN, 2006). It also requests for the establishment of the remuneration 
committee with exclusive memberships of non-executive directors. It should be 
responsible for the determination of the remunerations for the directors. It should 
also determine the remunerations for the non-executive directors, which should be 
restricted to the directors’ fees and sitting allowances, as well as the compensation of 
travel and accommodation on an official trip only (CBN, 2006). It also compels all 
banks to observe the current code of conduct for bank directors strictly. Additional 
notable requirements concerning the board are the formation of boards committees, 
in which the board is compelled to constitute at least audit, credit, and risk 
management committees (CBN, 2006). 
Similarly, the CBN 2006 code imposes that full disclosure of related parties’ 
transactions or interests involving any board member should be made to the CBN. It 
additionally demands the bank’s CEOs as well as the bank's chief financial officers 
to certify every official document submitted to the CBN. It requests that all financial 
information and results of operations of the bank should be fairly represented in the 
financial statements in all material respects. additionally, the code instructs that any 
unfaithful submission will attract severe penalties besides the CEO’s suspension for 
6 months for the first occasion, and dismissal as well as boycott for the second 
instance (CBN, 2006). It also requests the setting up of an internal audit unit with 
staff members who are independent, competent, and full of integrity. Lastly, the 
CBN 2006 code requires that the external auditors of the banks should maintain an 







2.7.6 Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators 2008  
After the effective reforms in the Nigerian pension sector in 2004, which encouraged 
the participation of only private firms in pension trust fund management. The 
PENCOM issued the code of corporate governance for licensed operators in 2008. 
The PENCOM 2008 Code set up guidelines to monitor both the retirement fund 
custodians and the pension administrators on the structures and procedures of the 
utilisation of the fund. It has sketched the benchmark for corporate governance in the 
pension sector, which is intended to boost financial performance and improve the 
market integrity by means of providing incentives for pension systems with a view to 
making a positive impact on the participants that will eventually boost their 
confidence (PENCOM, 2008).  
The PENCOM Code 2008, as well, makes provisions about CEO duality and board 
composition by requesting that the starring roles of the firm’s Chairman and the CEO 
shall be separated. Moreover, the total number of non-executive directors, omitting 
the Chairman, shall always be, at least, equal to the number of executive directors of 
the board. It also necessitates that the Board must have at least 1 independent director 
(PENCOM, 2008). It orders the board to meet a minimum of 1 time each quarter of 
the fiscal year and should provide a rigorous yearly appraisal of its performance, 
different directors’ performances, and its committees. It imposes that the board must 
report on the directors’ remunerations, annually, to the shareholders. It requires the 
board to inaugurate the Investment Strategy Committee, the Nominating Committee, 







Similarly, the PENCOM Code 2008 prohibits any transaction between the Pension 
Fund Custodians as well as the Pension Fund Administrators with which it decides to 
transact. Lastly, it orders the Pension Fund Custodians as well as the Pension Fund 
Administrators to insert a testimony on their extent of compliance with the 
PENCOM code of corporate governance in its annual report and on its website 
(PENCOM, 2008). 
2.7.7 Code of Good Corporate Governance for the Insurance Industry 2009  
The global meltdown of 2008 necessitated the issuance of the code of corporate 
governance for the Nigerian Insurance Industry by the NAICOM in 2009. The Code 
is compulsory for the entirety of the registered companies in Nigeria. The issuance of 
the 2009 NAICOM Code is an attempt to restore and sustain the diminishing 
confidence of stakeholders in the insurance sector (NAICOM, 2009).  
The 2009 NAICOM Code has made provisions related to the board’ and 
responsibilities; adequate exercise of shareholders’ rights, as well as transparency 
and disclosure (NAICOM, 2009). It demands the separation of the Chairman’s 
position from that of the CEO. It also orders that there should be at least 7 and at 
most 15 members on the board of directors. In addition, the board must be comprised 
of both executives as well as non-executive directors in which at least 1 should be 
independent (NAICOM, 2009). It, correspondingly, demands the establishment of 
audit and compliance, investment, an enterprise risk management, as well as 
financial and general-purpose committees, and the committees should be headed by 







The NAICOM Code 2008 requires that the appointment of an external auditor shall 
be for a maximum tenure of 5 years, subject to the approval of the NAICOM. The 
auditors’ performance shall be appraised periodically. It also requires the formation 
of an internal audit unit answerable audit committee and that an Internal Auditor 
shall confirm every annual report and a copy must be sent to the NAICOM within 3 
months, which, as well, the auditor of the company must confirm and report 
(NAICOM, 2009).  
2.7.8 Revised Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria 
2011 
After almost 8 years from the issuance of its first code of corporate governance, the 
SEC issued the SEC 2011 Code, which applies, to all publicly registered firms and 
companies pursuing to raise capital from the NSE, and which shall conform to the 
code. The code is voluntary, and in the event of a conflict between the code and the 
codes issued by other regulators, the code with a stronger requirement shall prevail 
(SEC, 2011).  
The SEC 2011 Code demands the board of a company to meet at least 1 time in 
every 3 months and that it should develop a well-defined and documented, as well as 
transparent process for the selection of the board members. In addition, it provides 
that the board should carry out a performance assessment of the board, committees, 
and individual directors, including the chairperson, annually. It also forbids the board 
from having any related persons on the board at a time. Similarly, it bans whichever 
type of insider trading as may be prescribed by any law or standard as insider 







Likewise, the code requires the board of directors to institute committees for 
governance/remuneration and risk management along with an audit committee. It, as 
well, permits the Board to inaugurate supplementary committees that will support the 
board in discharging its obligations. It also calls for the establishment of an effective 
risk-based internal audit unit.  
It encourages the companies to establish a well-known whistle-blowing scheme for 
all stakeholders. It demands firms to rotate their external auditors to maintain the 
integrity of the audit exercise and assert audit objectivity. It gives room for the 
shareholders to have a shareholder association allowing them to have meetings at a 
provided venue. It calls for investors of public firms to perform a vital part in good 
corporate governance. Specifically, the institutional shareholders and block holders 
must strive for a positive impact on the corporate governance compliance in their 
respective firms.  
The SEC Code 2011 requests that firms should embark on improving disclosure 
beyond the constitutional requirements of the CAMA. It also imposes that the board 
must make sure that they present risk management reports in the annual report of 
their respective companies. Lastly, it requests that a firm present a statement of 
business practices as well as a code of ethics as part of the corporate governance 
mechanism of the company (SEC, 2011). 
2.7.9 Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Companies in Nigeria 2014  
To match with the dynamic environment of the capital market coupled with various 







corporate governance of 2011 to replicate the global best practices, which came into 
effect in 2014, as the code of corporate governance for Public Companies (SEC, 
2014).  
The key upgrade that happened is that the compliance with the code is no longer 
voluntary, but rather mandatory for all listed public firms. It imposes the use of 
sanctions and punishments for failure to abide by the code. The code still retains all 
the provisions of the SEC 2011. 
2.7.10 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in 
Nigeria and Guidelines for Whistle-Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry 
2014  
The 2008 universal financial meltdown uncovered various flaws in controlling the 
activities of businesses worldwide. Specifically, in Nigeria, the code of practice set 
up as exactly established was found to be insufficient to address the problem (CBN, 
2014). In the Nigerian banks, the banking scrutiny and inspection jointly combined 
by the panel of the CBN and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 
discovered several corporate misuses which the existing corporate governance codes 
failed to tackle, which necessitated the revision of the CBN 2006 Code (CBN, 2014). 
 The CBN 2014 revised code requires all banks and discount houses in Nigeria to 
submit compliance evidence with the current requirements of the reviewed code 
every 3 months. It requires external auditors to submit a supplemental report on the 
compliance to the CBN annually (CBN, 2014). The reviewed code restates the board 







must have at least 2 independent directors, whereas discount houses must have at 
least 1 independent director (CBN, 2014).  
The code requires the separation of the positions of CEO and the Chairman and that, 
it must not only be separated for an individual but also for an extended family, even 
in the subsidiaries of the bank. The code requires the effective implementation of the 
board’s risk management committee. The code outlines that the annual report shall 
contain the directors’ data and corporate governance, amongst others, as part of the 
minimum disclosure. It instructs that the board should be accountable for the 
appointment as well as the withdrawal of the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) on 
condition of the confirmation from the CBN.  
The revised code demands the mandatory instituting of a securities trading policy for 
the bank that shall encompass proper compliance values from all employees 
including the Directors to guarantee its proper implementation. The code has 
additionally specified that an internal evaluation mechanism should be established to 
check for compliance and efficiency. It, as well, requires all banks to form a code of 
conduct. In conclusion, the code has helped so much in strengthening the governance 
framework through the enhanced information disclosure, such as on the ownership 
structure, audit committee and the firm’s going-concern that benefits investors and 
other stakeholders. 
2.8 Audit Committee in the Nigerian Listed Financial Sector 
Considering the agency theory viewpoint, internal board committees, such as audit, 







conflicts (Abdullah, 2015). The committees are essential for checking the important 
corporation activities that are sensitive to the firm’s going-concern.  
In Nigeria, Section 359 (3&4) of the CAMA 1990 specifically mandates that all 
public companies should establish a statutory audit committee. Additionally, it is 
requested that all corporations should have a board audit committee along with the 
statutory audit committee (CBN, 2014; SEC, 2014; NAICOM, 2009). Therefore, 
most of the Nigerian financial institutions have dual audit committees, separately, the 
statutory audit committee (CAMA, 1990) and the board audit committee (CBN, 
2014; SEC, 2014; NAICOM, 2009). Equally, the SEC (2011) codes endorse that the 
Board of a company shall make sure that the audit committee is established in the 
manner specified by the CAMA 1990 and should be capable of discharging its 
statutory obligations effectively. As well, the CAMA 1990 and the SEC 2014 
requires that, in any case, no less than 1 member of the audit committee needs to be a 
person with financial knowledge. Likewise, all members of the committee should 
have basic financial literacy and should be knowledgeable in understanding financial 
statements (SEC, 2014). It is, as well, recommended that most of the board members 
of the audit committee shall be independent directors (SEC, 2014). 
Also, the SEC (2014) code requires that, other than its constitutional roles, the audit 
committee shall support in the overseeing of the reliability of the firm’s financial 
accounts, ensure compliance with legal and other statutory requirements, assess the 
qualifications and objectivity of the external auditor, appraise the performance of the 
firm’s internal audit function, and, in addition, that of the external auditors. 







the identification of substantial fraud threats in the company and ensure that adequate 
prevention, detection, and reporting measures are in place, which will protect the 
firm from receiving unexpected going-concern threats. 
Concerning the Nigerian financial institutions, the code of the Bankers' Committee of 
Nigeria (2003) requires banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria to establish 
an audit committee in accordance with the requirements of the provisions of the 
CAMA 1990. Moreover, it should serve as a formal and transparent engagement for 
considering the use of the financial reporting and internal control policies, and for 
preserving a proper association with the company's external auditors. Whereas, the 
Bankers' Committee of Nigeria (2003) Code requires the Boards of private limited 
liability financial institutions to inaugurate Audit committees comprising directors 
and shareholders. Likewise, the majority of such members should be non-executive. 
Moreover, they should be provided with terms of reference that are compressed 
evidently with its power and responsibilities. Moreover, the members of the audit 
committee must obtain proper training to guarantee a sufficient level of financial 
knowledge, as well, the members must have up-to-date, significant, and appropriate 
financial knowledge. 
Furthermore, the CBN 2006 has observed that there are ineffective audit committees 
in the Nigerian banks, which involve members who are not educated in accounting 
and financial management, as a result, rendering the committees ineffectual. For that 
reason, to promote good corporate governance for banks in Nigeria, the CBN 2006 
code suggests that there must be an active and well-organised board audit committee, 







and some of them should have knowledge of internal control practices. Moreover, 
that, Chairman of the Committee should be one of such selected ordinary investors. 
Additionally, the Audit Committee will be accountable for the evaluation of the 
reliability of the financial reporting of the bank, in addition to watching over the 
external auditors’ objectivity and independence. In addition, the CBN (2014) code 
requires that the audit committee shall have high contact with the bank’s financial 
accounts as well as the reports of the external auditors. Moreover, to guarantee full 
knowledge of the firm’s going-concern status of the banks and discount houses, the 
audit committee should be provided with a summary of the reported cases and the 
outcomes of the inquiries by the Internal Audit unit. 
With regards to insurance companies in Nigeria, the 2009 NAICOM Code has made 
provisions that the Audit Committee should be elected in agreement with the 
requirement of the CAMA at the Annual General Meeting of the firm. Moreover, it 
should constitute Non-Executive Directors with at least 2 members with required 
accounting and financial management knowledge. Moreover, at least 1 member must 
have a good understanding of the insurance business, and the chairperson of the audit 
committee must be an independent director, and the members shall have a high level 
of honesty, commitment, and self-control. 
In view of the fact that every single company has been compelled to have a statutory 
audit committees since 1990 by the CAMA in Nigeria, correspondingly, a series of 
Nigerian codes of corporate governance were developed with emphasis on its 
effectiveness in checking a company’s financial activities which are vital to the 







independence, and expertise, both financial and business. Hence, it is an essential 
committee that may play a role in influencing the outcome of the companies 
operating in Nigeria and is worth investigation.  
2.9 Underpinning Theories 
The theories capable of explaining this study are the agency theory and the resource 
dependence theory. Although there are many theories about ownership structure and 
the firm’s going-concern, the above were found to be more suitable for the study. 
Furthermore, the agency theory is about the principal-agent (owners - managers) 
conflict (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; Hadani, Goranova, & Khan, 
2011; and Shi, Connelly, & Hoskisson, 2016), as well as the principal-principal 
(dominant owners - minority owners) conflict (Young et al., 2008) which are 
relevant to ownership structure.  
Whereas, the resource dependence theory advocates a diversity of means wherein a 
company can guarantee the supply of resources precarious to its survival (Pajunen, 
2006; Hillman et al., 2009; Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; and Nutt, 2004). A different 
group of shareholders and audit committee members owns the required resources that 
most likely have a strong influence on a company’s going-concern. Based on these 









Figure 2.1  
Theoretical Framework of the Study  
Therefore, these theories have been adopted for this study so as to test the research 
questions and identify the related variables to direct the study. 
2.9.1 Agency Theory 
It is a salient fact that the principal-agent theory is commonly regarded as the first 
topic for several deliberations on the topic of corporate governance originating from 
the established thesis on The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Berle and 
Means (1932). As stated by the theory, the central agency problem in contemporary 
companies is predominantly as a result of the separation concerning funding and 
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ownership and control and, for that reason, are run by experienced executives 
(agents) who cannot be held responsible by different owners (principals). By the 
way, the critical problem is how to guarantee that management keeps an eye on the 
well-being of the owners to decrease the cost associated with the principal-agent 
conflict (Connelly et al., 2010; Hadani et al., 2011; and Shi et al., 2016). 
The owners (principals) are challenged with 2 fundamental difficulties. Aside from 
fronting with opposing choice troubles in that, they are challenged with picking the 
most skilled management. They are, as well, tested with an ethical threat problem; 
they must give agents (managers) adequate motivation to make decisions in 
cooperation with the owners’ (principals) interests (Connelly et al., 2010; Hadani et 
al., 2011; and Shi et al., 2016). 
Furthemore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined an agency relationship as an 
agreement under which one or more individuals (principals) appoint a different agent 
to carry out certain services on his/her or their behalf, which includes entrusting 
certain policymaking power to the agent. In this situation, a conflict of interest occurs 
concerning managers or governing shareholders (agents), and outside or minority 
shareholders (principals) leading to the possibility that the earlier may manipulate the 
company's resources and be less concerned in chasing innovative, cost-effective 
ventures. Agency costs consist of monitoring expenses by the principal, for instance, 
auditing, budgeting, and control in addition to reward schemes, bonding expenses by 
the agent plus residual damage attributable to the deviation of interests concerning 
the principal along with the agent. The share price that owners (principals) pay 







The traditional principal-agent problems often are succeeded in companies by agency 
conflicts mounting from dominant shareholders who grabbed the advantage of their 
privileged position to participate in “asset expropriation” of the minority owners. In 
other words, scholars moved the “centre of gravity” of the conflict away from the 
relationship between the shareholders and managers towards the relationship 
between the majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, 
Berrone, & Makri, 2016). Furthermore, the principal–principal conflicts are stuck 
between the controlling and the minority shareholders caused by high managerial 
ownership and control, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the weak legal 
protection of the minority stockholders (Young et al., 2008). Such principal–
principal conflicts will possibly change the fundamental forces of the business 
ownership system and, sequentially, demand different handlings from those that 
handle the principal-agent conflicts (Young et al., 2008). Block ownership, together 
with the absence of active outside mechanisms (foreign ownership) could give rise to 
more continual conflicts amongst the controlling and the minority shareholders 
(Morck et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008). However, an expropriation may be 
conducted by the block owners to the minority as the majority shareholders have 
more information about the business (information asymmetry) and higher control 
rights (Bae, Baek, Kang, & Liu, 2012; Fitri et al., 2017). 
Moreover, audit committee variables are stretched out from the agency theory. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) described the agency relationship as an agreement 
where principals (shareholders) engage an agent (audit committee) to act on their 
behalf. Therefore, it is the obligation of the audit committee to carry out the duty 







quality financial reporting (Nelson & Devi, 2013). From an agency theory viewpoint, 
the audit committee is an additional governance mechanism that can be employed to 
bring into line the interests of the owners and the executives (Armstrong, Jia, & 
Totikidis, 2005). Consistent with the agency theory, the main role of the audit 
committee is to make sure that the executives are performing their duties in the best 
interests of the owners (Komal & Bilal, 2016). Based on the agency theorists, the 
efficiency of the audit committee is centred on its characteristics (Garcia, Barbadillo 
& Perez, 2012; Klein, 2002).  
This agency theory viewpoint is stressed on the audit committee size and 
independence, as well as financial expertise. Furthermore, the agency theory works 
claim that a big audit committee with adequate resources helps in the quick 
ratification of financial reporting, uncovering irregularities and increasing 
accountability and transparency in a corporation (Li, Mangena, & Pike, 2012). 
Moreover, it is expected that the domination of non-executive participants helps the 
firm to increase its performance and to escape financial suffering, which will, 
sequentially, reduce the firm’s going-concern threats. As well, for an audit 
committee to achieve its tasks, the participants need to be independent of the 
executives (Ismail et al., 2010). It is recommended that an audit committee has to be 
comprised of independent directors, exclusively, because they tend to be independent 
of the management and, therefore, offer sufficient monitoring to safeguard the 
owners from the opportunistic behaviours of the managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Komal & Bilal, 2016). Emphasising the audit committee’s financial expertise, the 
agency theory requires the audit committee to reduce agency costs by overseeing the 







expected to use their knowledge, skills, and experience in ensuring a credible 
financial report and improved performance and preventing the firms from the likely 
going-concern problems. 
2.9.2 Resource dependence theory 
The theory of resource dependence presents the ease of contact with the resources, 
along with the separation of ownership and control, as a serious aspect of the 
consideration of the ownership structure. The resource dependence theory suggests a 
diversity of ways in which a company can safeguard the supply of resources 
precarious to its survival (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 2006; Hillman et al., 2009; 
Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; and Nutt, 2004). A different group of shareholders owns 
the required resources that most likely have a strong influence on a company’s 
going-concern. 
The resource dependence theory advocates for various means by which a company 
must ensure the supply of resources vital to its continued existence (Pajunen, 2006). 
Resource suppliers are expected to provide a firm with resources that are critical to 
the firm’s survival (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 2006; and Hillman et al., 2009); these 
key resource suppliers include shareholders. The resource dependence theory claims 
that the fundamental to a business’s survival is its ability to obtain and preserve its 
resources (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 2006; and Hillman et al., 2009). According to 
Hillman et al. (2000), shareholders convey resources to the company, for instance, 
information, expertise, technology, and access to essential elements, such as 







In line with Pfeffer (2003), Hillman et al. (2009) affirmed that the resource 
dependence theory had been initially developed to deliver a substitute outlook to 
economic philosophies of mergers and board interlocks. As well as to comprehend, 
specifically, the form of the company’s affairs that have led to the recent market 
failures. 
Once more, the theory emphasises that business typically has a habit of decreasing 
the ambiguity of outside influences by guaranteeing that resources are accessible for 
its continued existence, which is the firm’s going-concern (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 
2006; and Hillman et al., 2009). In line with this, Abdullah and Valentine (2009) 
explained that the resource dependence theory focuses on the role of the shareholders 
in contributing the resources required by the company so as to guarantee its 
persistence. 
Moreover, Sheppard (1995) and Hillman et al. (2009) claimed that there are many 
ways in which an organisation might utilise its resources to ensure its survival. The 
resource dependence theory’s underlying assumption is that firms can only survive 
by acquiring and maintaining their resources. If a firm fails to obtain a proper 
mixture of resources, it will eventually fail completely (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 
2006; and Hillman et al., 2009). 
Similarly, Hillman et al. (2000) argued that the resource dependence theory puts 
emphasis on the role that shareholders play in contributing or obtaining vital 
resources for the company through their connections to the external environment. 
The overall function of managerial, non-executive director, block, foreign or 







influence. Occasionally, shareholders may own resources which may affect the 
organisational behaviour, managers or directors in critical units that may have 
control of the resources or skills that an organisation needs (Sheppard, 1995; 
Pajunen, 2006). Also, institutional investors may play a crucial role in contributing to 
the company with the resources required to survive and operate efficiently 
(Filatotchev & Toms, 2003). Certainly, Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand (1996) and 
Filatotchev and Toms (2003) agreed that resource dependence theorists offer an 
effort on the choice of institutional investors’ agents as a channel for achieving 
contact with the resources essential for the company’s achievement and survival.  
Likewise, Daily, Dalton, and Canella (2003) claimed that shareholders and directors 
support firms with resources that enrich the firm’s running, performance, and overall 
going-concern. It is also debated that shareholders have an additional power that 
supports or goes against company management (Pfeffer & Slanick, 1978; Pfeffer, 
2003; and Hillman et al., 2009). Likewise, Al-Matari et al. (2014) argued that the 
resource dependence theory is backing an association with outside resources for the 
reason that these resources make available, to the company, various bases and 
diverse skills as the investors try to optimise the stockholder rights. They also added 
that outsourcing resources contributes to a company transacting with professionalism 
and expertise. Moreover, foreign investors may help the firm to obtain the modern 
technology and innovation which may help the firm’s survival. 
Under the resource dependence theory, outside resources are a farm-out tool that aids 
to fund the firm's equity. Likewise, foreign shareholders are one of the greatest 







decision-making procedure. It respectively offers valuable foreign knowledge that 
gives a bright picture of the foreign investments (Sheppard, 1995; Pajunen, 2006; 
and Al-Matari et al., 2014). Moreover, Chou (2015) claimed that even though the 
agency theory is commonly used in research on the ownership structure, studies of 
the resource dependence theory that link the external environment to the managerial 
shareholders make available an encouraging viewpoint to complement the competing 
theoretical arguments.  
According to the resource dependence theory, the larger the audit committee, the 
greater the firm’s performance. A smaller audit committee size will possibly not gain 
the same diverse expertise and experience as its outsized counterpart and, hence, turn 
out to be ineffectual (Pfeffer, 1987; Al-Matari et al., 2014). By using the resource 
dependence theory, some studies have provided proof that firms could benefit from 
the existence of directors with financial knowledge and a detailed accounting 
experience (Abdullah, 2015). The resource dependence theory supports the idea  that, 
audit committee members with different types of knowledge and expertise are 
engaged in order to improve the monitoring role of the audit committee (Komal & 
Bilal, 2016). It stresses that it is a basis of acquiring a comprehensive benefit as audit 
committee members have exceptionally relevant means thatrepresent the business in 
public (Wernerfelt, 1984; Komal & Bilal, 2016). Contrary to the agency theory, the 
resource dependence theory describes that the presence of members as observers is 
not enough, but rather their experiences, contacts, and knowledge helps improve the 
firm’s performance. In addition, concerning the audit committee size, the resource 
dependence perspective advocates that a big audit committee size will indicate that 







the resource dependence theory describes the audit committees as the resources 
provided and contributing skills and expertise with the aim of the companies 
achieving competitive benefits, particularly in earnings quality (Nelson & Devi, 
2013). These audit committee members with expertise are anticipated to alleviate the 
agency crises that may increase due to the managers’ propensity to manipulate 
reported earnings. The above argument has delivered a synopsis of the underlying 
theories, which advocates the agency as well as the resource dependence theories. 
Both theories are clarified to highlight the reason for applying them in this work. It is 
expected that relating these theories will help in expressing every hypothesised 
relationship comprehensively. The agency theory, as the leading theory, was the 
primary interaction for this study’s analysis. It is followed by the resource 
dependence theory as a supporting theory to upkeep the theoretical base of the work. 
Therefore, this work, which has examined the effects of ownership structure on the 
going-concern of the listed Nigerian banks, will provide a bridge between the agency 
and resource dependence theories in enlightening the relationship between ownership 
structure and the firm’s going-concern using the audit committee as a moderating 
variable. 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
This section started with the definition of a firm’s going-concern and a discussion of 
the concepts of the firm’s going-concern so as to understand the subject matter 
clearly. As well, it discussed the usage of the statistical model in predicting the 
firm’s going-concern. Then, this was followed by a definition of corporate 







discussion on the relevant codes of corporate governance in Nigeria. Furthermore, 
the concept of ownership structure, as well as the related provisions for the audit 








RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
This section presents the research framework, as well as the hypothesis development 
based on the relationships concerning the dependent, independent, as well as 
moderating variables. The relationships included managerial ownership and a firm’s 
going-concern, non-executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern, 
block ownership and a firm’s going-concern, institutional ownership and a firm’s 
going-concern, and foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern. Whereas, audit 
committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) have been 
introduced as the moderating variables. 
3.2 Research Framework 
The framework in Figure 3.1 contains elements of the ownership structure (CEO, 
executive director, non-executive director, block, foreign, and institution) as the 
independent variables and a firm’s going-concern (earnings management, 
profitability, and bankruptcy) as the dependent variable, whilst audit committee 
attributes were adopted as the moderating variables. This was in line with the 
suppositions of the agency and resource dependence theories based on the 
relationship between 2 parties. For instance, the agency theory addresses the 
conflicting issues in the relationship between the principal (shareholders) and the 







principal (minor shareholders). Whereas, the resource dependence theory addresses 
the diversity of the means wherein a company must guarantee the supply of resources 
precarious to its survival.  
Thus, this study has expected that, with audit committee as a moderating factor, it 
will influence the strength of the relationship between the ownership structure 
elements (CEO, executive director, non-executive director, block, foreign, and 
institutional ownership) and a firm’s going-concern (earnings management, 
profitability, and bankruptcy). Some other ownership structures and audit elements 
were not included, such as family ownership, minority ownership, and audit 
committee meeting frequency, for some inevitable reasons. Firstly, family and 
minority shareholdings were not disclosed in the annual reports of the firms in 
Nigeria. The reason for that is that, there is no provision that requires the firms to 
report information regarding the family and minority shareholdings. Likewise, in 
Nigeria, most of the family ownership is concentrated in the limited liability 
companies (unquoted firms) with very few in public liability companies (quoted 
firms). 
Whereas, the reason for not including the audit committee meeting frequency in this 
study is that, prior to 2011 in Nigeria, no provision required the firms to disclose the 
number of meetings held by the audit committee. The audit committee meeting 
frequency disclosure became mandatory by the provision of the SEC 2011 code of 
corporate governance. Therefore, it was inevitable that the researcher would not be 
able to retrieve the record prior to 2011 considering the scope of this study. Hence, 
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3.3 Development of the Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this work were established on the basis of the ownership 
structure’s particular elements, which were incorporated into 5 clusters (managerial, 
non-executive director, block, foreign, and institutional ownership), to answer the 
subsidiary research questions, as raised in Section 1.3. For the hypothesis 
development as well as variable organisation, similar consideration was given to 
every ownership structure variable in relation to the firm’s going-concern variables, 
and whether the moderating variables could affect their relationships. 
3.3.1 Managerial Ownership and Firm Going-Concern 
Managerial ownership is considered as a crucial characteristic of ownership structure 
which may limit earnings management practices in a company. Managerial 
ownership is a fraction of the executive directors’ ownership of the shares of the total 
number of shares issued (Bekiris, 2013). To put it another way, managerial 
ownership is a proportion of the shares owned by the corporate managers (Mustapha 
& Che Ahmad, 2011). Managerial ownership may synchronise the management’s 
and the shareholders’ interests; thereby, decreasing the overall agency conflicts. The 
relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs is linear, and the peak 
point for the business is accomplished once the executives obtain all of the shares of 
the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). That is to say, the higher the managerial 








Moreover, agency theorists have anticipated that managerial shareholdings reduce a 
firm’s going-concern problems (Iskandar et al., 2011; Parker et al., 2005). This is 
because, once managers become part of the business owners, they should have an 
attached degree of interest with the other stockholders. Those managers will under no 
circumstance take risks that will be hazardous to the investors. Therefore, it is 
expected that the larger the managerial ownership in the firm, the less the agency 
problems will occur; this will, accordingly, improve the performance of the 
companies and aid the businesses to reduce the firms’ going-concern problems (Gul 
et al., 2003). 
Earlier studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern variables (bankruptcy, earnings management, and profitability) have 
shown inconsistent results. For instance, Zureigat et al. (2014b) used a sample of 113 
Jordanian non-financial firms using the year 2011 data and found a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Similarly, Zureigat (2015) used a sample of 339 Jordanian non-financial firms from 
2009 to 2011 and found a significant positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern problem. Furthermore, Ahmed and Hadi 
(2017) examined the influence of ownership structures on a firm’s financial 
performance and found that managerial ownership affected a firm’s performance 
negatively. This, in turn, may widely increase a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Likewise, in Nigeria, Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) conducted a study on ownership 
structure and earnings management using a sample of 10 banks. They found a 







management measured by the discretionary accruals. Therefore, they suggested that 
managerial ownership could not reduce the opportunistic behaviours of the firm’s 
managers which would increase the firm’s going-concern problem. Moreover, in 
Nigeria, Farouk and Hassan (2014) examined the effect of ownership structure on the 
earnings management of Nigerian chemical and paint companies from 2007 to 2011. 
They employed multiple regressions and found a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management. Furthermore, they added that 
managerial ownership was unsuccessful in monitoring corporate managers and 
keeping them from devious behaviours of manipulating reported earnings which 
would lead to a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Additionally, Imoleayo et al. (2017) examined the role of ownership structure on 
earnings management practices using a sample of 137 Nigerian firms. The study 
revealed that there was a significant positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management. This showed that the higher the percentage of 
managerial ownership, the higher the earnings management practices in the Nigerian 
firms, which may lead to the firms’ going-concern problems.  
However, Davidson et al. (2004) found a significant positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and profitability. Therefore, the higher the managerial 
ownership, the less the firm’s going-concern problem. Likewise, Parker et al. (2005) 
used 161 financially distressed firms between 1988 and 1996 and established that 
managerial ownership was negatively related to firms’ frequent going-concern 







level of managerial ownership helps firms to avoid economic and operating 
problems.  
In addition, Ali et al. (2008), using a panel data regression model to analyse the data 
acquired from the financial reports for the period from 2002 to 2003 in Malaysia, 
certified that there was a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
earnings management. Thus, Ali et al. (2008) recommended that earnings 
management practices were fewer for companies with managerial ownership. 
Likewise, in Malaysia, Iskandar et al. (2011) established that managerial ownership 
had a significant negative relationship with a firm’s going-concern problem and, 
therefore, recommended that regulators ought to offer convincing motivations to 
boost the desire of business managers to have a specific percentage of the business 
shareholdings.  
Besides that, Ittonen (2011) studied a sampling of 3,193 firms between 2002 and 
2008. They found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
firms’ going-concern problems (proxied by the firms’ going-concern audit reports). 
Therefore, when managerial ownership is higher, the firms’ going-concern issues 
ought to be less of a surprise for a larger proportion of owners. Furthermore, in 
Portugal, Alves (2012), utilising 34 non-financial registered companies for the period 
from 2002 to 2007, discovered that the discretionary accruals used (a proxy for 
earnings management) were negatively related to managerial ownership. The study 
recommended that managerial ownership increased the value of the annual income 
by decreasing the earnings management levels, which would, in turn, reduce a firm’s 







Meanwhile, in Malaysia as well, Amran and Ahmad (2013), using a sample of 420 
listed non-financial firms, discovered that managerial ownership was related 
significantly and negatively to the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity 
(ROE). The results suggested that managers with block ownership and high control 
were more anxious with self-interests than the shareholders’ interests, which would 
affect the firm’s going-concern, negatively. Similarly, Chou (2015) adopted the 
resource dependence theory to examine the relationship between managerial 
ownership and business performance using 1,156 firm-year observations. The 
empirical results displayed that managerial ownership exercised a positive influence 
on firm performance. Likewise, in Jordan, Ramadan (2016) applied a panel 
regression analysis to analyse the data from 2000 to 2014. The study concluded that 
managerial ownership was related negatively to earnings management practices 
which, subsequently, decreased the possibility of a firm’s going-concern problem.  
Likewise, Iskandar et al. (2017) found that managerial ownership was significantly 
and negatively related to the firm performance of the Malaysian small-and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). This implied that managerial ownership did not reduce the 
conflict of interest between the management and the shareholders. High managerial 
ownership may increase the controlling decision power of the managerial owners and 
decrease the governing influence of other shareholders. 
In Nigeria, Adebiyi and Olowookere (2016) used 9 listed Nigerian banks between 
2005 to 2013 and established that financial reporting quality (proxied by 
discretionary accruals) was positively related to managerial ownership. They 







the levels of financial reporting manipulation and, hence, minimised the firm’s 
going-concern problem.  
Contrary to the above studies that found a positive or negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and a firm’s going-concern elements, Gulzar and Wang (2011) 
found that there was no significant relation between managerial ownership and 
earnings management in China. That is to say,managerial ownership had no 
influence on earnings management and a firm’s going-concern at large.  
Concisely, the findings of these reviewed studies revealed a diverse outcome. One 
group was of the view that managerial ownership was negatively related with the 
firm’s going-concern variables (Chou, 2015; Gul et al., 2003; Parker et al., 2005; Ali 
et al., 2008; Iskandar et al., 2011; Alves, 2012; Ittonen, 2011; and Ramadan, 2016). 
Whereas, another group was of the opinion that managerial ownership was positively 
related to the firm’s going-concern variables (Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012; Farouk & 
Hassan 2014; Zureigat et al., 2014b; and Zureigat, 2015). Established on the agency 
theory, the resource dependence theory and the related discussion above, it was 
anticipated that there was a relationship between managerial ownership and a firm’s 
going-concern. Therefore, to analyse this relationship, this study, consistent with Ali 
et al. (2008); Alzoubi (2016); and Morck et al. (1988), split managerial ownership 








3.3.1.1 CEO Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
CEO ownership stands for the number of entire equity shares controlled by the CEO 
in a corporation (Alves, 2012; Farouk & Hassan, 2014). The equity ownership of a 
CEO is an essential mechanism in supporting the interest of the CEO and other 
owners (Alves, 2012; Warfield et al., 1995). In line with the agency theory, there is 
always a clash of interests between CEOs and other equity owners that are innate 
from the separation of control and ownership. This interest has been anticipated to be 
brought into line as the level of CEO ownership rises. CEOs that have substantial 
ownership in a company are unlikely to be mixed up in the devious acts that will lead 
to their firm’s going-concern problem (Gul & Lai, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Moreover, Bergrtresser and Philippon (2006) studied the CEO equity ownership and 
earnings management in the United States of America using datasets of 4,671 firm-
year observations from 1993 to 2000. Using the OLS regression they established a 
positive relationship between CEO equity ownership and earnings management, 
hence, the greater the CEO ownership, the higher the earnings management 
activities, which will lead to a firm’s going-concern problem. 
So, also, Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010), using a sample of 17,542 CEOs for the 
period from 1993 to 2006, look at the relationship between CEO equity incentives 
and earnings management. Utilising a logistic regression, they proved that there was 
a positive relationship between CEO equity incentives and earnings management. 
Therefore, increasing the CEO equity incentives may lead to the likelihood of 







In Taiwan, Liu and Tsai (2015) examined the effect of ownership structure on the 
earnings management of listed firms using a sample of 5,788 observations from 2006 
to 2010. Applying the regression analysis, they found that CEO ownership had an 
insignificant positive relationship with earnings management. Thus, CEO ownership 
may not be a signal to moderate earnings management.  
Contrary to the above studies, Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pferrer, and Khanin (2008) 
explored the effect of CEO equity ownership on earnings management activities in 
the United States. Using data compiled from a sample of 2,532 listed firms from 
1996 to 2001, the logit regression was employed. The result revealed a negative 
relationship between CEO equity ownership and earnings management. Therefore, 
earnings management actions are fewer in a firm with high CEO equity ownership 
and this reduces the firm’s possible going-concern problem. 
Moreover, Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012) evaluated the relationship between 
the CEO equity ownership and earnings management of non-financial firms in the 
United States using a sample of 1,895 firms from 1992 to 2004. The panel data 
regression analysis revealed that CEO ownership was significantly and negatively 
connected to earnings management. Therefore, CEO stock ownership can constrain 
earnings management activities and reduce a firm’s possible going-concern problem. 
Likewise, Gong and Li (2013) used 27,069 observations covering the 1993 to 2008 
period. They applied regression to evaluate the relationship between the equity 
ownership by CEOs and the earnings management of quoted companies in China. 
The analysis exposed that there was a negative relationship between CEO ownership 







ownership mitigates earnings management as well as decreases the potentiality of a 
firm’s going-concern problem.  
In Nigeria, Omoye and Eriki (2014) used a sample of 130 registered companies from 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2010. Utilising a binary regression, they 
evaluated the relationship between CEO shareholdings and earnings management, 
and the result confirmed that there was no significant relationship between CEO 
shareholdings and earnings management. This means that, the CEO’s share 
ownership does not affect earnings management; as well, it does not affect the going-
concern status of the firms.  
Based on the above discussions, the influence of managerial ownership on a firm’s 
going-concern needs to be investigated separately for CEO ownership. The study has 
proposed the following testable hypothesis: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between CEO ownership and 
the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
3.3.1.2 Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
Executive directors have the influence to impact on company decisions. Likewise, 
they are more likely to take part in the operations of the company compared to non-
executive directors (Ali et al., 2008). The separation of control and ownership may 
capture the role of the executive directors who have a direct relationship in handling 
a company’s business activities. Once managerial concern is in the same vein to that 
of the owners, earnings management behaviour is anticipated to be curtailed which 







Similarly, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) explored the relationship between the 
corporate governance structure and performance of 347 registered companies in 
Malaysia between 1996 and 2000. The finding revealed a significant negative 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and financial performance, 
which would upturn the chances of a firm’s going-concern problem. Likewise, 
Hashim (2009) used the sample of 277 nonfinancial companies after excluding 
financial and utility firms of Bursa Malaysia for the period from 1998 to 2006. Using 
a linear multiple regression analysis, he stated that ownership by the executive 
directors was significantly and negatively connected to the quality of earnings which 
automatically increased earnings management and, in turn, would lead to a firm’s 
going-concern problem.  
Moreover, Alzoubi (2016) assessed the influence of executive directors’ ownership 
on earnings management practices using the 69 listed firms in Jordan. Using the 
multivariate regression, the results advocated that executive directors’ ownership can 
have a negative effect on a company. Therefore, it can influence the objective of 
maximising the business’s value and reducing the firm’s going-concern problem.  
However, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examined how company boards as well as 
audit committees were related to earnings management forecasts, and they revealed 
that there was a significant positive relationship between executives’ ownership and 
earnings management which would increase the likelihood of a firm’s going-concern 
problem. Moreover, Velury and Jenkins (2006), utilising 4238 observations for the 
period of 1992–1999 and using the Compact Disclosure, CompStat, and CRSP 







earnings management that would proliferate the possibilities of a firm’s going-
concern problem. Likewise, Elsayed (2007) used the sample of 92 Egyptian public 
limited firms over the period from 2000 to 2004 and disclosed a significant positive 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and firm performance, which 
would minimise the risks of a firm’s going-concern problem. Also, Ali et al. (2008) 
used a panel data regression model to analyse the data acquired from financial 
reports for the period from 2002 to 2003 in Malaysia and the result pointed out that 
the level of executive directors’ ownership was negatively and significantly 
associated with earnings management as proxied by discretionary accruals, which 
would lessen the odds of a firm’s going-concern difficulty. Inversely, some research 
works found an insignificant relationship between the executive directors’ ownership 
and a firm’s going-concern (Habbash, 2010).  
Based on the above discussions, the influence of managerial ownership on a firm’s 
going-concern needs to be investigated separately for executive directors’ ownership. 
The study has proposed the following testable hypothesis: 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between executive directors’ 
ownership and the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
3.3.2 Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
Non-executive directors are expected to be fundamental board members. They ought 
to make autonomous decisions in addition to the essential scrutiny of the 
management and executive director’s plans and activities, particularly, on strategy 







non-executive directorship is a monitoring structure aimed to build up the control 
capability of the board and to decrease the agency costs related to management (Cho 
& Kim, 2007). Fama and Jensen (1983) claimed that non-executive directors had 
motivations to perform their monitoring responsibilities and not to connive with 
executives to expropriate shareholder capital; hence, the presence of non-executive 
directors raises the board's capability to observe top management activities 
efficiently.  
According to agency theorists, as long as non-executives’ ownership rises, non-
executive directors’ interests are more cautiously united with the other owners’ 
interests, thus, offering more feelings to improve earnings quality which will, 
accordingly, increase the performance of the company and support the business to 
lower the firm’s going-concern problem (Alzoubi, 2016). Moreover, the Resource 
dependence theory claims that the fundamental to a business’s survival is the 
capability of the company to obtain and preserve its resources (Sheppard, 1995; 
Pajunen, 2006; and Hillman et al., 2009). According to Hillman et al. (2000), non-
executive directors convey resources to the company and provide access to essential 
elements that are fundamental to the business’s survival. Similarly, Al-Matari et al. 
(2014) argued that the resource dependence theory backs the association with outside 
resources because they make  various bases and diverse skills available to the 
company as they make an effort to optimise the stockholder rights. They added that, 
this theory ascertains that outsourcing directors contribute to a company to transact 
with professionalism and expertise, meanwhile  professional non-executive directors 
will help the company in obtaining the modern technology and innovation which will 







In order to increase and support this, in Nigeria, the CBN (2014), NAICOM (2009), 
and SEC (2014) codes require that the number of non-executive directors shall be 
more than that of the executive directors. The CBN (2014) code further requires that 
the board of banks shall have at least two (2) non-executive directors as independent 
directors, whilst those of the discount houses shall have at least one (1). Likewise, 
the CBN (2014) code provides that all committees of the board shall be headed by 
non-executive directors. 
Empirically, Beasley (1996) established a significantly negative relationship between 
the possibility of earnings management and non-executive directors’ ownership. 
Beasley (1996) suggested that a high level of ownership held by non-executive 
directors does help in weakening the possibility of earnings management which will, 
in turn, lead to a reduction of a firm’s going-concern problem.  
Furthermore, Bhagat and Black (2001) revealed that non-executive directors are 
more active when they have substantial ownership and improve value for the 
company; therefore, it is recommended that policy-makers should emphasise that 
non-executive directors must possess a high number of shares in an attempt to 
enhance business performance and the firm’s going-concern. 
Likewise, Ali et al. (2008) used a panel data regression model to analyse the data 
acquired from financial reports for the period from 2002 to 2003 in Malaysia. The 
result shows that there was a significant negative relationship between the level of 
non-executive directors’ shareholdings and earnings management, which would, 







Moreover, Hashim and Devi (2008) used 280 non-financial firms’ data registered on 
Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board in 2004 and found a significant positive relationship 
between outside board ownership and earnings quality, which habitually decreased 
the earnings management and reduced a firm’s going-concern problem. Similarly, 
Hashim (2009) used the sample of 277 non-financial companies after excluding 
financial and utility firms of Bursa Malaysia for the period from 1998 to 2006. Using 
a linear multiple regression analysis, he stated that the non-executive directors’ 
shareholdings were significantly and positively related to the quality of earnings, 
which usually decreased the earnings management and reduced a firm’s going-
concern problem. 
Furthermore, Alzoubi (2016) used the sample of 69 listed firms, utilising a 
multivariate regression as the technique for the data analysis, and the results 
suggested that non-executive directors’ shareholdings on the board would exercise 
fewer effects compared to other members of the board concerning the demand for 
lower earnings management. 
Established on the agency theory, resource dependence theory, and preceding 
studies, it was expected that non-executives’ ownership would improve the 
efficiency in checking the management and provide a healthier going-concern for a 
firm. Therefore, the study proposed the following testable hypothesis: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between non-executive directors’ 







3.3.3 Block Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
Block equity holders perform a major role in the internal control of companies; this 
is due to the bulk of the contribution inspiring them to observe and affect the policy 
of the corporation for which they have provided financing (Yeo et al., 2002). Block 
ownership can be in a different form, comprising individual shareholders, a private 
equity firm, pension funds, banks, insurance, and corporations (Klein, 2002; Miko & 
Kamardin, 2015). Ownership concentration is an additional margin for reducing 
agency costs by shareholders taking an active role in monitoring the business 
activities. However, this is subject to the sizes of their shareholdings (Morck et al., 
2005; Young et al., 2008). The greater the shareholdings, the more involved they are 
in monitoring and protecting their security. 
Previous studies concerning block ownership on the firm’s going-concern variables 
(bankruptcy, earnings management, and profitability) have revealed different 
outcomes. For instance, in agreement with the agency theory assumption, Davis et al. 
(1997) posited that the presence of big block investors may moderate the biased 
activities of corporate managers to be involved in earnings management practices as 
the investors have a stake in the company which will ease the risks of business 
failure. Likewise, Parker et al. (2005), using 161 financially distressed firms for the 
period of 1988-1996, confirmed that a firm’s going-concern problem (proxied by 
modifications reports) was negatively associated with block holder ownership. 
Furthermore, Alves (2012) suggested that block ownership was negatively related to 
earnings management practices. Hence, block ownership cuts the level of earnings 







from the Latin American stock exchange market, Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) 
discovered that block shareholders were negatively related with earnings 
management, particularly the discretionary accruals. Also, the study suggested that 
high block ownership can limit manipulative practices by devious managers.  
Similarly, Paik and Koh (2014) explored whether ownership structure transforms 
corporate managers’ behaviours to meet market expectations through earnings 
management employing a sample of 1,255 firms from 2000 to 2010. The result 
shows that managers were less expected to avoid negative earnings surprises as block 
ownership increased, which implies that large shareholders play an internal 
monitoring role for managers' earnings management.  
Likewise, Ramadan (2016) investigated the correlation between the block 
shareholders and earnings management of listed companies in Jordan utilising panel 
regression to analyse the data for the period from 2000 to 2014. The experimental 
outcome also found that there wd a negative relationship between block shareholders 
and earnings management. For that reason, the block shareholders have less impulse 
to manipulate corporate earnings and could moderate the devious conduct of 
managers, which would reduce the chances of business failure. 
Furthermore, Acero et al. (2017) established that an increase in the level of block 
ownership to a certain level had a positive effect on performance. Likewise, Ahmed 
and Hadi (2017) examined the influence of ownership structures on a firm’s financial 
performance in the Middle East and the North African (MENA) region. The results 
proved that block ownership had a positive influence on a firm’s performance. 







positively related to earnings management and they found that the level of minority 
shareholder protection weakened this positive relationship.  
Similarly, Shan and Gong (2017), using a sample of 288 Chinese A-share listed firms 
(excluding financial firms) in the Shenzhen and Shanghai securities exchanges 
between 2003 and 2011, conducted static and dynamic panel data analyses of the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The result suggested 
that the concentration of ownership by the largest shareholder can significantly 
improve the long-term firm performance. Furthermore, Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) 
found a significant positive relationship between block ownership and firm 
performance. 
In the Nigerian context, Usman and Yero (2012) examined the relationship between 
block ownership and earnings management practices using a sample of 6 Nigerian 
listed conglomerate firms between 2005 and 2010. The study found a significant 
negative relationship between block ownership and earnings management. Similarly, 
Kurawa and Saheed (2014) investigated the relationship between block ownership 
and earnings management in the Nigerian petroleum companies. The study found 
that block ownership had a significant negative relationship with earnings 
management. Thus, high block ownership mitigates earnings management practices 
which may decrease a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Also, Imoleayo et al. (2017) examined the role of ownership structure on earnings 
management practices using the financial reports of 137 Nigerian firms. It revealed 
that there was a significant negative relationship between block ownership and 







ownership, the lower the earnings management practices of the Nigerian firms, 
which would decrease the likelihood of a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Furthermore, Ozili and Uadiale (2017) discovered that firms with high block 
ownership had higher return on assets, a greater net interest margin, and greater 
recurrent earning power. They further discovered that firms with high block 
ownership had higher financial performances, which may decrease the likelihood of 
a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Conversely, in regards to the above findings, Gulzar and Wang (2011) identified the 
impact of block ownership on the earnings management practices amongst the 
registered firms of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China covering 
2002 to 2006 with a sample of 1009 companies in China. They utilised multiple 
regression as the technique of the data analysis. The result argued that there was a 
positive relationship between block ownership and earnings management practices, 
which would increase the probabilities of business failures, which contradicted the 
agency theory which argues that the greater the ownership concentration, the less the 
agency problem. 
Similarly, Klai and Omri (2011) established a negative correlation between block 
holdings and the quality of financial reporting in the Tunisian non-financial sector. 
Likewise using panel regression, Farooq and El Jai (2012) studied the relationship 
between ownership structure and earnings management using 71 listed firms of the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange for the 2004 to 2007 period in Morocco. The finding 
indicated a positive relationship between block ownership and earnings management 







Riro (2013) conducted a study in Kenya with actual samples of 37 firms registered 
on the Nairobi Stock Exchange considering the period of 2006 to 2010. Their study, 
using panel data, found that block ownership had a positive effect on the incidence of 
earnings management, therefore, the greater the block ownership, the greater the 
propensity for earnings management actions, which may likely raise the possibilities 
of a firm’s going-concern problems. 
Similarly, in Nigeria in the banking sector, Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) 
investigated the effect of block shareholders on earnings management from 2006 to 
2010 using multivariate regression techniques. The results revealed a significant 
positive relationship between block shareholders and earnings management practices. 
Therefore, block shareholders are likely to be embroiled in earnings management 
practices that may lead to the possibilities of business failures. 
In a nutshell, the findings of these reviewed studies reveal different outcomes. One 
group was of the view that block ownership is negatively related with the firm’s 
going-concern variables (Alves, 2012; Davis et al., 1997; Gonzalez & Garcia-Meca, 
2014; Kurawa & Saheed, 2014; and Ramadan, 2016). Whilst, another group was of 
the view that Block ownership was positively related to the firm’s going-concern 
variables (Gulzar & Wang, 2011; Farooq & El Jai, 2012; Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012; 
and Waweru & Riro, 2013). Grounded on the agency and resource dependence 
theories and related reviews, it was expected that there was a positive relationship 
between block ownership and a firm’s going-concern. Hence, to examine this 







H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between block ownership and the 
going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
3.3.4 Foreign Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
Foreign shareholding refers to the whole or bulk possession/control of a corporate or 
means in a nation by persons who are not citizens of that nation, or by corporations 
whose centres of operations are not in that nation (Heyman et al., 2007). Foreign 
ownership is the proportion of the number of stocks held by the foreign investors to 
the total amount of stock outstanding at the end of the year (Jeon et al., 2011). 
Foreign shareholders play a significant role as users of the financial statement, who 
utilise the information to plan and work their investments. Furthermore, the foreign 
shareholders, being sophisticated shareholders, are clever in observing the activities 
of the firms.  
Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) asserted that the external ownership of a 
company is likely to moderate the agency conflicts that happen to the business 
management and the shareholders. Likewise, from the resource dependence theory 
perspectives, foreign ownership ordinarily offers new technology in conjunction with 
financial and other organisational resources to the company.  
Past empirical evidence on the impacts of foreign ownership on the firm’s going-
concern variables (Bankruptcy, Earnings Management, and Profitability) has 
revealed different outcomes. In Korea, Paik and Koh (2014) explored whether 
ownership structure transformed corporate managers’ behaviours to meet market 







2000 to 2010. The result showed a significant positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and earnings management through the corporate managers’ behaviours to 
meet market expectations. Therefore, corporate managers are less likely to dodge 
positive earnings surprises as foreign ownership increases.  
Similarly, Guo and Ma (2015) analysed the relationship between ownership 
characteristics and earnings management using a sample of 1,176 companies in 
China; the study used panel data between 2004 and 2010. The study found a positive 
relationship between foreign shareholdings and earnings management. Therefore, 
high foreign ownership did not constrain the earnings management practices. 
Correspondingly, Zureigat (2015), using 2009 to 2011 data, improved the sample to 
be 339 non-financial sector firms ignoring the financial sector, despite its importance 
in any economy, to restate the relationship between foreign shareholdings and a 
firm’s going-concern evaluation (Altman's Z ratio of 1968). They found a positive 
and significant relationship between foreign shareholdings and a firm’s going-
concern evaluation. Furthermore, in Nigeria, Adebiyi and Olowookere (2016) used 9 
Deposit Money Banks from 2005 to 2013. The study found that foreign ownership 
had a positive relationship with earnings management. 
However, contrary to the above studies, Aydin et al. (2007) established a positive 
correlation between foreign shareholdings and a business's performance. The study 
claimed that foreign shareholdings increased a company's profitability higher than 
those that were locally owned. In the same way, Ali et al. (2008), in Malaysia, 







accruals, which would, as well, reduce the likelihood of a firm’s going-concern 
problem.  
Likewise, Klai and Omri (2011) established a negative correlation between foreign 
shareholdings and the quality of the financial reporting. Thus, following the agency 
theory and the results of the previous studies that were mentioned above, they found 
that foreign ownership enhanced the quality of the financial statements and firm 
performance, which would, as well, decrease the possibility of a firm’s going-
concern problem. Likewise, Ogega (2014), in Kenya, used a multiple regression 
analysis which revealed a strong positive relationship between foreign shareholdings 
and the profitability of commercial banks. The study further showed that a unit 
increase in foreign ownership would result in a greater financial performance by 
Kenyan commercial banks. The study established that the local ownership of the 
banks significantly affected the financial performance of the banks in Kenya. 
Therefore, this indicates that, the higher the foreign investors in the company, the 
higher the possibility of a business’s survival.  
So, also, Zureigat et al. (2014a) used the sample of 113 non-financial sector firms in 
Jordan for the year 2011 to establish the relationship between foreign shareholdings 
and a firm’s going-concern evaluation. Using Altman's Z ratio of 1968, they found a 
negative but not significant relationship between foreign shareholdings and a firm’s 
going-concern problem. 
In the same way, Guo et al. (2015) observed the relationship between foreign 
shareholdings and earnings management in Japan for the period from 2004 to 2008. 







and earnings management, therefore, a firm with higher foreign shareholdings 
pressures earnings management activities, hence, there would be a reduction in the 
chance of a firm having a going-concern problem.  
Equally, in Jordan, Alzoubi (2016) assessed the impact of foreign shareholdings on 
earnings management practices using the sample of 69 listed firms. Multivariate 
regression was utilised as a technique for the data analysis, and the result certified 
that there is a negative relationship between foreign shareholdings and earnings 
management. Thus, foreign ownership is more likely to elucidate the devious 
behaviours of corporate managers in manipulating earnings; therefore, it reduces the 
chance of a firm having a going-concern problem. Likewise, Manna et al. (2016), 
using panel data for the National Stock Exchange (NSE)-listed Indian companies for 
the period from 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2013, they found that foreign promoters’ 
shareholdings had been identified to have a positive impact on more than one 
corporate performance variable. 
 Furthermore, Vural-Yavas and Erdogan (2016), using a panel of 256 Turkish 
companies for the 2009-2014 period, and the showed that the foreign ownership 
increased the firm’s profitability up to a certain level. Likewise, Yasser and Al 
Mamun (2017) present results which showed that the proportion of the foreign 
ownership was positively associated with firm performance.  
Simply put, the findings of these reviewed studies revealed a diverse outcome. One 
group wasof the view that foreign ownership was negatively related with a firm’s 
going-concern variables (Aydin et al., 2007; Guo & Ma, 2015; Ogega, 2014; Paik & 







positively related to the firm’s going-concern variables (Ali et al., 2008; Alzoubi, 
2016; Guo et al., 2015; Kim, 2015; Klai & Omri, 2011; and Zureigat et al., 2014a).  
Therefore, established on the agency and resource dependence theories and previous 
literature, a positive relationship between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-
concern has been anticipated. Therefore, to study this relationship, this study has 
made the following propositions: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
3.3.5 Institutional Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
Institutional ownership is the size of a firm’s issued share possessed by endowments, 
insurance firms, investment businesses, mutual or pension funds, private foundations, 
or other big bodies that manage resources in the best interests of others. Furthermore, 
the agency theory supports that institutional ownership can be an essential control 
mechanism in monitoring business’s undertakings (Young et al., 2008). Certainly, 
institutional owners may perhaps perform active monitoring, which may be tough for 
minority shareholders to perform (Almazan et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008) which 
aids in minimising the firm’s going-concern problem.  
With regards to the relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s going-
concern, Cornett. et al. (2007) studied the relationship regarding institutional 
shareholder’ participation in, and the operational performance of big businesses, 
which confirms a significant relationship between a company’s operating cash flow 







institutional shareholders. Nevertheless, this rapport has been established for only a 
division of the institutional investors: those less probable to have a business 
relationship with the company. These outcomes advocate that institutional investors 
with possible business dealings with the companies’ in which they invest be 
compromised as monitors of the company. 
Alves, (2012) observed the relationship between the corporate ownership structure in 
Portugal and earnings management, using a sampling of 34 non-financial companies 
from 2002 to 2007. The study found that the relationship between discretionary 
accruals as a representative for earnings management and institutional ownership 
was positive as well as significant, in line with the passive, hands-off assumption that 
advocates that institutional shareholders could escalate managerial reasons to be 
involved in earnings management, which may lead to the mounting going-concern 
problem in a firm.  
Furthermore, Lin and Manowan (2012) examined the relationship between 
institutional shareholders with diverse natures and earnings management. They also 
discovered a significant positive relationship between institutional investors and 
discretionary accounting accruals which has been supported in the emerging firms’ 
going-concern problems. Similarly, Emamgholipour and Mansourinia (2013), using 
the correlation and regression analyses on 140 firms, found that institutional 
investors had a significant role in earnings management, which would help in 
determining a firm’s going-concern threat. Likewise, Manna et al. (2016), using an 
average sample size of 12 companies from the National Stock Exchange (NSE)-listed 







institutional shareholdings had a positive relationship with firm performance. In 
addition, Sakaki et al. (2016) examined the relationship between institutional 
ownership stability and real earnings management and found that firms held by more 
stable institutional owners, experienced lower real activities of manipulation by 
limiting overproduction. 
In another contrary study, Yang et al. (2009) used 613 Malaysian firms from 2001 to 
2003. The study found that institutional ownership had a negative relationship with 
earnings management, which in turn, reduced a firm’s going-concern problem. 
Moreover, Iskandar et al. (2011) proved that the relationship between institutional 
shareholding and a firm’s going-concern problem is significant and negative. Hence, 
it is recommended that regulators offer some incentives to inspire institutional 
shareholders to have a high percentage of the firm’s shares. 
Furthermore, Zureigat et al. (2014b) used the sample of 113 non-financial sector 
firms in Jordan for the year 2011 to establish the relationship between institutional 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern problem (Altman's Z ratio of 1968); and they 
established that there was a negative relationship with institutional ownership. 
Similarly, Zureigat (2015) enriched the sample to be 339 non-financial sectors, using 
data from 2009 to 2011, to reaffirm the relationship between institutional 
shareholdings and a firm’s going-concern evaluation (Altman's Z ratio of 1968). 
They found a negative correlation concerning institutional ownership and a firm’s 
going-concern problem. Furthermore, Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) presented results 







firm performance. Likewise, in Nigeria, Adebiyi and Olowookere (2016) established 
that financial reporting quality was negatively related to institutional ownership.  
Concisely, the findings of these reviewed studies reveal a diverse outcome. One 
group was of the view that institutional ownership had a negative relationship with 
the firm’s going-concern variables (Iskandar et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2009; and 
Zureigat et al., 2014b). However, another group was of the view that institutional 
ownership had a positive relationship with the firm’s going-concern variables (Agyei 
& Owusu, 2014; Alves, 2012;  and Lin & Manowan, 2012). Therefore, based on the 
supporting theories and previous works, it is likely that there is a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s going-concern. Hence, to 
study this relationship, this study has made the following propositions: 
H5: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
3.3.6 Audit Committee as a Moderating Variable 
An audit committee is constitutive to financial reporting quality (Moses, Ofurum & 
Egbe, 2016). The committee has an important role in monitoring a company’s 
activities to assure the financial reporting quality of the company (Al Daoud et al., 
2015; Moses et al., 2016). Consistent with that, Magrane and Malthus (2010) 
advocated that the audit committee is accountable for overseeing 4 primary areas, 
which are risk management, overall internal controls, internal and external audits, as 
well as external financial reporting. The audit committee works to improve the 







directors is informed about the possibilities of a firm’s going-concern problems and 
thus, enables it to improve on the going-concern of the reporting firm (Chapple et al., 
2012). The audit committee also plays a key part in guaranteeing the independence 
and quality of the external audit. In addition, the overseeing financial reporting role 
of the audit committee raises the prospect of directors and external auditors in 
reaching  a consensus regarding the firm’s going-concern risks (Chapple et al., 
2012). 
The audit committee's composition is an important component of a firm’s structure 
notwithstanding its  size and the members’ independence or qualifications. Hence, it 
has a major role in the firm’s going-concern. Furthermore, it has an oversight 
function as a board committee to ensure that the firm can sustain its future business 
(Ishak, 2016).  
Theoretically, the agency theory postulates that the clash between shareholders and 
management frequently leads to management serving its own personal interests (Al-
Matari et al., 2014; Jensen, & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, these conflicts of interest 
arise mostly due to the manager’s devious manner. For that reason, competent and 
efficient audit committees should be appointed to resolve these conflicts of interest 
(Al-Matari et al., 2014; Klein, 2002; and Mohd, Takiah, & Norman, 2009). This will 
eventually improve the going-concern of the company.  
Previous studies have emphasised that an audit committee is likely to be positively 
related to the performance of  a company (Al Daoud et al., 2015; Amin, Lukviarman, 
Suhardjanto, & Setiany, 2018), which in turn, will influence the firm’s going-







effects of the audit committee (Sharma et al., 2011). Additionally, Al Daoud et al. 
(2015) claimed that the audit committee’s presence in a firm contributes positively to 
improve its performance. Which, in turn, improves the going-concern status of a 
firm. Furthermore, there are limited studies that also focus on the moderating effect 
of the audit committee. Even amongst all the limited studies, their concern was not 
on the moderating effect of the audit committee on the relationship between 
ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern (for example see, Al Daoud et al., 
2015; Kamarudin et al., 2012; and Sharma et al., 2011).  
3.3.6.1 Audit Committee Size 
Several studies have revealed the importance of audit committee size in influencing 
business activities which, in turn, affects the financial reporting, wherein the firm’s 
going-concern is part of the financial reporting. As well, the SEC (2014) code 
recommends that an audit committee must comprise no less than 5 members, and 
there must be at least 3 independent non-executive directors in the committee, a 
majority of whom must be independent. In any case, 1 board member shall be 
financially literate. Audit committee members shall have simple financial literacy 
and shall be able to read and understand financial reports. Likewise, Buchalter and 
Yokomoto (2003) suggested that the audit committee ought to comprise at least 3 to 
5 members; even though it should be based on the company’s size.  
In line with the resource dependence theory, an audit committee with several 
members indicates that the members could offer more resources to the firm. All of 
these possible resources may help to achieve a better going-concern for the firm. 







the better the firm’s performance. Where the audit committee has only a few 
members, the experience of the experts will be limited and it may affect its efficiency 
(Al-Matari et al., 2014; Pfeffer, 1987). 
Likewise, several studies have provided evidence that audit committee size is related 
with a better going-concern position for a firm (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; 
Al-Matari et al., 2014; Amin et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2012; Ismail, Adibah, 
Dunstan, and Zijl, 2010; and Lin, Li, & Yang, 2006). Conversely, Abbott, Parker, 
and Peters (2004); Adiguzel (2013); Baxter and Cotter (2009); Xie, Davidson, and 
DaDalt (2003) ascertained that there was an insignificant relationship between audit 
committee size and the firm’s going-concern variables.  
Similarly, in Nigeria, the importance of the audit committee size as an effective 
governance monitoring mechanism for controlling financial report disclosure of 
firms was considered. Therefore, the SEC (2011&2014) code of corporate 
governance requests that the board of directors should comprise not less than five 
members, and the size of the audit committee should be decided based on the size of 
the board. Empirically, Bala and Gugong (2015), using 8 listed food and beverage 
firms covering the 2007-2014 period, found that audit committee size negatively 
affected earnings management. Similarly, Salihi and Jibril (2015), using 29 listed 
companies in the consumer sector for the period from 2010 to 2013, found that audit 
committee the size negatively and significantly affected earnings management. 
Therefore, Salihi and Jibril (2015) recommended that the audit committee should be 
increased to minimise the likelihood of earnings management, thus increasing the 







of 70 listed non-financial companies for the period of 2011, found an insignificant 
relationship between audit committee size and earnings quality. 
In addition, the agency theory studies have asserted that a bigger size audit 
committee with adequate resources provides faster ratification of financial reporting 
disclosure errors and increases accountability and transparency in a company’s 
financial report (Li et al., 2012). In view of the agency theory, resource dependence 
theory, and prior studies, it was anticipated that the nomination of many audit 
committee participants would improve the internal checking efficiency and lead to a 
better going-concern for a firm. Therefore, it was hypothesised that: 
H6a: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between ownership structure 
and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Furthermore, this hypothesis been divided into more sub-hypotheses to explore the 
moderating effect of audit committee size on the individual ownership structure 
(CEO, executive directors, non-executive directors, block, foreign, and institution) 
and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
There have been mixed findings amongst different groups of scholars regarding 
managerial ownership. Some scholars, such as Ali et al. (2008); Amran and Ahmad 
(2013); Iskandar et al. (2011); Parker et al. (2005); and Ramadan (2016) believed 
that managerial ownership was negatively associated with the firm’s going-concern 
variables. Whilst some others, such as Isenmila and Afensimi (2012); Farouk and 
Hassan (2014); and Chou (2015) were of the view that managerial ownership was 







gap, created by the above studies, by presenting a variable that has a robust 
contingent effect on this relationship. In line with the resource dependence theory, a 
bigger audit committee improves the firm’s performance (Al-Matari et al., 2014; 
Pfeffer, 1987). Correspondingly, some studies have provided evidence that audit 
committee size is related with a better going-concern position for a firm (Ahmad-
Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; Amin et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2012; and Ismail et al., 
2010). Therefore, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6a1: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between CEO ownership and 
the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6a2: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between executive directors’ 
ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Furthermore, previous researchers found a negative relationship between non-
executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern problem (Ali et al., 2008; 
Alzoubi, 2016; Hashim, 2009; and Hashim & Devi, 2008). However, Darko et al. 
(2016) found a positive relation between non-executive directors’ ownership and a 
firm’s going-concern problem. Hence, there is a need to justify these mixed findings 
by presenting a variable that will modify this relationship. Consistent with the 
resource dependence theory, a large audit committee enhances a firm’s performance 
(Al-Matari et al., 2014). Likewise, numerous studies have provided evidence that 
audit committee size is related with a better going-concern position for a firm 
(Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Amin et al., 2018; and 







H6a3: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between non-executive 
directors’ ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Regarding the relationship between block ownership and the firm’s going-concern 
variables, some researchers found a positive relationship (Gulzar & Wang 2011; 
Farooq & El Jai 2012; Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012; and Waweru & Riro, 2013). 
However, some scholars found a negative relationship between the block ownership 
and the firm’s going-concern variables (Alves, 2012; Kurawa & Saheed, 2014; 
Parker et al., 2005; Ramadan, 2016). Hence, this necessitates addressing these mixed 
finding gaps by introducing a variable that can moderate the relationship.  
In agreement with the resource dependence theory, the larger the audit committee, 
the better the firm’s performance will be (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Pfeffer, 1987). 
Equally, several studies have provided evidence that audit committee size is 
associated with a better going-concern position for a firm (Al-Matari et al., 2014; 
Amin et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2012; Ismail et al., 2010; and Lin et al., 2006). 
Therefore, it was hypothesised that: 
H6a4: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between block ownership and 
the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Likewise, the relationship between foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern 
variables was claimed to be positive by some researchers (Aydin et al., 2007; Paik & 
Koh, 2014; Guo & Ma, 2015). Nevertheless, Alzoubi (2016); Guo et al. (2015); and 
Zureigat et al. (2014a) argued that there was a negative relationship between the 







justify the above position by presenting s variable that will influence this relationship 
in order to strengthen or weaken the effect. Consistent with the resource dependence 
theory, the audit committee size was expected to improve the firm’s performance 
(Al-Matari et al., 2014; Pfeffer, 1987). Furthermore, Amin et al. (2018); Garcia et al. 
(2012); Ismail et al. (2010); and Lin et al. (2006) established that audit committee 
size influences a firm’s going-concern position. Hence, it was hypothesised that: 
H6a5: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between foreign ownership 
and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Similarly, concerning the relationship between institutional ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern variables, some researchers have provided empirical evidence that 
high institutional ownership reduces a firm’s going-concern problem (Agyei & 
Owusu, 2014; Alves, 2012; Emamgholipour & Mansourinia, 2013; and Lin & 
Manowan, 2012). On the other hand, Yang et al. (2009); Iskandar et al. (2011) 
showed that high institutional ownership leads to the high going-concern problem of 
a firm. Accordingly, this study proposed to justify this situation by presenting a 
moderating variable.  
In line with the resource dependence theory, large audit committees enhance the 
firms’ performances (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Pfeffer, 1987). Several studies have 
provided evidence that audit committee size is related with a better going-concern for 
a firm (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Amin et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2012; and Lin et al., 







H6a6: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between institutional 
ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
3.3.6.2 Audit Committee Independence 
Audit committees characterised by a large number of non-executive directors as 
members are expected to be more independent compared to those with a high number 
of executive directors as members (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Mohd et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, Lin et al. (2006) claimed that an audit committee with many 
independent participants encourages the effective monitoring of the management and 
lowers the likelihoods for incorrect reporting as there is a slighter quantity of 
interloping from the management. Consistently, external members of the audit 
committee have a fundamental role in ascertaining the corporate governance 
practices in the auditing practices (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Swamy, 2011).  
Furthermore, the agency theory and resource dependence theory claim that audit 
committee independence decreases earnings management activities in a firm (Al-
Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Hence, it reduces the firm’s going-concern problem. 
Established on the agency theory, the efficiency of the audit committee depends on 
its characteristics (Garcia et al., 2012; Klein, 2002). For an audit committee to 
achieve its responsibilities, its participants must be autonomous to the executives 
(Ismail et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is anticipated that a high number of non-
executive participants in the audit committee assists the firm to improve its 







Consistently, previous researchers have provided proof that audit committee 
independence is related to a healthier going-concern of a firm (Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2015; Amin et al., 2018; Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 2003; Garcia et al., 
2012; Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2007; and Salleh & Haat, 2014). Conversely, some 
studies (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Bukit & 
Iskandar, 2009; Carcello & Neal, 2003; Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011; and 
Parker et al., 2005) documented a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and the likelihood of a firm’s going-concern threats. On the other 
hand, limited studies have ascertained an insignificant relationship between the 
independence of the audit committee and a firm’s going-concern problem (Abdullah 
& Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; and Ismail et al., 2010).  
In order to guarantee the integrity and transparency of a firm’s financial activities in 
Nigeria, the SEC (2011&2014) proposed that most of the board members of the audit 
committee shall be independent directors. In Nigeria, to validate this empirically, 
Madawaki and Amran (2013), using a sample of 70 listed non-financial companies 
for the period of 2011, found that an audit committee’s independence was positively 
associated with financial reporting quality. Whereas, Bala and Gugong (2015), using 
8 listed food and beverage firms covering the 2007-2014 period, found that an audit 
committee’s independence was positively and significantly related to earnings 
management. However, Kibiya, Ahmad and Amran (2016), using a sample of 101 
non-financial listed companies for the 2010 to 2014 period, found an insignificantly 
positive relationship between audit committee independence and financial reporting 
quality. Established on the agency and resource dependence theories, it was predicted 







the monitoring of a firm’s going-concern position. Hence, it has been hypothesised 
that: 
H6b: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between ownership 
structure and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Moreover, this hypothesis was divided into more sub-hypotheses to explore the 
moderating effect of audit committee independence on individual ownership 
structure (CEO, executive directors, non-executive directors, block, foreign, and 
institution) and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Regarding managerial ownership, there is evidence of mixed findings amongst 
different groups of scholars. Ali et al. (2008); Alves, (2012); Amran and Ahmad 
(2013); and Iskandar et al. (2011) believed that managerial ownership was negatively 
associated with a firm’s going-concern. Whereas, some others, such as Davidson et 
al. (2004); Isenmila and Afensimi (2012); Farouk and Hassan (2014); and Chou 
(2015) were of the view that managerial ownership was positively related to a firm’s 
going-concern. Therefore, there is a need to address these mixed results by 
introducing a moderating variable. Moreover, the agency and resource dependence 
theories emphasise that audit committee independence decreases a firm’s going-
concern problem (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Likewise, prior scholars have 
provided proof that audit committee independence influences a firm’s going-concern 
status (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; Al-Matari et al., 2014; Al-Rassas & 








H6b1: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between CEO 
ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6b2: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between executive 
directors’ ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
With respect to the relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership and the 
firm’s going-concern variables, Ali et al. (2008); Alzoubi (2016); Bhagat and Black 
(2001); and Hashim and Devi (2008) established that there was a negative 
relationship; however, Darko et al. (2016) claimed that there was a positive 
relationship. Thus, there is a need to address this gap by adopting a variable that will 
modify this relationship. Moreover, the agency and resource dependence theories 
assert that audit committee independence influences a firm’s going-concern status 
(Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Similarly, previous researchers have provided proof 
that audit committee independence is related to a firm’s going-concern (Amin et al., 
2018; Bukit & Iskandar, 2009; Carcello et al., 2011; Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 
2003; Garcia et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2005; Saleh, et al, 2007; and Salleh & Haat, 
2014). Therefore, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6b3: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between non-
executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
Concerning the relationship between block ownership and the firm’s going-concern 
variables, some scholars claim that there is a positive relationship (Farooq & El Jai, 







scholars claim a negative relationship between block ownership and a firm’s going-
concern (Alves, 2012; Gonzalez & Garcia-Meca, 2014; Kurawa & Saheed, 2014; 
Parker et al., 2005; and Ramadan, 2016). Hence, this necessitates introducing a 
variable that can moderate this relationship. Furthermore, the agency and resource 
dependence theories emphasise that audit committee independence reduces a firm’s 
going-concern problem (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Moreover, Bukit and 
Iskandar (2009); Carcello and Neal (2003); Feldmann and Schwarzkopf (2003); 
Garcia et al. (2012); Saleh et al. (2007); and Salleh and Haat (2014) provided proof 
that audit committee independence affects a firm’s going-concern. Therefore, it has 
been hypothesised that: 
H6b4: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between block 
ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Furthermore, some scholars claim that there is a positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern (Aydin et al., 2007; Ogega, 2014; and 
Paik & Koh, 2014). However, some researchers argue that there is a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern (Alzoubi, 2016; 
Guo et al., 2015; Kim, 2015; and Klai & Omri, 2011). Hence, this study has 
presented a variable that will strengthen or weaken the relationship. Moreover, the 
agency theory and resource dependence theory claim that audit committee 
independence improves a firm’s going-concern (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). 
Along the same line, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015); Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-
Hussin (2010); Al-Matari et al. (2014); Amin et al. (2018); Bukit and Iskandar, 







independence is related to a better going-concern for a firm. Hence, it has been 
hypothesised that: 
H6b5: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between foreign 
ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Furthermore, as for the relationship between institutional ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern variables, some studies have provided empirical evidence that 
institutional ownership can improve a firm’s going-concern (Alves, 2012; Agyei & 
Owusu, 2014; Emamgholipour & Mansourinia, 2013; and Lin & Manowan, 2012). 
Conversely, some studies have provided empirical evidence that high institutional 
ownership reduces a firm’s going-concern (Iskandar et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2009). 
As a result, the moderating variable has been introduced. Similarly, the agency and 
resource dependence theories assert that audit committee independence decreases a 
firm’s going-concern threat (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Consistently, Ahmad-
Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010); Al-Matari et al. (2014); Al-Rassas and Kamardin 
(2015); Amin et al. (2018); Carcello et al. (2011); Garcia et al. (2012); and Salleh 
and Haat (2014) documented evidence concerning the relationship of audit 
committee independence and the likelihood of a firm’s going-concern threats. 
Therefore, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6b6: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between 








3.3.6.3 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Knowledge of finance is paramount for audit committee efficiency in elevating the 
quality financial reporting soundness (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Therefore, the 
increases in a firm’s going-concern are responsive. The significance of audit 
committee financial expertise have been extensively discussed and recommended by 
different Company Laws and codes of corporate governance, globally. In Nigeria, 
the CAMA 1990 and SEC (2014) have emphasised the audit committee members’ 
financial expertise. It is mandatory that at least 1 of the audit committee members has 
basic finance knowledge (CAMA, 1990; SEC, 2014). Moreover, in line with the 
resource dependence theory, Abdullah, (2015) claimed that firms could benefit from 
an audit committee with a high level of financial knowledge and experience. 
The audit committee participants’ educational qualifications affect their duties 
(DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). If the members have a comprehensive understanding of 
the auditing matters, comprising risk alertness and exposure, then they should be 
more effective in supporting the auditor’s decision to form a going-concern opinion 
of the firm. Furthermore, the audit committee effectiveness hangs on the participants’ 
financial knowledge which raises the firm’s performance and prevents its financial 
suffering (Rahmat, & Iskandar, 2009; Sallouma, Azzia, & Gebrayelb, 2014). 
Accordingly,audit committees with members who are financially literate can reduce 
the financial distress of the companies (Rahmat & Iskandar, 2009). From the 
perspective of the internal audit, the presence of professionals in finance in the audit 
committee reduces the possibility of internal control weaknesses (Hotaish, Hotaish, 







A financially-literate audit committee consists of members who can read and 
understand fundamental financial statements and evaluate or analyse financial 
information (Sallouma et al., 2014). Similarly, the electing of audit committee 
members with accounting and finance experience aids to reinforce the operation of 
the committee, essentially in checking and to enhance the financial reporting quality 
(Wan Ismail & Kamarudin, 2012). Therefore, enhances firm going-concern signals. 
Moreover, Mangena and Tauringana (2008) describe that educated members of the 
audit committee are in a better situation to appreciate financial reporting matters, as 
well as auditor decisions for that reason, may possibly provide better checking of the 
financial reporting procedure.  
Some studies claim that audit committee members’ financial expertise increased the 
productivity of a firm’s internal control (Amin et al., 2018; Badara & Saidin, 2014; 
Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009; Wan Ismail & Kamarudin, 
2012; and Yusof, 2010). However, some researchers like Mohamad, Rashid, & 
Shawtari (2012) and Sallouma et al. (2014) found that audit committee financial 
expertise did not have any influence on a firm’s going-concern.  
In the Nigerian setting, it is a prerequisite of the CAMA 1990 and SEC (2014) that, 
in any case, at least 1 member of the audit committee must be a shareholder with 
financial knowledge. Likewise, all members of the committee shall be capable of 
understanding financial reports (SEC, 2014). To support this, Madawaki and Amran 
(2013) used a sample of 70 listed Nigerian non-financial companies for the period of 
2011. The study found that audit committee expertise was positively related to high 







Similarly, Bala and Gugong (2015), using 8 listed food and beverage firms covering 
the 2007-2014 period, found the audit committees’ financial expertise had a negative 
relationship with earnings management. Likewise, Kibiya et al. (2016), using a 
sample of 101 non-financial listed companies for the 2010 to 2014 period, found that 
audit committee financial expertise was positive and significantly influenced the 
financial reporting quality. 
Given all these opinions and proofs, it is posited that companies with a greater 
percentage of financial experts in the audit committee would reduce the effect that 
the companies have on audit risks. Established on the agency theory along with the 
resource dependence theory, it has been argued that audit committee financial 
expertise reduces earnings management and increases profitability and a firm’s 
going-concern position. Hence, it has been hypothesised that:  
H6c: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between 
ownership structure and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Moreover, this hypothesis can be divided into more sub-hypotheses to explore the 
moderating effect of audit committee financial expertise on individual ownership 
structures (CEO, executive directors, non-executive directors, block, foreign, and 
institution) and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Regarding managerial ownership and a firm’s going-concern, some of the previous 
researchers found that managerial ownership was negatively associated with a firm’s 
going-concern (Ali et al., 2008; Alves, 2012; Amran & Ahmad, 2013; Iskandar et al., 







scholars found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and a firm’s 
going-concern (Chou, 2015; Davidson et al., 2004; Farouk & Hassan, 2014; and 
Isenmila & Afensimi, 2012). Therefore, due to these mixed findings, there is a need 
to introduce a moderating variable in order to strengthen or weaken the existing 
relationship. Grounded on the agency and resource dependence theories, audit 
committee financial expertise decreases earnings management practices and 
improves a firm’s going-concern. Likewise, some of the previous studies claim that 
audit committee members’ financial expertise affected a firm’s internal control and 
the firm’s going-concern (Amin et al., 2018; Badara & Saidin, 2014; Wan Ismail & 
Kamarudin, 2012; and Yusof, 2010). Therefore, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6c1: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between CEO 
ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6c2: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between 
executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
Whereas, Ali et al. (2008); Alzoubi (2016); Beasley (1996); Bhagat and Black 
(2001); and Hashim and Devi (2008) established a negative relationship between 
non-executive directors’ ownership and the possibility of a firm’s going-concern 
problem. Darko et al. (2016) claimed a positive relationship between non-executive 
directors’ ownership and the possibility of a firm’s going-concern problem. Thus, 
there is a need to present a variable that will modify this relationship. Established on 
the agency and resource dependence theories, audit committee financial expertise 







position. Similarly, Amin et al. (2018); Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009); Wan 
Ismail and Kamarudin (2012); and Yusof (2010) found that audit committee 
participants’ financial expertise influenced a firm’s internal control and, hence, 
affected the firm’s going-concern. Therefore, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6c3: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between non-
executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
Moreover, Gulzar and Wang (2011); Farooq and El Jai (2012); Waweru and Riro 
(2013); and Isenmila and Afensimi (2012) claimed that there was a positive 
relationship between the block ownership and the firm’s going-concern variables. 
However, scholars like Parker et al. (2005); Alves (2012); Gonzalez and Garcia-
Meca (2014); and Ramadan (2016) claimed that there was a negative relationship 
between the block ownership and the firm’s going-concern variables. Hence, this 
necessitates the introduction of a variable that can moderate the relationship. 
Established on the agency and resource dependence theories, it has been argued that 
audit committee financial expertise reduces earnings management and increases 
profitability and a firm’s going-concern position. Equally, previous studies are of the 
opinion that audit committee participants’ financial expertise influenced a firm’s 
going-concern (Amin et al., 2018; Badara & Saidin, 2014; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 
2009; and Wan Ismail & Kamarudin, 2012). Hence, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6c4: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between block 







Furthermore, some scholars claimed that there was a positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern (Aydin et al., 2007; Guo & Ma, 2015; 
Ogega 2014; and Paik & Koh, 2014). However, some researchers found a negative 
relationship between a firm’s going-concern and the foreign ownership (Alzoubi, 
2016; Guo et al., 2015; Kim, 2015; Klai & Omri, 2011; and Zureigat et al., 2014a). 
Hence, there is a need to introduce a variable that will strengthen or weaken this 
relationship. In line with the agency and resource dependence theories, audit 
committee financial expertise can reduce earnings management practices and 
improve a firm’s going-concern. Similarly, Amin et al. (2018); Baxter and Cotter 
(2009); Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009); and Yusof (2010) claimed that audit 
committee participants’ financial expertise can increase the efficiency of a firm’s 
internal control and enhance a firm’s going-concern. Hence, it has been hypothesised 
that: 
H6c5: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between 
foreign ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Moreover, Agyei and Owusu (2014); Alves, (2012); Emamgholipour and 
Mansourinia (2013); and Lin and Manowan (2012) claimed that an increase in 
institutional ownership improved the firm’s going-concern variables. On the 
contrary, an increasing institutional ownership led to a decrease in the firm’s going-
concern variables in the companies (Iskandar et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2009). 
Therefore, a moderating variable has been introduced. In line with the agency and 
resource dependence theories, audit committee financial expertise reduces earnings 







Furthermore, Amin et al. (2018); Badara and Saidi (2014); Wan Ismail and 
Kamarudin, (2012); and Yusof (2010) argued that audit committee participants’ 
financial expertise can upturn the productivity of a firm’s internal control and a 
firm’s going-concern. Thus, it has been hypothesised that: 
H6c6: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
3.3.7 Summary of the Developed Hypotheses 
A summary of the developed hypotheses is presented in Table 3.1 below: 
Table 3.1  
Summary of Hypotheses 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between CEO ownership and 
going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
H1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between executive directors’ 
ownership and going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between non-executive directors’ 
ownership and going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between block ownership and  
going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H5: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6a1: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between CEO ownership and 
going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6a2: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between executive director 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 







director ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6a4: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between block ownership and 
going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6a5: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between foreign ownership 
and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6a6: Audit committee size moderates the relationship between institutional 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6b1: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between CEO 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6b2: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between executive 
director ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6b3: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between non-
executive director ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
H6b4: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between block 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6b5: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between foreign 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6b6: Audit committee independence moderates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6c1: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between CEO 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6c2: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between 
executive director ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
H6c3: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between non-
executive director ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
H6c4: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between block 
ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
H6c5: Audit committee financial expertise moderates the relationship between 
foreign ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 







institutional ownership and going-concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This section started with the research framework, as well as the hypothesis 
development based on the relationship between the dependent, independent, and 
moderating variables. These relationships covered managerial ownership and a 
firm’s going-concern, non-executive director and a firm’s going-concern, block 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern, institutional ownership and a firm’s going-
concern, and foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern. As well, it presented the 
moderating effect of audit committee size, independence, and financial expertise on 
such relationships. The following section discusses the administration of the 
research, the collection of the data process, and the research instruments that were 










This section offers the research methodology that was engaged in conducting this 
research work. It includes a discussion on the research design, the population of the 
study, the sample size and sampling technique, and the sources and methods of the 
data collection used. It also explains the variables of the study, their measurements, 
and the statistical tools for the analysis of the data. 
4.2 Research Design 
The philosophy that guides study effects how things are observed by the researchers. 
The key branches of philosophy that are relevant to research are epistemology and 
ontology. Where epistemology is a branch that considers the methods, nature, and 
origin of things that are restricted to the human understanding. Researchers may 
rationalise their beliefs in the way they observe things by means of personal 
reasoning, despite the fact that it may possibly not be similar to another person’s 
opinion. Therefore, the epistemological position has affected the design and methods 
to be utilised for the data collection in this study. On the other hand, ontology is a 
branch that considers nature and the relations of being that have existed, which are 
the basic clusters and affect the actual essence of the matter being examined (Burrell 
& Morgan, 1979).  
As well, the 2 prevailing paradigms or opinions in relation to the nature of 







organise the research data into a system of beliefs of which the expressions are 
peculiar to a situation. Whereas, the Positivist research strives for discovering the 
study data using propositions that can be verified or recognised in other settings (Lin, 
1998). This research was intended to be a positivist research.  
The epistemological postulation of positivists is that for knowledge to be regarded as 
a significant material (external), the reality is observational only (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002). Also, Lin (1998) claimed that establishing causal 
relationships is the jurisdiction of positivist research. Positivists argue that 
knowledge can be forecast and described by perceiving the symmetries of action and 
causal relationships amongst the components in the population in an epistemology 
founded study (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
Similarly, Yin (2003) claimed that the ontological paradigm of the positivists accepts 
that reality is external and must be studied by objective procedures. Hence, the 
interpretivist method is disregarded once the objective approach is chosen, whereas 
the subjective method is motivated by interpretations established on human feelings, 
senses, thoughts or perceptions (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Hence, some procedures 
utilised in this research have reflected the epistemology as well as the ontology of the 
positivist paradigm. Established on the above, this research has attempted to discover 
the knowledge that occurs in the corporate environment, categorically, ownership 
structure and audit committee. to predict a firm’s going-concern. 
A quantitative research method was employed to gather data for this research. The 
research design that was used for this research was the ex-post facto research design 







This is given the fact that the research entailed the use of the annual reports and 
accounts of the listed Nigerian financial institutions. Hence, the non-survey research 
design was adopted in this study considering its relative importance to the 
actualisation of the study objective which was aimed at evaluating the effects of 
ownership structure on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions, 
as well as the moderating effects of the audit committee on this relationship. The data 
for this research, therefore, were collected, measured, and analysed from the annual 
reports and accounts of the listed Nigerian financial institutions under investigation. 
4.3 Population of the Study  
The population of concern was the whole of the listed financial institutions that 
operated in Nigeria. This work covered the period from 2006 to 2015, as this was the 
era in which the Nigerian financial sector had witnessed various changes; besides 
that, some of the possible effects were quite visible. It was at that time that, the SEC 
issued the revised corporate governance code in 2011 and 2014. In which, in 2014, it 
mandated that all registered firms adhere to all the provisions of the code of 
governance. Similarly, in this period, the CBN in 2006 issued a code of corporate 
governance for Banks and Discount Houses. Likewise, the NAICOM 2009 code of 
corporate governance for insurance companies was presented within this period. 
More so, in this period, the CBN issued a revised code of corporate governance for 
Banks and Discount Houses in 2014 to address the vague areas of the previous code 
including ownership structure. 
Similarly, it was within this period that the World Bank assessment of the status 







Code (ROSC) 2011 revealed that there was a poor implementation. Moreover, it 
showed that many financial institutions in Nigeria were misusing the ambiguities of 
the Nigerian laws as well as the Accounting and Auditing Standards related to 







Table 4.1  
Study Population 
S/N   Company Name Year of Listing 
    Banking Sub-sector   
1 1 Abbey Building Society Plc. 2008 
2 2 Access Bank Plc. 1989 
3 3 Aso Saving and Loans Plc. 2008 
4 4 Diamond Bank Plc. 2005 
5 5 EcoBank Transnational Incorporated 2006 
6 6 FBN Holding Plc. 1971 
7 7 Fidelity Bank Holding Plc. 2005 
8 8 First City Monument Bank Plc. 2004 
9 9 Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc. 2012 
10 10 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc. 1996 
11 11 Infinity Trust Mortgage Bank Plc. 2013 
12 12 NPL Micro Finance Bank Plc. 2010 
13 13 Omoluabi Savings and Loans Plc. 2014 
14 14 Resort Saving and Loans Plc. 2009 
15 15 Skye Bank Plc. 2005 
16 16 Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc. 2005 
17 17 Sterling Bank Plc. 1993 
18 18 Union Bank of Nigeria Plc.  1970 
19 19 United Bank for Africa Plc. 1970 
20 20 Unity Bank Plc. 2005 
21 21 Wema Bank Plc. 1991 
22 22 Zenith Bank Plc. 2004 




23 1 Aiico Insurance Plc. 1990 
24 2 African Alliance Insurance Plc. 2009 
25 3 AxaMansard Insurance Plc. 1989 
26 4 Consolidated Hallmark Insurance Plc. 2008 
27 5 Continental Reinsurance Plc. 2007 
28 6 Cornerstone Insurance Plc. 1997 
29 7 Custodian and Allied Insurance Plc. 2007 
30 8 Equity Assurances Plc. 2007 
31 9 Gold link Insurance Plc. 2008 
32 10 Great Nigerian Insurance Plc. 2005 
33 11 Guinea Insurance Plc. 1991 
34 12 International Energy Insurance Plc.  2007 








Table 4.1 (Continued) 
S/N   Company Name Year of Listing 
35 13 Investment and Allied Assurances Plc. 2008 
36 14 Lasaco Assurance Plc. 1991 
37 15 Law Union and Rock Insurance Plc. 1990 
38 16 Linkage Assurance Plc. 2003 
39 17 Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc. 2002 
40 18 N.E.M. Insurance Co. Nig. Plc. 1990 
41 19 Niger Insurance Co. Plc. 1993 
42 20 Prestige Assurance Co. Plc.  1990 
43 21 Regency Allied Insurance Plc. 2008 
44 22 Royal Exchange Plc. 1990 
45 23 Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc. 2006 
46 24 Staco Insurance Plc. 2007 
47 25 Standard Alliance Insurance Plc.  2003 
48 26 Unic Insurance Plc. 1990 
49 27 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc. 2009 
50 28 Universal Insurance Co. Plc. 2008 
51 29 Wapic Insurance Plc. 1991 
  
Others Financial Institutions 
 
52 1 Africa Prudential Registrars Plc. 2013 
53 2 Deap Capital Management Plc. 2007 
54 3 Sim Capital Allied Value Plc. 2011 
55 4 United Capital Plc. 2013 
Source: NSE Factbook 2015 
Thus, the study has covered the quoted financial institutions operating in the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange as of 2015 as presented in Table 4.1 above. 
4.4 Sample Size and Sampling Technique 
The sample size represents the part of the population to be considered for the purpose 
of reducing the population. As stated by Asika (1991) and Turner (2003), the best 
sample is the whole population itself, since all the components of the population are 







accurately estimate the population features, thereby minimising sampling errors and 
warranting the absence of systematic variance. In line with the study of Samaila 
(2014), this study applied the census sampling technique. The census sampling 
technique is a technique in which all the elements of the population are considered as 
part of the sampling technique; in this way, it will eliminate any potential bias 
occurring through the sampling technique.  
Table 4.2 presents the detailed procedures adopted and the number of firms for each 
sub-sector and for each year for the sample size as presented below. 
Table 4.2  
Sample Selection Procedure and Sub-Sector Distribution  
Details Firms Obs. % Sub-sector Firms Obs. % 
Firms listed after 31st December 2006  32 320   Banks 15 150 47% 
Firm Below Listing Standard 1 10 3% Insurance 14 140 44% 
Firm under restructuring process  1 10 3% Others 0 0 0% 
Firms without complete data 1 10 3%       
Final firm- year observations 29 290 91% Total 29 290 91% 
Therefore, all the listed financial institutions that existed from 2006 to 2015 were 
taken as the sample size of the study. However, firms that had been listed in the NSE 
later than the 31st December 2006 and companies below the listing standards, 
companies under the restructuring process, and companies without available data 








Table 4.3  
Study Sample 
S/N   Company Name Sub-Sector Listed On 
1 1 Access Bank Plc Bank 1989 
2 2 Diamond Bank Plc Bank 2005 
3 3 EcoBank Transnational Incorporated Bank 2006 
4 4 FBN Holding Plc Bank 1971 
5 5 Fidelity Bank Holding Plc Bank 2005 
6 6 First City Monument Bank Plc Bank 2004 
7 7 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc Bank 1996 
8 8 Skye Bank Plc Bank 2005 
9 9 Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc Bank 2005 
10 10 Sterling Bank Plc Bank 1993 
11 11 Union Bank of Nigeria Plc Bank 1970 
12 12 United Bank for Africa Plc Bank 1970 
13 13 Unity Bank Plc Bank 2005 
14 14 Wema Bank Plc Bank 1991 
15 15 Zenith Bank Plc Bank 2004 
          
16 1 Aiico Insurance Plc Insurance 1990 
17 2 AxaMansard Insurance Plc Insurance 1989 
18 3 Cornerstone Insurance Plc Insurance 1997 
19 4 Guinea Insurance Plc Insurance 1991 
20 5 Lasaco Assurance Plc Insurance 1991 
21 6 Law Union and Rock Insurance Plc Insurance 1990 
22 7 Linkage Assurance Plc Insurance 2003 
23 8 Mutual Benefit Assurance Plc Insurance 2002 
24 9 N.E.M. Insurance Co. Nig. Plc Insurance 1990 
25 10 Niger Insurance Co. Plc Insurance 1993 
26 11 Prestige Assurance Co. Plc Insurance 1990 
27 12 Royal Exchange Plc Insurance 1990 
28 13 Standard Alliance Insurance Plc Insurance 2003 
29 14 Wapic Insurance Plc Insurance 1991 
4.5 Sources and Method of the Data Collection 
The main aim of this study was to evaluate the moderating effects of the audit 
committee on the ownership structure and the going-concern of the quoted Nigerian 
financial institutions. Moreover, the International Accounting Standards Board 







express his/her opinion on the firm’s going-concern or otherwise of the firm based on 
the annual reports and accounts submitted to it (IAS 1). The reliability of a report on 
any research must be influenced by the correctness of the data collected and the 
techniques used in conducting the research.  
Consistent with the aim of this research and based on the importance of the 
secondary data to the research topic, the research, therefore, utilised the secondary 
source of data. The data was obtained from the annual reports and the accounts of the 
listed financial institutions of the study covering a period of ten years from 2006 to 
2015. Therefore, the Nigeria Stock Exchange, data-stream of Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope database, and websites of respective financial institutions were 
appropriate resource centres for the required data. 
4.6 Variables of the Study and Measurements 
These research variables consist of the dependent, independent, control, and 
moderating variables and their measurements. The research used 3 measurements of 
the firm’s going-concern problem to understand their effectiveness. The firm’s 
going-concern measurements as the dependent variables included the Altman “Z-
Score” 2017 bankruptcy model, discretionary loan loss provisions, and return on 
assets. Whereas, the independent variables were comprised of CEO ownership, 
executive directors’ ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, block 
ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership. Furthermore, audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, and audit committee financial 
expertise represented the moderating variables. Whereas, company size, loss-loss, 







Table 4.4 below presents the acronyms, descriptions, measurements, predicted signs, 
and data sources of the study variables. 
Table 4.4  
Descriptive summary of the Variable Measurements 
Acronym Description Formula Expected Sign Data Source 
Firm’s going-concern Variables 
Z-Score  Altman 2017 
bankruptcy  
Z = 3.25 + 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 
+ 1.05X4  
 Annual Report 




The absolute value of accruals loan loss 
provisions to total liabilities 
 Annual Report 
and Data Stream 
ROA Return on Net 
Assets 
The ratio of Net Income to Total Asset  Annual Report 
and Data Stream 
GC Firm’s going-
concern 








Percentage of executive directors’ 
shareholding in the firm 




Percentage of non-executive directors’ 
shareholding in the firm 
+ Annual Report 
BO Block 
Ownership 
Percentage of owners with 5% and 
above shareholding in the firm 
+ Annual Report 
FO Foreign 
Ownership 
Percentage of foreign investors 
shareholding in the firm 
+ Annual Report 
IO Institutional 
Ownership 
Percentage of institutional investors 
shareholding in the firm 
+ Annual Report 
Audit Committee Characteristics 
ACS Audit 
Committee Size 
Total number of audit committee 
members 




Percentage of non-executive audit 
committee members 




Percentage of members with members 
of accounting and finance academic or 
professional qualification 
+ Annual Report 
Control Variables 
FS Firm Size Natural logarithm of total asset + Data Stream 
LL Loss-Loss A dichotomous variable, "1" if the 
previous Profit after Tax (PAT) is 
negative and otherwise "0." 
- Annual Report 
and Data Stream 
Tang Tangibility Proportion of a fixed asset to total 
assets  







4.6.1  The Dependent Variables and their Measurements 
Bankruptcy estimation model: This refers to the likelihood that a firm will not be 
capable of servicing its debt anymore and would, therefore, wind-up its business; as 
it is assumed that most of the quoted firms, which were not excluded, had a huge 
volume of their funds as loans. Consistent with Sajjan (2016) the likelihood of 
bankruptcy is measured by the Altman 2017 bankruptcy model score, which 
integrates various financial indicators (Altman et al., 2017). Altman estimated the 
following four-variable Z-Score model as:  
Z = 3.25 + 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4     Model 1 
Where:  
Z = Overall Index  
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets  
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets  
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets  
X4 = Book value of equity/Book value of total liabilities 
 Zones of discrimination: 
Z > 2.6 = “Safe” Zone 
1.1 < Z < 2.6 = “Grey” Zone 
Z < 1.1 = “Distress” Zone 
Hence, the greater the Z-score, the better the going-concern status of the business. 
Earnings Management: In the same way as non-financial firms, banks can use 







accruals of banks are the loan loss provisions (LLPs) which play a more complex 
role than the accruals of the non-financial companies for 2 reasons (Ahmed, Takeda, 
& Thomas, 1999; Norden, & Stoian, 2013). LLPs, concurrently, affect the 
profitability and risk of the banks, which results in a trade-off (Beatty & Liao, 2011; 
Bushman & Williams, 2012; and Norden & Stoian, 2013). Also, according to Healy 
and Wahlen (1999), they suggested that the bank loan loss allowance is 
discretionary. Whereas, Non-performing loans are non-discretionary, and the loan 
charge-offs are considered relatively non-discretionary. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
also mentioned that loan loss reserves are extremely reliant on management’s 
decisions, are openly connected to the bank’s most vital assets and liabilities and are 
usually very huge proportionate to the net income as well as equity book values. 
Consequently, as a result of the significance and the judgment of the bank loan loss 
provisions/allowance by banks, this is a good measurement to measure earnings 
management (Altamuro & Beatty, 2010; Cohen et al., 2014).  
Since discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs) are fundamentally the banking 
equivalent of discretionary accrual models, and since discretionary accrual models 
have been verified widely, therefore, in line with Ahmed et al., 1999; Beatty & Liao, 
2011; Bushman & Williams, 2012; Kazemian & Sanusi, 2015; and Norden & Stoian, 
2013), this research has used the absolute value of loan loss provisions to total 
liabilities. 
However, for the insurance companies, in line with Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson 
(2003) and Gaver and Paterson (2004), the insurance loss reserve accrual (also 







reserves signify the major charge on insurers’ accounts, whereas under-reserving 
decreases the stated liabilities and raises the insurance companies’ assets, as a result, 
it empowers insurance companies to appear safer than they are and vice versa 
(Veprauskaite & Adams, 2014). Beaver et al. (2003) and Gaver and Paterson (2004) 
explained that insurance companies’ managers can understate loss reserves with the 
aim of reducing the stated loss liabilities and evading financial distress as well as 
insolvency. 
The Profitability: This is a sign of how profitable a company is before it is 
leveraged, and is related to other firms in a similar industry. It is measured as the 
ratio of net income to the total asset. This is in line with Mohammad (2012); Ogega 
(2014), and Sanda et al. (2005).  
A consolidated matrix was applied to combine all 3 of the firm’s going-concern 
indicators into one model. The technique of integrating multiple measures to come 
up with a fresh one is not new in accounting literature (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang, 2012). The relationship between the Z-score and a firm’s going-concern is 
that, the higher the Z-score, the lower the bankruptcy possibility, thus the better the 
firm’s going-concern (Altman et al., 2017; Zureigat et al., 2014a,b). Similarly, the 
relationship between the ROA and a firm’s going-concern is direct; that is, the higher 
the ROA, the better the profitability (Mohammad, 2012; Sanda et al., 2005), hence, 
the better the going-concern status of the firm. Whereas, for Discretionary accruals 
and the firm’s going-concern relationship, the higher the discretionary accruals, the 
higher the earnings management (Beatty & Liao, 2011; Norden & Stoian, 2013; 







To measure a firm’s going-concern, this study consolidated these 3 known measures 
of a firm’s going-concern, which were the Altman 2017 Bankruptcy Z-score Model 
(Altman et al., 2017; Sajjan, 2016), Discretionary loan loss provisions (Cohen, 
Cornett et al., 2014; Norden & Stoian, 2013), and the return on assets (Mohammad, 
2012; Ogega, 2014) to arrive at a more robust measure of the variable. The study, 
firstly, multiplied the discretionary accruals by negative one (so that the higher 
amount, the better the firm’s going-concern) and added it to the Z-Score and the 
ROA (which all had a direct relationship with a better going-concern of the firm). 
The higher the amount of this aggregate measure, the more likely that the going-
concern of the firm would be healthier. Thus: 
GC = Z-Score + ROA – DLLP      Model 2 
Where: 
GC denotes Firm Going-Concern; 
Z-Score denotes Altman 2017 bankruptcy Model; 
DLLP denotes Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions; 
ROA denotes Return on Net Assets. 
 
4.6.2 The Independent Variables and their Measurements 
CEO Ownership (CO): This is the percentage of equity held by the CEO of the 
company at the end of the accounting year. This covers the direct and indirect 
shareholdings of the CEO in the company. The higher the percentage of the CEO 







would do any potential legitimate actions to protect their own financial benefits and 
the overall economic benefits of the whole of the shareholders (Alves, 2012; Farouk 
& Hassan, 2014; Jiang et al., 2010; and Liu & Tsai, 2015). 
Executive directors’ ownership (EO): The executive directors’ ownership is 
measured by the percentage or ratio of the equity ownership of the executive 
directors to the total equity. This consists of the direct and indirect shareholders as 
the executive directors of the firm. The greater the percentage of the executive 
directors’ shareholdings, the healthier the firm’s going-concern as the management 
would do every legal possible action to protect their financial interests and the 
overall economic interests of the whole of the stakeholders (Alzoubi, 2016; Amran & 
Ahmad, 2013; and Elsayed, 2007). 
Non-executive directors’ ownership (NO): The non-executive directors’ ownership 
is measured by the percentage or fraction of the equity ownership of the non-
executive directors. This contains the direct and indirect shareholdings of the non-
directors in the business. The higher the percentage of the non-executive directors’ 
equity ownership, the healthier the going-concern of the company will be as the non-
executive directors would do any appropriate, possible movement to protect their 
economic interests and those of the other shareholders (Ali et al., 2008; Alzoubi, 
2016; and Darko et al., 2016). 
Block Ownership (BO): This is measured as the percentage or ratio of the equity 
stakes of a company, which is 5% or beyond that held by investors. This comprises 
managerial, foreign, institutional, or any other type of shareholder. This is responsive 







Foreign Ownership (FO): This is measured as the percentage of the total equity 
stakes possessed by foreign shareholders at the end of the accounting year. This is in 
accordance with the studies of Jeon et al. (2011); Iskandar, Bukit, and Sanusi (2012); 
and Greenaway, Guariglia, and Yu (2014). 
Institutional Ownership (IO): This is measured as the percentage of the total equity 
stakes possessed by institution shareholders at the end of the accounting year. This is 
in line with the studies of Iskandar et al. (2011) and Miko and Kamardin (2015). 
4.6.3 The Moderating Variables and their Measurements 
Audit Committee Size (ACZ): This is measured as the total number of audit 
committee members. This is consistent with Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 2010; Al-
Matari et al., 2014; Garcia et al., 2012; Ismail et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2006; and Miko 
& Kamardin, 2015). Consistent with the resource dependence theory, the bigger the 
audit committee, the higher the firm performance will be (Pfeffer, 1987; Al-Matari et 
al., 2014), therefore, the healthier the firm’s going-concern position. 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI): This is the percentage of non-executive 
audit committee associates to the overall number of audit committee members. This 
is consistent with Al-Matari et al., 2014; Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Garcia et al., 
2012; Mansor, Che-Ahmad, Ahmad-Zaluki, & Osman, 2013; Miko & Kamardin, 
2015; and Salleh & Haat, 2014). The agency and resource dependence theories assert 
that the independence of the audit committee decreases earnings management (Al-
Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Therefore, there will be a decrease in the firm’s going-







control assists the company to improve its performance and to escape any financial 
distress, which will, sequentially, decrease the firm’s going-concern threats. 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise (ACE): This measures the percentage of the 
audit committee members with finance-related academic or professional 
qualifications to the total number of the audit committee members. This is consistent 
with Badara & Saidin, 2014; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Sallouma et al., 2014; and 
Wan Ismail & Kamarudin, 2012). From the perspective of the internal audit, the 
presence of financial experts on the audit committee reduces the likelihood of 
internal control weaknesses (Zhang et al., 2007; Hotaish et al., 2009; and Naike & 
Sharma, 2009). Hence, it reduces a firm’s going-concern threats.  
4.6.4 Control Variables and their Measurements 
The research included the following control variables: Firstly, control for firm size 
by means of the natural logarithm of the company’s total assets (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, 
& Cosset, 2012). Such control was essential due to the argument that bigger 
companies have fewer possibilities of having going-concern difficulties. Besides that, 
a control variable for a firm’s going-concern using Loss-loss was measured through a 
dichotomous variable, that is, 1 was assigned if the previous Profit after Tax (PAT) 
was negative; otherwise, 0 was allocated (Ben-Nasr et al., 2012; Goh, Krishnan, & 
Li, 2013; and Li, 2009). Lastly, asset tangibility was used as an alternative control 
variable, and it was measured as the proportion of a fixed asset to the total assets 







4.7 Techniques of Data Analysis 
In view of the nature of the proposed source of data for this research; specifically, 
annual reports and accounts, and considering its nature (quantitative analysis). The 
use of descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation coefficient, and linear panel-data 
analyses were employed in analysing the data for the purpose of presentation and the 
discussion of the outcomes. The brief justification of the techniques that were utilised 
will be explained in the subsequent subsections. 
4.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics were used in this research to calculate the summary statistics 
that defined the central tendency, along with how the data spread out around the 
value or the variability. This instrument is familiar in describing the dependent, the 
independent, and the moderating variables of the research by computing the mean, 
median, mode range, and standard deviation of the variables.  
4.7.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
Pearson Correlation analysis is particularly useful in ascertaining the strength and 
direction of the association between the variables one-on-one (Hamilton, 2003). This 
is used to determine the nature of the relationships amongst all of the variables under 
study so as to understand their individual relationships with one another before 
regressing them. The values range from -1 to +1, but specifically, there are 4 logical 
correlation coefficients, which are: 
If the variables are independent, i.e., there is no relationship between them, the 







relationship, i.e., +1, the variables are positively related, which means that, as one 
variable varies, the other changes in the same proportion and direction. If the 
variables show a perfect negative connection, i.e., when the correlation is equal to -1, 
it means that, as one variable rises, the other declines by the same proportion. If the 
correlation coefficient stands between a perfect positive relationship (+1) and a 
perfect negative (-1) relationship, the closeness of the positive or negative 
relationship between the variables determines the extent of their correlation. 
4.7.3 Multiple Regression Techniques 
Panel data (also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional time-series data) are the 
data in a dataset in which the behaviours of the entities are detected across a certain 
period. The dataset combines features of both the time series and cross-sectional 
data. These entities could be institutions, companies, individuals, or countries (Hsiao, 
2014). This dataset was conducted using the STATA version 14 to identify the 
effects of the audit committee on the relationship between ownership structure and a 
firm’s going-concern. The capabilities of the Stata consist of better data 
management, graphics, regression, and statistical analysis. 
In an attempt to determine the variations in the dependent variable (firm’s going-
concern as explained by bankruptcy, earnings management, and profitability) due to 
the variation in any of the independent variables (ownership structure as explained 
by CEO, executive director, non-executive director, block, foreign, and institutional 
ownership) and the moderating variables (Audit Committee Size, Audit Committee 
Independence, and Audit Committee Financial Expertise), the research used the 







clarify the variation in the dependent variable due to the variation in any of the 
independent variables. However, the selection of the appropriate statistical 
techniques from amongst the many multiple statistical tools that were available 
depended on the measurement of the research variables.  
The Fixed-Effect Regression and Random-Effect (GLS) Regression: A standard 
investigation of the panel data is one of the random-effect model against the fixed-
effect model (Hsiao, 2014). This analysis was utilised in conducting this study. This 
technique of data analysis was used to examine the relationship between the 
dependent (bankruptcy, earnings management, and profitability) and the independent 
(CEO, executive director, non-executive director, block, foreign, and institutional 
ownership) variables. It predicts the dependent variable, using the information 
derived from the analysis of the independent variable. The coefficient of correlation 
(R) indicates the extent of the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable in each model. The coefficient of determination (R2) also 
indicates the degree to which the independent variable explains the variability in the 
dependent variable. Lastly, the coefficient of the independent variable shows the 
amount of change in the independent variable to have a unit change in the dependent 
variable. 
Generating the models from the panel data needed, first, an outline to be made as to 
whether a correlation existed between the unobservable heterogeneity ηi of every 
company and the explanatory variables of the model. If a correlation existed (fixed 
effects), then the constant estimation would be obtained through the within-group 







appraising the equation via the Generalised Least Squares (GLS). The conventional 
approach to understanding whether the effect is fixed or random is to apply the 
Hausman specification test in the null hypothesis, E (ηi/xit) = 0. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the effect is reflected to be fixed, and the model is at that point 
predicted by the OLS. If the null hypothesis is established, the effect is reflected to 
be random, and the model is at that moment predicted by the GLS. In this manner, a 
more efficient estimator of β can be attained (Greene, 2008). 
This technique of data analysis helped in ascertaining the significance of the 
relationships between a firm’s going-concern and each of the independent variables. 
The different elements of a firm’s going-concern were adopted as the independent 
variables. Each hypothesis was designed to assess the significance of the relationship 
between each independent variable, and the firm’s going-concern variables were 
tested using the Fixed-Effect Regression and Random-Effect (GLS) Regression 
Statistics (Greene, 2008).  
The following statistics were used in the regression models to analyse the effect of 
each individual factor on the DV and to test the utility of the hypotheses.  
Partial slopes (b): These are the multiple regression coefficients that explain an 
increase or decrease in the dependent variable as a result of increasing or decreasing 
the value of the predictor or independent variable by one more unit whilst holding all 
other variables constant. The dependent variable’s unit increase or decrease depends 







R – Square (R2): This is called the multiple coefficient determination. The R2 of a 
regression model is the fraction of variation in the dependent variable that is 
accounted for and is capable of being explained by all the independent variables in 
the regression model. 
t- Statistics: This is the famous student test. It is used in the regression model to test 
the significance of each independent variable in the model. Generally, regression 
software compares the t-statistic, as computed from the data, with the student’s t 
distribution (i.e., the critical value of t) to determine the probability (p-value) of the t- 
statistics. This scenario or technique is used to test hypotheses about independent 
variables. Thus, the value of the t-statistic is compared with a critical value of t at a 
particular level of significance (e.g., 5%). 
Fishers’ F test: This is called the overall F test. T is used to assess the utility of the 
regression model by testing the significance of the relationship between the 
dependent variables in the model. The F statistic is to be used to check the model’s 
general null hypothesis: None of the independent variables (x1, x2, x3, x4,-----xn) is 
significantly related to the dependent variable (y). The condition for rejecting this 
null hypothesis is when the F (value) > (critical F value) at a specified level of 
confidence (Pallant, 2001). 
Note that, based on the multiple regression models, entirely, the statistics mentioned 
above (a-d) were used on each hypothesis in analysing the influence of each 
independent variable on the dependent variables, and to check the effectiveness of 







4.8 Models of the Study 
To evaluate the strength of the relationships between the ownership structure 
measures, on one hand, and a firm’s going-concern (Bankruptcy, Earnings 
Management, and Profitability) on the other hand. The study adopted the Altman 
2017 bankruptcy model as the proxy for bankruptcy. Discretionary accruals as the 
absolute value of the loan loss provisions to total liabilities (DLLPs) served as the 
proxy for Earnings Management in line with Beatty & Liao, 2011; Norden & Stoian, 
2013; and Kazemian & Sanusi, 2015). Whilst the return on net assets (ROA) was 
adopted as the proxy for Profitability (Mohammad, 2012; Sanda et al., 2005). The 
variables were derived from the same Published Annual Reports. 
Since other factors apart from the explanatory and identified control variables are 
likely to affect a firm’s going-concern, the coefficient of determination (r2) was 
computed to explain the changes in the dependent variables attributable to the 
independent variables. All other things that affect a firm’s going-concern score were 
factored into the relationship by adding an error term, ϵ. The functional interactions 
between these variables were, hence, defined as:  
GCit = f (CO, EO, NO, BO, FO, IO, ACS, ACI, ACE, FS, LL, Tang) it + ϵit 
From this general form of the regression equation, 4 models were designed to test the 
hypotheses of the study.  
GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACSit + α8ACIit 







The hierarchical regression analysis technique was utilised to test the moderation 
effect of the audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial 
expertise) as the moderators which were presented in the function of the model, this 
was to moderate the relationship between ownership and a firm’s going-concern. The 
relationship was between ownership as the independent variable and a fir’s going-
concern as a dependent variable. According to Barron and Kenny (1986) and Frazier, 
Tix, and Barron (2004), a relationship will be established first between the 
independent and dependent variables. Furthermore, a relationship between the 
moderating variable and the dependent variable will be established. Lastly, the 
moderation effect concerning the independent and moderating variables is recognised 
on the dependent variable. Therefore, audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) as a moderator are presented in the function of 
the 3 hierarchical models to moderate the relationship between ownership structure 
and a firm’s going-concern. When the moderator was introduced into the regression 
model, the hierarchical regression models of the study were, thus: 
The moderating effect of audit committee size on the relationship between ownership 
structure and a firm’s going-concern: 
GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACSit+ α8COit * 
ACSit + α9EOit * ACSit + α10NOit * ACSit + α11BOit * ACSit + α12FOit * ACSit + α13IOit 
* ACSit + α14FSit + α15LLit + α16Tangit + ϵit     Model 4 
Moderating effect of audit committee independence on the relationship between 







GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACIit+ α8COit * 
ACIit + α9EOit * ACIit + α10NOit * ACIit + α11BOit * ACIit + α12FOit * ACIit + α13IOit * 
ACIit + α14FSit + α15LLit + α16Tangit + ϵit     Model 5 
Moderating effect of audit committee members expertise on the relationship between 
ownership structure and a firm’s going-concern: 
GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACEit+ α8COit * 
ACEit + α9EOit * ACEit + α10NOit * ACEit + α11BOit * ACEit + α12FOit * ACEit + α13IOit 
* ACEit + α14FSit + α15LLit + α16Tangit + ϵit     Model 6 
Where: 
GC denotes Firm’s going-concern; 
CO denotes CEO Ownership; 
EO denotes Executive Director Ownership; 
NO denotes Non-Executive Director Ownership; 
BO denotes Block Ownership; 
FO denotes Foreign Ownership; 
IO denotes Institutional Ownership; 
ACS denotes Audit Committee Size; 
ACI denotes Audit Committee Independence; 
ACE denotes Audit Committee Financial Expertise; 
FS denotes Firm Size; 
LL denotes Loss-Loss; 







α0 represents the fixed intercept element; 
α1-16 represents the ratio of change in DV to a unit change in each substituted 
explanatory variable; and 
ϵit is the error term that is factored to satisfy the linear regression model assumption. 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
This section deliberated on the processes to be used in gathering the data, along with 
the research design and techniques for the empirical analysis of the data. Firstly, the 
section discussed the positivism as the philosophical methodology of the research. 
The spirit of positivism was used in the data collection and in the empirical analysis. 
The data was gathered from a number of sources, such as the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, data-stream of Thomson Reuters Worldscope database, and websites of 
the respective financial institutions. For the purpose of the data analysis process, 4 
models were constructed. These models were analysed using descriptive statistics, 
Pearson correlation coefficient, and linear panel-data analysis. These analyses were 










This chapter presents the analyses and interpretations of this study. The purpose of 
this study was to examine the interactive role of audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership 
structure and the going-concern of the registered financial institutions in Nigeria. 
This chapter starts with the descriptive analysis of the variables of the study. The 
chapter also presents the results of the assumption of normality, autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity related to the model of the study. Then, it reports the multivariate 
analysis of the direct relationships concerning ownership structure and the going-
concern of the registered financial institutions. It is then followed with the results 
discussion of the interactive role of the audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between ownership 
structure and the going-concern of the registered financial institutions in Nigeria. An 
additional analysis was conducted on the individual regression of each of the firm’s 
three going-concern measurements, which were the Altman 2017 bankruptcy Z-
score, discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP), and return on assets (ROA) to 
confirm that the results are in line with the expectations. As well, the alternative 
measurements of audit committee independence and financial expertise are applied 
to see whether the same result or an alternative outcome can be obtained. Finally, the 







5.2 Descriptive Analysis 
The following tables discussed in the next sub-sections are related to the firm’s 
going-concern, ownership structure, and audit committee attributes.  
5.2.1 Firm’s Going-Concern Attributes’ Frequencies, and Percentages 
As for the firm’s going-concern variables, which were the bankruptcy prediction Z-
scores, discretionary loan loss provisions, and return on asset frequencies and 
percentages, are presented in Table 5.1, Table 5.2, and Table 5.3, respectively. 
Table 5.1 
Frequencies and Percentages of the Bankruptcy Z-scores of the Sampled Firms 
Discriminations Zone Z-Scores 
Freq. % 
Z < 1.1 -“Distress” Zone 3 1% 
1.1 < Z < 2.6 -“Grey” Zone 8 3% 
Z > 2.6 -“Safe” Zone 279 96% 
290 100% 
Table 5.1 revealed that only three companies were within the “Distress” zone during 
the study period, which accounted for only 1%2. Whereas, only 3% were in the 
“Grey” zone. Whilst, about 96% were found to be in the “Safe” zone; this indicates 
that most of the Nigerian listed financial firms were financially stable. 
  
                                                     









Frequencies and Percentages of the Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions of the 
Sample Firms 
Discretionary Range DLLP 
Freq. % 
< 1% 103 36% 
1%<4.99% 99 34% 
5%<9.99% 35 12% 
10%<19.99% 38 13% 
20%<49.99% 15 5% 
50%<74.99% 0 0% 
75%<99.99% 0 0% 
100% 0 0% 
Total 290 100% 
From Table 5.2, it can be seen that more than 36% of the sampled firms accounted 
for less than a 1% level of discretionary loan loss provisions during the study period. 
Whilst, about 34% accounted for the discretionary range from 1% to 4.99%. 
However, 12% accounted for the discretionary range between 5% and 9.99%. As 
well, 13% constituted the discretionary range between 10% and 19.99% and only 5% 
for the range from 20% to 49.99%. This indicates that most of the Nigerian listed 
financial companies practised less than 5% accrual earnings management in relation 
to the loan loss provisions. 
Table 5.3 
Frequencies and Percentages of the Return on Assets of the Sample Firms 
Range ROA 
Freq. % 
< 1% 80 28% 
1%<4.99% 167 58% 
5%<9.99% 33 11% 
10%<19.99% 10 3% 
20%<49.99% 0 0% 
50%<74.99% 0 0% 
75%<99.99% 0 0% 
100% 0 0% 







From Table 5.3, it can be seen that more than 28% of the sampled firms reported less 
than 1% of the ROA during the study period. Similarly, 58% revealed between 1% 
and 4.99% of the ROA. However, 11% revealed ROA ranging from 5% to 9.99%. As 
well, only 3% reported between 10% and 19.99%. This indicates that most of the 
Nigerian listed financial companies had experienced very poor performance 
regarding profitability indicators with less than 5% of the ROA. 
5.2.2 Ownership Structure Attributes’ Frequencies and Percentages 
As for the ownership structure variables which comprise the CEO, executive 
director, non-executive director, block ownership, foreign ownership, and 
institutional ownership, the foregoing attributes are presented in the form of 
frequencies and percentages in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 
Frequencies and Percentages of each Ownership Variable of the Sample Firms 
Range CO EO NO BO FO IO 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
< 1% 234 81% 206 71% 48 17% 48 17% 164 57% 34 12% 
1%<4.99% 38 13% 53 18% 73 25% 0 0% 4 1% 8 3% 
5%<9.99% 17 6% 27 9% 39 13% 20 7% 19 7% 15 5% 
10%<19.99% 1 0% 4 1% 57 20% 31 11% 42 14% 34 12% 
20%<49.99% 0 0% 0 0% 51 18% 98 34% 33 11% 107 37% 
50%<74.99% 0 0% 0 0% 20 7% 75 26% 26 9% 71 24% 
75%<99.99% 0 0% 0 0% 2 1% 18 6% 2 1% 21 7% 
100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 290 100% 290 100% 290 100% 290 100% 290 100% 290 100% 
Table 5.4 indicates that 81% of the CEOs owned below 1% of the shares of the 
sampled firms during the period under observation. The next group was for, CEOs 
with 1% to 4.99% ownership of the sampled firms which accounted for 13%. 
Whereas, only 6% of the CEOs owned more than 5% of the shares of the sampled 







that only one CEO owned above 10% of the shareholdings of the sampled firms 
during the study period. However, none of the CEOs owned shares above 20% of the 
firms during the period under observation.  
Similarly, Table 5.4 also showed that 71% of the executive directors possessed 
below 1% of the shares during the period under observation. Moreover, 18% of the 
executive directors possessed between 1% and 4.99% ownership during the period 
under observation. Likewise, only 9% of the executive directors owned more than 
5% of the shareholdings of the sampled firms during the period under observation. 
Table 5.4 also revealed that only four executive directors during the period under 
observation had above 10% of the shareholdings which accounted for 1% of the 
executive directors. Whereas, no single executive director owned shares above 20% 
during the period under observation. This indicates that both the CEOs and executive 
directors held a few shares of the firms during the period under observation with the 
majority not exceeding 5% ownership.  
However, for the non-executive directors, 25% of them held between 1% and 4.99% 
of the shares of the sampled firms during the period under observation. This was 
followed by 20% of the non-executive directors with between 10% and 19.99% of 
the shares of the sampled firms for the period under consideration. Next, 18% of the 
non-executive directors owned from 20% to 49.99% of the shareholdings of the 
sampled firms during the period under observation. And, 17% of them had less than 
1% of the shares of the firms during the sampled period. Whereas, 13% of them held 
between 5% and 9.99% of the shares of the sampled firms. Whilst, only 7% and 1% 







75% and 99.99%, respectively. This indicates that unlike the CEOs and executive 
directors, the non-executive directors of the firms under study held quite a significant 
number of shares with the majority exceeding 5% ownership. 
Furthermore, Table 5.4 indicated that only 17% of the firms under observation did 
not have any block ownership during the study period. This indicates that the 
majority shareholders owned about 83% of the firms under observation. Whereas, 
about 7% of the shareholders had acquired from 5% to 9.99%. Similarly, 11% had 
acquired between 10% and 19.99% of the sampled firms for the period under 
consideration. Whilst, the ownership possessed by 35% of the shareholders was 
between 20% and 49.99% of the sampled firms for the period under consideration. 
Whereas, 26% of the shareholders owned from 50% to 74.99% of the sampled firms 
for the period under consideration. As well, 6% of the shareholders owned between 
75% and 99.99% of the sampled firms for the period under consideration.  
Besides that, Table 5.4 also showed that more than 57% of the foreign investors 
owned less than 1% of the shares of the sampled firms during the study period. 
Whereas, 1% of them owned between 1% and 4.99%. Also,7% had acquired from 
5% to 9.99%, whilst 14% owned between 10% and 19.99% of the sampled firms 
during the study period. Furthermore, 11% of the foreign investors owned from 20% 
to 49.99%, as well as 9% who owned between 50% and 74.99% of the sampled firms 
during the study period. However, only 1% of the foreign shareholders owned 
between 75% and 99.99% of the sampled firms. This indicates that substantial 
foreign investors acquired below 10% of the shares of the sampled firms during the 







restriction which states that all acquisitions of shares beyond 10% should be rectified 
by the CBN. 
However, Table 5.4 displays that 12% of the institutional investors owned less than 
1% of the shares of the sampled firms during the study period. Whereas only 3% of 
them owned between 1% and 4.99%, 5% acquired between 5% and 9.99% of the 
sampled firms during the study period. And, 12% of them owned from 10% to 
19.99% of the shares of the sampled firms during the study period. ', about 37% of 
them owned between 20% and 49.99%. Further, 24% of the institutional investors 
owned from 50% to 74.99% of the shares of the sampled firms during the study 
period. Moreover, only 7% of the institutional investors had ownership between 75% 
and 99.99%. This indicates that about 85% of the institutions acquired above 5% of 
the shares of the firms under observation, which means that 85% of the block 
ownership was owned by institutions. 
5.2.3 Audit Committee Characteristics’ Frequencies and Percentages 
As for the audit committee variables, which comprised audit committee size, audit 
committee independence and audit committee financial expertise. The committee 
financial expertise represented the moderating variable as presented in Table 5.5, 









Frequencies and Percentages of the Audit Committee Variables of the Sample Firms 
Range ACS ACI ACE 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Below 1 0 0% 0 0% 2 1% 
1 0 0% 0 0% 9 3% 
2 0 0% 1 0% 47 16% 
3 to 5 33 11% 82 28% 223 77% 
6 253 87% 203 70% 9 3% 
Above 6 4 1% 4 1% 0 0% 
Total 290 100% 290 100% 290 100% 
In Table 5.5, it was found that 87% of the sampled firms during the study period had 
six members in their audit committees. This was followed by 11% of the sampled 
firms during the study period with audit committee members between three and five. 
Whereas, only 1% of the sampled firms during the study period had more than 6 
members on the audit committee. This was in line with the CAMA 1990 requirement 
which stated that the audit committee membership should consist of at least 3 
members from the shareholders and 3 members from the board of directors, 
respectively. 
Moreover, from Table 5.5, it was revealed that 70% of the sampled firms during the 
study period had an audit committee with at least six independent members. This was 
followed by 28% of the sampled firms during the study period with 3 to 5 
independent members. Whereas, only 1% of the sampled firms during the study 
period had audit committees with more than six independent members. Furthermore, 
only one company of the sampled firms during the study period had 2 independent 
directors. This was in line with the CAMA 1990, CBN 2014, and SEC 2014 
recommendations that the majority of the audit committee members of companies 







Furthermore, from Table 5.5, it was revealed that 77% of the sampled firms during 
the study period had audit committees with between 3 and 5 members with financial 
expertise. This was followed by 16% of the sampled firms during the study period 
with audit committees composed of 2 members with financial expertise. Whereas, 
only 3% of the sampled firms during the study period had audit committees with 
only 1 member with financial expertise. Similarly, 3% of the sampled firms during 
the study period had audit committees with 6 members with financial expertise. 
However, only 1% of the sampled firms during the study period had audit 
committees without members with financial expertise. This was in line with the 
CAMA 1990, CBN 2014, and SEC 2014 recommendations that at least one audit 
committee members of companies should be financially literate and that all members 
of the committee should have basic financial knowledge. Furthermore, these have 
been explained in the percentages in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 
Frequencies and Percentages of the Audit Committee Independence and Financial 
Expertise of the Sample Firms 
Range ACI ACE 
Freq. % Freq. % 
0% to 49.99% 0 0% 50 17% 
50% to 79.99% 23 8% 178 61% 
80% to 99.99% 37 13% 37 13% 
100% 230 79% 25 9% 
Total 290 100% 290 100% 
From Table 5.6, it was revealed that 79% of the sampled firms during the study 
period had an audit committee with all independent members. This was proceeded by 
13% of the sampled firms during the study period with audit committees which had 
80% to 99.99% members as independent members. Whereas, only 8% of the sampled 







independent members. However, none of the companies under study had an audit 
committee with less than 50% independent members; this was inspired by the 
CAMA 1990, CBN 2014, and SEC 2014 requirements. 
Moreover, from Table 5.6, it was revealed that 61% of the audit committees of the 
sampled firms during the study period had between 50% and 79.99% members with 
financial expertise. However, only 17% of the audit committees of the sampled firms 
during the study period had from 0% to 49.99% members with financial expertise. 
Moreover, only 13% of the sampled firms during the study period had audit 
committees between 80% to 99.99% of the members with financial expertise. 
Furthermore, only 9% of the sampled firms during the study period had audit 
committees with 100% of the members with financial expertise. This was also in line 
with the CAMA 1990, CBN 2014, and SEC 2014 recommendations that the audit 
committee members of companies should have financial knowledge. 
5.2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
This sub-section reports and discusses the descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics 
have been used in this research to calculate the summary statistics that defined the 
central tendency, along with how the data spread out around the value or the 
variability. This instrument is familiar in describing the dependent, the independent, 
and the moderating variables of a research work by computing the mean, mode 
range, and standard deviation of the variables. This consists of the interpretation of 
raw records into a system that offers statistics to describe an established condition 







Furthermore, Table 5.7 reveals the descriptive statistics of 15 banks and 13 insurance 
companies that covered the sample of this study from 2006 to 2015. From the 
outcome Table 5.8 reveals that the firm’s overall going-concern mean was 6.1677, 
which was safe, with the standard deviation of 3.0004 amongst the companies under 
consideration. As well, the firm’s minimum going-concern of -1.3924 specified that 
a number of firms under study were experiencing a severe going-concern problem. 
Conversely, the firm’s maximum going-concern of 16.1672 specified that certain 
firms had sound going-concern positions in the Nigerian financial sector.  
Table 5.7  
Descriptive Statistics of the Sampled Firms 
Variables OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
GC 290 6.1677 3.0004 -1.3924 16.1672 
Independent Variables 
CO 290 0.0090 0.0194 0.0000 0.1361 
EO 290 0.0140 0.0244 0.0000 0.1361 
NO 290 0.1564 0.1892 0.0000 0.8561 
BO 290 0.3451 0.2543 0.0000 0.8589 
FO 290 0.1178 0.1878 0.0000 0.8589 
IO 290 0.3630 0.2524 0.0000 0.8589 
Moderating Variables 
ACS 290 5.8069 0.6476 3.0000 8.0000 
ACI 290 0.9545 0.0950 0.6667 1.0000 
ACE 290 0.5980 0.2068 0.0000 1.0000 
Control Variables 
FS 290 18.4220 2.3022 13.8381 22.2639 
LL 290 0.1655 0.3723 0.0000 1.0000 
Tang 290 0.0687 0.0530 0.0089 0.3426 
GC = Firm’s going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-
Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign Ownership; IO = Institutional 
Ownership; ACS = Audit Committee Size; ACI = Audit Committee Independence; ACE = Audit 
Committee Financial Expertise; FS = Firm Size; LL = Loss-Loss; Tang = Asset Tangibility. 
As for the ownership structure, the mean of the CEO ownership, as revealed in Table 
5.7, was 0.9% with the standard deviation of 0.0194 along with the lowest of 0.00% 







commitment. These findings were very close to those of Liu and Tsai (2015) in 
Taiwan who reported an average value of 1.20% with the standard deviation of 
0.00% and the minimum of 0.40% and the maximum of 25.30%.  
The mean of the executive directors’ ownership, as presented in Table 5.7, was 1.4% 
with the standard deviation of 0.0244 as well as the minimum of 0% and the 
maximum of 13.61%, indicating a lack of presence of the executive directors’ 
financial commitments. This outcome pointed out that there was a conflict between 
the executive director and the other shareholders due to the information asymmetry. 
These findings were close to those of Alzoubi (2016) in Jordan who reported an 
average value of 7.6% with the standard deviation of 0.075 as well as the minimum 
of 0.00% and the maximum of 29.7%. These figures were revealed as being lower as 
compared to the study by Amran & Ahmad (2013) in Malaysia who reported an 
average value of 44.63% with the minimum level of ownership of 0% and the 
maximum of 74.78%.  
On the other hand, the non-executive directors’ ownership had an average of 15.64% 
with a disparity of 18.92% amongst the companies with the lowest and highest levels 
of 0.00% and 85.61%, respectively. This is because of the high level of indirect 
equity held by the non-executive directors through the bodies they represented; 
although a number of firms’ non-executive directors did not have any direct or 
indirect equity holdings in the businesses. These findings were not close to those of 
Alzoubi (2016) in Jordan who reported an average value of 4.4% with the standard 








Block ownership revealed an average of 34.51% with a disproportion of 25.43% 
amongst them with the minimum level of 0.00% and the highest level of 85.89%. 
These findings were slightly below those of Farouk & Hassan (2014) who reported a 
mean of 69.20% and standard deviation of 20.52% for 8 listed Nigerian chemical and 
paints firms. However, these values were slightly above those of Parker et al. (2005) 
who described an average value of 15.74% with a disparity of 17.79%. However, the 
minimum and maximum were very close to those found by Parker et al. (2005) who 
reported low and high levels of 0.00% and 90.00% of 161 USA financially distressed 
firms, respectively. Similarly, Farouk & Hassan (2014) reported a high level of 
96.00% in 8 listed Nigerian chemical and paints firms.  
Furthermore, foreign ownership revealed a mean and standard deviation of 11.78% 
and 18.78% individually, accompanied by the minimum and maximum level of 
0.00% and 85.89%. These findings were slightly below those of Adebiyi and 
Olowookere (2016) who reported a mean of 14.49% as well as the lowest and 
maximum levels of 0.00% and 100%, correspondingly, for 15 listed Nigerian banks. 
However, they were slightly below those of Alzoubi (2016) in Jordan who reported 
an average value of 15.1% with the standard deviation of 16.4% along with a 
minimum of 0.00% and a maximum of 98.5%.  
Moreover, institutional ownership displayed a mean of 36.30% and standard 
deviation of 25.24% amongst firms with the minimum and maximum levels of 
0.00% and 85.89%. These findings were close to those of Alzoubi (2016) in Jordan 
who reported an average value of 19.0% with the standard deviation of 17.7% along 







As for the moderating variable figures, the audit committee size had an average of 
about 6 participants with a discrepancy of at least 1 person amongst the studied 
companies along with the minimum and maximum of 3 and 8 participants, 
respectively. There was an increase in audit committee size compared to the findings 
of Salihi and Jibril (2015) who reported an average of nearly 5 associates with a 
disparity of at least 1 person along with the minimum and maximum of 2 and 6 
participants, using the data of the consumer sector for the periods of 2010 to 2013. 
This increase in audit committee size followed the recommendation of the SEC 
(2014) codes of corporate governance that states that the audit committee should 
have at least 6 members. 
In the same vein, audit committee independence had a mean of 95.45% with a 
standard deviation of 9.50% amongst the firms under study as well as the minimum 
of 66.67% and a maximum of 100% of audit committee independent members. 
Similarly, Moses et al. (2016), using 15 Nigerian banks from 2010 to 2014 reported a 
mean of 93.33% and a maximum of 100% of the audit committee independent 
members. Likewise, there was an increase in audit committee independence 
compared to the findings of Madawaki and Amran (2013) who reported a mean of 
84% and the minimum of 0%, using a sample of 70 listed non-financial Nigerian 
companies for the period of 2011. This increase in audit committee independence 
followed the recommendation of the SEC (2014) codes of corporate governance 
which states that independent members should dominate the audit committee. 
On the other hand, the audit committee members with financial expertise was on 







observation along with the minimum and maximum of 0% and 100% for associates 
with financial expertise, respectively. This indicated that some listed financial firms 
in Nigeria did not comply with the SEC (2014) code’s requirement that there be at 
least one audit committee member with financial expertise, although the CAMA 
(1990) provision is that, the audit committee of companies should have at least 1 
member with financial literacy. There was an increase in audit committee financial 
expertise compared to the findings of Madawaki and Amran (2013) who reported a 
mean of 51% and the maximum of 80%, using listed non-financial Nigerian 
companies for the period of 2011. This increase in audit committee independence 
followed the recommendation of the SEC (2014) codes of corporate governance 
which states that independent directors should dominate the audit committee. The 
minimum and maximum levels of domination were similar to those found by Moses 
et al. (2016) who revealed levels of 0% and 100%, respectively.  
Similarly, Table 5.7 showed the descriptive statistics for the control variables. The 
total companies’ assets as a proxy for the firm size ranged from the minimum of 
N13.8381 billion 3(approximately US$45.4 million) to the maximum of N22.2639 
billion (approximately US$73.0 million), with an average value of N18.4220 
(approximately US$60.38 million) and standard deviations of 2.3022. These figures 
indicated that the assets of the listed Nigerian financial companies varied 
extensively. Whereas, loss-loss had a mean of 0.1655%, reflecting that around 
16.55% of the firms had negative incomes during the 10 years of the study, with a 
37.23% variability. This happened mostly as a result of the 2008-2009 global 
economic meltdowns which shook the financial sector. Finally, asset tangibility had a 
                                                     







mean of only 6.87% of the total assets, with a standard deviation of 5.30%. Whereas, 
the minimum ratio of a fixed asset to a total asset by these firms was 0.89% and the 
maximum was 34.26%. This was a result of the assets of the financial companies 
being heavily in financial assets, such as loans and advances to customers, and cash 
and balances with banks and insurance companies. 
5.3 Univariate Analysis 
Table 5.8 reveals the results of the correlation matrix for the research variables. In 
general, the outcomes disclosed a little multicollinearity problem amongst the 
variables under study. The top correlation amongst the variables under study was 
between block ownership and institutional ownership which revealed a value of 
89.75%. This pointed out the strong correlation between the block ownership and IO. 
According to Gujarati (2004), a correlation of more than 0.5 is high. Conversely, 
Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2014) and Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) argued 
that a correlation of less than 90% is not a correlational problem. Therefore, the 
correlation between block ownership and institutional ownership, in this case, 
indicated the absence of a multicollinearity issue in the regression model.  
The dependent variable (firm’s going-concern) had a significant and positive 
correlation at a 1% level of significance with the block ownership, institutional 
ownership, and asset tangibility. And, on the other hand, the firm’s going-concern 
had a significant and negative correlation at a 1% level of significance with audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, and firm size. Whereas, the 
relationship between the firm’s going-concern and non-executive directors’ 







relationship between the firm’s going-concern and executive directors’ ownership, as 







Table 5.8  
Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Research Variables  
  GC CO EO NO BO FO IO ACS ACI ACE FS LL Tang 
GC 1.0000 
CO -0.0343 1.0000 
EO -0.1145* 0.7703*** 1.0000 
NO 0.1183** -0.0553 -0.0524 1.0000 
BO 0.3421*** -0.1351** -0.2123*** 0.3227*** 1.0000 
FO -0.0813 -0.1000* -0.1334** 0.1406** 0.4361*** 1.0000 
IO 0.2648*** -0.1511*** -0.2258*** 0.3341*** 0.8975*** 0.4919*** 1.0000 
ACS -0.3103*** 0.0787 0.0825 -0.1799*** -0.3065*** 0.0610 -0.3116*** 1.0000 
ACI -0.3139*** 0.0841 0.0235 -0.1607*** -0.1203** 0.0497 -0.0863 0.1492** 1.0000 
ACE 0.0901 0.0005 0.0744 0.0311 0.1884*** -0.0272 0.2024*** -0.1309** -0.0915 1.0000 
FS -0.6766*** 0.0248 0.0892 -0.3519*** -0.4557*** 0.1328** -0.3393*** 0.2392*** 0.3381*** 0.0013 1.0000 
LL -0.1113* -0.0607 -0.0064 0.0620 0.0762 -0.0784 0.0922 0.0182 -0.0553 -0.0466 -0.1917*** 1.0000 
Tang 0.1707*** 0.1448** 0.0788 0.3938*** 0.1896*** 0.0169 0.1508** -0.0357 -0.1630*** -0.0752 -0.5837*** 0.1886*** 1.0000 
GC = Firm’s going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign 
Ownership; IO = Institutional Ownership; ACS = Audit Committee Size; ACI = Audit Committee Independence; ACE = Audit Committee Financial Expertise; FS = Firm 




Regarding the ownership structure variable, Table 5.8 showed that the CEO ownership 
was positively correlated with the executive directors’ ownership at the 1% significance 
level. So, also, CEO ownership was positively correlated with the Tangibility at the 5% 
significance level. However, CEO ownership was negatively correlated with institutional 
ownership at the 5% significance level. Whilst, CEO ownership was negatively 
correlated with the block ownership at the 5% significance level. Similarly, CEO 
ownership was negatively correlated with the foreign ownership at the 1% significance 
level. In the same vein, the executive directors’ ownership was negatively correlated 
with block ownership and institutional ownership at the 1% significance level. 
Moreover, executive directors’ ownership was negatively correlated with foreign 
ownership at the 5% significance level.  
 Table 5.8 showed that non-executive directors’ ownership was positively correlated 
with block ownership, institutional ownership, as well as asset tangibility at the 1% 
significance level. Similarly, non-executive directors’ ownership was positively 
correlated with foreign ownership at the 5% significance level. Conversely, non-
executive directors’ ownership was negatively correlated with audit committee size, 
audit committee independence, and firm size at the 1% significance level. Whereas, 
block ownership was positively correlated with foreign ownership, institutional 
ownership, and audit committee financial expertise at the 5% significance level. 
However, block ownership was negatively correlated with audit committee size and firm 
size at the 1% significance level. Similarly, block ownership was negatively correlated 









correlation between foreign ownership and institutional ownership was positive and at 
the 1% significance level. And, foreign ownership was positively correlated with firm 
size at the 5% significance level. However, institutional ownership was positively 
correlated with audit committee financial expertise and was negatively correlated with 
audit committee size and firm size, all at the 1% significance level.  
Concerning the audit committee's characteristics, the univariate analysis revealed that 
audit committee size was found to have a significantly positive correlation with firm size 
at 1% significance level. Whereas, the audit committee size was found to have a 
significant positive correlation with audit committee independence and a significant 
negative correlation with audit committee financial expertise at the 5% significance 
level. Correspondingly, audit committee independence had a positive correlation with 
firm size and a negative correlation with asset tangibility at the 1% significance level for 
all.  
Finally, firm size was found to have a significant negative correlation with loss-loss and 
asset tangibility at the 1% significance level. Lastly, loss-loss was found to have a 
positive correlation with asset tangibility at the 1% significance level. 
5.4 Multiple Regression 
This segment offers the effects of the diagnostic assessments tested to make sure that the 
study data fulfilled the basic multiple regression assumptions. The segment, 









the research models were appropriately specified. Likewise, the segment offers the 
model selection measures and ends with the presentation and discussion of the outcomes 
of the estimation models. 
5.4.1 Multivariate Regression Diagnostic Test 
The fundamental philosophies of the linear regression model consist of a test for 
normality, outliers, linearity, multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
cross-sectional dependence. This study conducted the normality test, Modified Wald 
heteroskedasticity test, variance inflation test of multicollinearity, Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation, and Pesaran’ cross-sectional dependence test. The results of these tests 
are presented in Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9  
Results of the Diagnostic Tests 
Test Direct effect Model Interaction Effects Models 
  ACS ACI ACE 
  chi2/Abs P chi2/Abs P chi2/Abs P chi2/Abs P 
Breusch and Pagan LM 13.45 0.0001 22.29 0.0000 17.57 0.0000 26.67 0.0000 
Hausman Specification 11.65 0.4744 16.77 0.3327 17.80 0.3360 12.13 0.7349 
Modified Wald 
Heteroskedasticity 
90440.09 0.0000 12482.16 0.0000 8968.15 0.0000 9155.12 0.0000 
Wooldridge 
Autocorrelation 
15.275 0.0005 7.841 0.0092 8.849 0.0060 13.571 0.0010 
Pesaran's cross sectional 
independence  
0.317 0.0001 0.324 0.0003 0.334 0.0000 0.330 0.0394 
Table 5.9 presented the diagnostic tests’ results. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier, Hausman specification, and Modified Wald Heteroskedasticity tests were 
undertaken. The result of the diagnostic tests proved that all four models had 









to Hoechle (2007) when these problems are found in a model, they can be corrected by 
applying the Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. The robust Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors is a nonparametric covariance matrix for an estimates’ balanced and unbalanced 
panel models (Hoechle, 2007). It is a robust solution to all heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence problems. Therefore, to overcome these 
problems, this study applied adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors for the four 
models. 
5.4.1.1 Normality 
Normality is the scattering of the data and whether the nature of the data is normally 
spread out. There are numerous means to check the normality of the data. In line with 
Hair et al. (2014) and Park (2008), who stated that the graphical and numerical way is a 
statistical technique that is widely used in checking normality, the plot probability (PP 
plot) normality was tested in this study. The PP plot relates the empirical aggregate 
distribution functions of the variables with a specific hypothetical aggregate distribution 
function by means of the standard normal distribution function (Park, 2008). 
Considering Figure 5.1, the PP plots pointed out that the data points had not departed 










Figure 5.1  
PP Plots 
5.4.1.2 Outliers 
Outliers are the observations that have exceptional or diverse features paralleled to the 
entire population. Several researchers backed that up by reporting that outliers should be 
retained for better representation of the entire population except if there is evidence of 
measurement errors (Hair, Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 2006). Other scholars offered a 
number of means to identify and treat every potential outlier. Methods like 
transformation, trimming and winsorising the data are used to treat every potential 
outlier. The added variable plots as displayed in Figure 5.2 show that the data points of 
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Figure 5.2  
Added Variable Plots 
5.4.1.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is a condition in which the explanatory variables are extremely 
interrelated with each other. Although multicollinearity may not influence the stability 
coefficient estimates of the regression model, it constitutes a danger in presenting 
inaccurate and unreliable coefficient estimates of the regression. The coefficient of the 
correlation matrix is commonly utilised to identify the presence of multicollinearity 
(Garson, 2012).  
The maximum correlation amongst the research variables was between block ownership 
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This association did not exceed the threshold of 90% as claimed by Hair et al. (2014). 
Therefore, it did not pose any problem to this study’s regression coefficient estimates. In 
addition to the correlation matrix, the variance inflation factor (VIF) test was performed 
for all the independent variables to confirm multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is 
expected to exist where the tolerance value is less than 0.01, and the VIF is more than 10 
(Hair et al., 2014; Pallant, 2001). Table 5.10 displays the evidence of the non-
multicollinearity challenge as both the tolerance value and VIF were within an 
acceptable region. 
Table 5.10  
Collinearity Statistics: Tolerance Value and Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CO 2.6300 0.3807 
EO 2.6600 0.3753 
NO 1.3400 0.7464 
BO 6.2400 0.1604 
FO 5.9600 0.1679 
IO 1.7900 0.5578 
ACS 1.2300 0.8128 
ACI 1.1800 0.8491 
ACE 1.1400 0.8750 
FS 2.6500 0.3769 
LL 1.1000 0.9111 
Tang 1.8500 0.5407 
Mean VIF 2.4800   
GC = Firm’s going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-
Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign Ownership; IO = Institutional 
Ownership; ACS = Audit Committee Size; ACI = Audit Committee Independence; ACE = Audit 










Heteroscedasticity is the challenge that emanates once the variance of the errors is not 
identically and autonomously dispersed amongst the studied observations. For panel data 
heteroscedasticity, whether or not the variance of errors is constant amongst the cross-
sectional observations, the variance will possibly vary amongst the observations through 
time, which raises the problem of group-wise heteroscedasticity (Baum, 2001). 
According to Baltagi (2008), disregarding the existence of heteroscedasticity can cause 
biased and ineffective coefficient estimations and partial standard errors. This study 
utilised the Modified Wald test for the group-wise heteroscedasticity to check for the 
error terms in the studied models. The results of the test established the existence of 
heteroscedasticity in all the models, which needed to be modified. 
5.4.1.5 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation is the problem of error elements being correlated across time caused by 
high homogeneity. In the regression model, it is expected that the error term of the 
components is not influenced and not correlated with other components. Even though 
this is a violation of the standard belief, it is an ordinary matter in a panel and time-
series study (Wooldridge, 2010). One of the notable and appropriate tests for revealing 
autocorrelation in the panel data in fixed and random-effect models is the Wooldridge 
test. The Wooldridge test was run on all the models of this study. The test established 









problems can be repaired to achieve correct outcomes using procedures like Newey-
West standard or Rogers errors. Conversely, they can only be corrected if the panel data 
do not have any cross-sectional dependence (Petersen, 2009). 
5.4.1.6 Cross-sectional Dependence 
Cross-sectional dependence, otherwise known as contemporaneous correlation, is a 
correlation of the residuals through units. Petersen (2009) described dual forms of cross-
dependency. One is where the company residuals are interrelated across periods, whilst 
the other is where the residuals of a specific period are correlated across companies. 
Petersen (2009) claimed that economic and financial data are expected more to have the 
cross-sectional dependence issues as firms have strong resemblances amongst them and 
across the period. Disregarding the problem might create underestimation or 
overestimation of the correct coefficients. Pesaran's test is one of the suitable tests to 
discover whether or not the data have a cross-sectional dependence problem. It is the 
best suitable test for the panel data that have large cross-sectional entities as well as 
small time-series (Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). Pesaran's cross-sectional dependence test 
was applied to all the models and the presence of cross-sectional dependence was 
established. Hence, the presence of the problem had to be fixed. 
5.4.2 Model Selection Criteria 
Panel data regression analysis is used wherever the data are gathered from the same 









estimation, this study followed Hoechle’s (2007) approach. Firstly, the study determined 
whether the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled-OLS) or random effect Generalised 
Least Squares (RE-GLS) was appropriate for each model. This was achieved through the 
estimation of the heterogeneous (λ) values of the models using the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects. When the RE model was taken, then a 
Hausman specification test was run to identify whether the Random or Fixed effect was 
more suitable. Then, to check the error terms in the studied models, a group-wise 
heteroscedasticity was tested using the Modified Wald test. Then, for the 
autocorrelation, the Wooldridge test was run on all the models of this study. Finally, 
Pesaran's cross-sectional dependence test was applied to all the models and the presence 
of cross-sectional dependence was established. Figure 5.3 illustrates the selection 
process for each model. 
 
Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation & Cross sectional dependence 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
Heteroskedasticity & Autocorrelation
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Heteroskedasticity
Robust Std. Err. 
Hausman Specification
Random-effects GLS regression Fixed-effects regression










Figure 5.3  
Models’ Selection process  
5.4.3 Regression Results 
In order to determine the effects of ownership structure on the going-concern of the 
Nigerian registered financial institutions, the first regression equation was run, which 
was GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACSit + 
α8ACIit + α9ACEit + α10FSit + α11LLit + α12Tangit + ϵit. Breusch and Pagan LM were 
tested in which it favoured the Random-effects GLS regression. Then, the model was 
run using the Fixed Effect regression and Random-effects GLS regression in which a 
Hausman specification test was also run to check a more efficient model against a less 
effective one, and the Hausman outcome favoured the Random-effects GLS regression. 
Then, the Modified Wald test for the group-wise heteroscedasticity, Wooldridge test for 
the autocorrelation and Pesaran's cross-sectional dependence test were applied to this 
model and the presence of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional 
dependence were established. Adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors were applied 











Table 5.11  
Results of Ownership Structure on the Firm’s Going-Concern (Direct Effect) Regression 
with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
GC Coef. Drisc/Kraay 
Std. Err. 
T P 
CO 13.9489 9.2677 1.5100 0.0715 
EO -10.0168 5.7774 -1.7300 0.0470 
NO -1.6402 0.5166 -3.1700 0.0020 
BO -1.3542 0.8682 -1.5600 0.0650 
FO 1.1109 0.6811 1.6300 0.0570 
IO 0.7740 0.5524 1.4000 0.0860 
ACS -0.5610 0.1691 -3.3200 0.0015 
ACI -2.4962 1.1760 -2.1200 0.0215 
ACE 0.8245 0.2632 3.1300 0.0020 
FS -1.1676 0.1663 -7.0200 0.0000 
LL -1.6933 0.3466 -4.8900 0.0000 
Tang -15.8933 3.3922 -4.6900 0.0000 
Cons 34.5227 4.1989 8.2200 0.0000 
R-squared: 0.6154 
Prob>F  0.0000 
GC = Firm’s Going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-
Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign Ownership; IO = Institutional 
Ownership; ACS = Audit Committee Size; ACI = Audit Committee Independence; ACE = Audit 
Committee Financial Expertise; FS = Firm Size; LL = Loss-Loss; Tang = Asset Tangibility. 
Table 5.11 presented the results which revealed that the coefficient of determinants of 
the R2 value was 61.54% indicating that the variables considered in the model accounted 
for about 61.54% of the change in the dependent variable, which was going-concern, 
whilst about 38.46% of the change may have been a result of the other variables not 
addressed by this model. As seen in Table 5.11, audit committee financial expertise had 
a significantly positive relationship with a firm’s going-concern at a 1% level. However, 
non-executive directors’ ownership, audit committee size, firm size, loss-loss, and asset 
tangibility had significant negative relationships with a firm’s going-concern at 1% 
significance levels. In the same direction, the executive directors’ ownership and audit 









concern at 5% significance levels. Whereas, CEO ownership, foreign ownership, and 
institutional ownership were found to have significant positive effects at 10%. 
Conversely, block ownership was found to have a significant negative relationship with 
a firm’s going-concern at a 10% significance level. 
5.4.3.1 CEO Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern (H1a) 
It was expected that the CEOs who had substantial ownership in a company were 
unlikely to be mixed up in devious acts that would lead to the firm’s going-concern 
problem. The results shown in the analysis in Table 5.11 were consistent with that 
expectation. It was found that CEO ownership had a significant positive effect on a 
firm’s going-concern. Thus, H1a was accepted by the direct model.  
This was in line with the alignment of interest argument which claims that CEO 
ownership enhances a firm’s going-concern by mitigating earnings management. 
Moreover, the agency theorists have predicted that a high level of CEO equity 
ownership may significantly reduce the firm’s going-concern problem. This is because 
once the CEO has become a part of the business holders, he/she must relate with other 
owners with a high degree of inspiration. Such CEOs will probably not take risks that 
will be unsafe for the owners. Therefore, it is expected that the larger the CEO 
ownership in the company, the lower the agency conflicts. This will, subsequently, 
increase the company performance and also aid the company in reducing the firm’s 









Furthermore, this finding was in support of those of Zhang et al. (2008), Alves (2012), 
Hazarika et al. (2012), and Gong and Li (2013) whose results revealed a negative 
relationship between CEO equity ownership and earnings management. Therefore, CEO 
stock ownership can constrain earnings management activities and reduce the firm’s 
possible going-concern problem. However, this study’s finding contradicted the 
entrenchment hypothesis argument which claims that high CEO ownership may reduce 
firm performance, which eventually increases the firm’s going-concern problems. 
Likewise, it contradicted the findings of Bergrtresser and Philippon (2006), Jiang et al. 
(2010), Liu and Tsai (2015), Imoleayo et al. (2017), and Iskandar et al. (2011) which 
established a positive relationship between CEO equity ownership and earnings 
management, hence, the higher the CEO ownership, the higher the earnings management 
activities, which will lead to a firm’s going-concern problem.  
5.4.3.2 Executive Director Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern (H1b) 
It was also expected that the executive director who has substantial ownership in a 
company is unlikely to be mixed up in the devious acts that will lead to the firm’s going-
concern problem. The results shown in the analysis of Table 5.11 varied from this 
anticipation. It was found that the executives’ ownership had a significant negative 
effect on a firm’s going-concern. Thus, H1b was rejected.  
This finding was consistent with the entrenchment effect hypothesis which postulates 









problems (Ahmed & Hadi 2017; Iskandar et al., 2017; and Patel, 2018). This is because 
executives with high share ownership may possibly be so influential that they do not 
have to consider the interests of the other shareholders. In the same way, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) asserted that when executive directors possess a few company’s shares, 
they have greater motivations to keep their interests matched with that of the 
shareholders as their ties to the business’s result is great. But, as executive directors’ 
ownership reaches a specific point, they may assign the company’s wealth to suit their 
interests irrespective of the consequence on the other owners.  
Furthermore, the average executive directors’ ownership of the sampled firms was 
1.40%, which may be inadequate to make a change that can affect the firm’s going-
concern positively. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that executive 
directors’ ownerships deviate from the goal of the shareholders’ wealth maximisation by 
consuming perquisites when they do not have an ownership stake in the firm. In this 
regard, it indicates that it is not merely the presence of executive directors’ ownership 
that could positively influence the performance of firms, but rather, only a high level of 
executive directors’ ownership. Furthermore, this is in line with the findings of Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006); Amran and Ahmad (2013); Ahmed and Hadi (2017); Iskandar et al. 
(2017); and Patel (2018) who found a negative relationship between executive directors’ 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern.  
However, this finding contradicted the convergence-of-interest argument which claims 









contradicted the findings of Parker et al. (2005), Alves (2012), Chou (2015), Alzoubi 
(2016), and Ramadan (2016) who found a positive relationship between executive 
directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern. 
5.4.3.3 Non-Executive Director Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern (H2) 
According to the agency theory, a non-executive directorship is a monitoring structure 
aimed to build up the control capability of the board and to decrease agency costs related 
to management. Furthermore, agency theorists assume that non-executive directors have 
heterogeneous incentives in monitoring managerial opportunists. Hence, the presence of 
non-executive directors enhances the effectiveness of the board and reduces the potential 
agency conflicts. According to agency theorists, as long as the non-executive directors’ 
ownership is high, their interests are more cautiously united with the owners’ interests, 
thus, offering more towards the performance of the firms and helping the firms to lower 
their going-concern problems.  
Similarly, resource dependence theorists claim that non-executive directors convey 
resources for the company’s access to essential elements that are fundamental to the 
business’s survival. The results revealed in the analysis of Table 5.11 were contrary to 
the expectation. It was found that non-executives’ ownership had a significant negative 
effect on the firm’s going-concern. Thus, H2 was rejected.  
This finding contradicted the monitoring and alignment of interest hypotheses which 









problem. Similarly, this finding opposed the findings of Ali et al. (2008), Hashim and 
Devi (2008), and Hashim (2009) who found that non-executive directors’ shareholdings 
positively increased the firm’s going-concern.  
However, the finding was consistent with the information asymmetry argument that an 
information asymmetry between the executive and non-executive directors can weaken 
the non-executives’ abilities to accomplish their monitoring and supervisory roles 
effectively. Likewise, the expropriation issue might be another possible reason for this 
negative relationship. This is a result of the high levels of ownership by non-executive 
directors enables them to make decisions which will serve a personal benefit to the 
detriment of the companies. Similarly, this finding was in line with Alzoubi (2016) who 
found that non-executive directors’ ownership was unable to lessen earnings 
management practices and the firm’s going-concern problem. 
5.4.3.4 Block Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern (H3) 
According to the agency theorists, block ownership is an alternative way to cut agency 
costs by shareholders virtually playing an active role in monitoring the firm’s activities. 
However, this relies on the size of their equity shares (Morck et al., 2005; Young et al., 
2008). The results revealed in the analysis of Table 5.11 were inconsistent with this 
expectation. It was found that block ownership had a significant negative effect on a 









This was in line with the entrenchment hypothesis claim that high block ownership will 
lead to a firm’s higher level of going-concern problems. Moreover, the finding was 
consistent with that of Gulzar and Wang (2011); Farooq and El Jai (2012); Waweru and 
Riro (2013); Park et al. (2016); and Bao and Lewellyn (2017) who found that block 
ownership negatively affected a firm’s going-concern.  
However, the finding contradicted the monitoring argument claim that the existence of 
block ownership could alleviate the agency problem. Furthermore, this finding was 
inconsistent with the findings of Parker et al. (2005), Alves (2012), Usman and Yero 
(2012), Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014), Paik and Koh (2014), and Ramadan (2016) 
who confirmed that a firm’s going-concern problem was negatively associated with 
block holder ownership. 
5.4.3.5 Foreign Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern (H4) 
According to agency theorists, the external possession of a corporation is expected to 
eradicate the agency conflicts that happen between owners and management. Likewise, 
according to the resource dependence theory, foreign equity ownership usually 
contributes essential resources and knowledge in conjunction with the monetary 
investment to a firm. The result revealed in the analysis of Table 5.11 was as predicted. 
It was found that foreign ownership had a significant positive effect on a firm’s going-









This finding was consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis which claims that a 
higher level of foreign ownership is associated with better firm performance and going-
concern. Likewise, the finding was consistent with those scholars who confirm that a 
firm’s going-concern problem was negatively associated with foreign ownership (Ali et 
al., 2008; Alzoubi, 2016; Kim, 2015; Yasser and Al Mamun, 2017; and Zureigat et al., 
2014a). 
However, this finding contradicted the transient hypothesis argument that foreign 
investors do not have adequate incentives to become effective in monitoring firms’ 
going-concerns. Furthermore, this finding contradicted the findings of Aksu et al. 
(2013), Paik and Koh (2014), Guo and Ma (2015), and Zureigat (2015) who argued that 
there was a positive relationship between foreign ownership and earnings management 
practice which would increase a firm’s going-concern problem. 
5.4.3.6 Institutional Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern (H5) 
Agency theorists claim that institutional ownership can be an essential control 
mechanism for observing a business’s undertakings (Young et al., 2008). The result 
revealed in the analysis of Table 5.11 was as predicted. It was found that institutional 
ownership had a significant positive effect on a firm’s going-concern. Thus, H5 was 
accepted.  
This was in support of the active monitoring hypothesis which claims that institutions 









going-concern, positively. Moreover, this finding was in line with that of Iskandar et al. 
(2011); Yang et al. (2009); Zureigat et al. (2014b); Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) who 
confirmed that institutional ownership reduced a firm’s going-concern problem.  
However, this finding contradicted the hands-off passivity hypothesis which claims that 
institutional ownership may increase managerial incentives to engage in earnings 
management, which will, eventually, lead to a firm’s going-concern problem. Likewise, 
the finding was inconsistent with the findings of Alves (2012); Agyei and Owusu 
(2014); Lin and Manowan (2012); and Lemma et al. (2018) who found a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management practices which 
would increase the probabilities of a business’s failure.  
5.4.4 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship between 
Ownership Structure and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
As mentioned before, the relationships between the ownership structure variables and a 
firm’s going-concern are mixed and inconclusive. In this regard, this study has 
hypothesised that these relationships can be moderated by the audit committee 
characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise). This is because previous 
studies on the audit committee characteristics, such as Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin 
(2010); Amin et al. (2018); Garcia et al. (2012); Ismail et al. (2010); and Lin et al. 
(2006) established that a big audit committee was accompanied by better going-concern 









committee size. Thus, this section examines the moderating effect of audit committee 
size on the relationship between ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-executive, 
block, foreign, and institution) and a firm’s going-concern. This provides an answer to 
the question of whether audit committee size moderates the relationship between 
ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-executive, block, foreign, and institution) and 
a firm’s going-concern. 
Hierarchical regression has been used to test the effect of audit committee size as a 
moderator on the relationship between ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-
executive, block, foreign, and institution) and a firm’s going-concern. This method has 
been suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) as one of the suitable techniques of 
examining whether the expected outcome of a dependent variable from the independent 
variables is influenced by an interacting variable. Consistent with Fairchild and 
MacKinnon (2009); Hayes (2013); Judd and Kenny (2010); Kinnon (2009); Kenny 
(2015); and Mitchell and Jolley (2012), a moderator is anticipated to strengthen, weaken 
or change the direction of the relationship between the predictor (independent variable) 
and the criterion (dependent variable).  
Therefore, to examine the moderating effect of audit committee size on the relationship 
between ownership structure and the going-concern of the quoted Nigerian financial 
institutions, the following regression equation was run: GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + 
α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACSit+ α8COit * ACSit + α9EOit * ACSit + 









α15LLit + α16Tangit + ϵit. The Breusch and Pagan LM, Hausman specification, group-
wise heteroscedasticity, Wooldridge (for autocorrelation), and Pesaran's cross-sectional 
dependence tests have been tested and evidence was found on the existence of all three 
problems. Adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors were applied to solve the 
problems as argued previously. The hierarchical regression result of the moderating 
effect of audit committee size on the relationship between ownership structure and a 
firm’s going-concern is offered in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12  
Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on Ownership Structure and a Firm’s Going-





CO -887.2623 199.9579 -4.4400 0.0000 
EO 269.8290 165.5254 1.6300 0.0570 
NO 0.4271 1.3155 0.3200 0.3740 
BO -19.1044 2.5583 -7.4700 0.0000 
FO -5.1380 4.1419 -1.2400 0.1125 
IO 6.4766 2.2997 2.8200 0.0045 
ACS -2.0705 0.2674 -7.7400 0.0000 
CO*ACS 150.3086 33.9916 4.4200 0.0000 
EO*ACS -46.2653 26.8214 -1.7200 0.0480 
NO*ACS -0.3033 0.2337 -1.3000 0.1025 
BO*ACS 2.9772 0.4931 6.0400 0.0000 
FO*ACS 1.0369 0.7418 1.4000 0.0865 
IO*ACS -0.9447 0.4336 -2.1800 0.0190 
FS -1.1911 0.1655 -7.2000 0.0000 
LL -1.7880 0.2685 -6.6600 0.0000 
Tang -16.4524 3.3613 -4.8900 0.0000 
Cons 42.0448 3.0117 13.9600 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6301 
Prob>F  0.0000 
GC = Firm’s going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-
Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign Ownership; IO = Institutional 









Grounded on the agency theory and resource dependence theory, appointment of many 
audit committee members improves the internal checking effectiveness and provides a 
firm with better going-concern. Table 5.12 revealed the coefficient of determination of 
the R2 value, which was 63.01%, indicating that the variables considered in the model 
accounted for about 63.01% of the changes in the dependent variable, which was going-
concern, whilst about 36.99% of the changes may have been a result of other variables 
not addressed by this model. In Table 5.12, institutional ownership, the interaction of the 
audit committee size with CEO ownership, and the interaction of the audit committee 
size with block ownership had significant positive relationships with a firm’s going-
concern at 1% significance levels. However, CEO ownership, block ownership, audit 
committee size, firm size, loss-loss, and asset tangibility had significant negative 
relationships with a firm’s going-concern at 1% significance levels. In the same 
direction, the interaction of the audit committee size with executive directors’ ownership 
and the interaction of the audit committee size with institutional ownership had a 
significant negative relationship with a firm’s going-concern at 5% significance levels. 
Whereas, executive directors’ ownership and the interaction of the audit committee size 
with foreign ownership were found to have significant positive effects at 10% 
significance levels. Conversely, non-executive directors’ ownership, foreign ownership, 
and the interaction of the audit committee size with non-executive directors’ ownership 









5.4.4.1 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship 
between CEO Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that CEO ownership had a 
significant positive effect on a firm’s going-concern. Similarly, corresponding to the 
agency and resource dependence notions which claim that an audit committee with 
many members improves the internal checking productivity, which prevents CEOs from 
taking part in fraudulent actions that will result in the firm’s going-concern problem. In 
Table 5.12, the result showed that the audit committee size interaction on the 
relationship between CEO ownership and a firm’s going-concern was positive and 
significant. Thus, it was established that the audit committee size positively moderated 
the relationship between CEO ownership and the going-concern in Nigerian registered 
financial firms. Hence, H6a1 was accepted. 
Therefore, the presence of an audit committee with many members strengthens the 
relationship between CEO ownership and a firm’s going-concern. The result was in line 
with the resource dependence notion which claims that an audit committee with several 
members means that the members may bring plentiful resources to the firm, such as 
experience and expertise, which may possibly keep up the audit committee’s usefulness. 
Thus, safeguarding the going-concern status of the firm. Therefore, the bigger the audit 









5.4.4.2 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship 
between Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that executive directors’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, in 
Table 5.12, the result showed that the audit committee size interaction on the 
relationship between executive ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and 
significant. Thus, it was established that audit committee size negatively moderated the 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in the quoted 
Nigerian financial firms. Hence, H6a2 was accepted. 
Therefore, the existence of an audit committee with a high number of members weakens 
the relationship between executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern. 
This result contradicted the agency and resource dependence theories which claim that 
an audit committee with many participants improves a firm’s going-concern. This is 
because, the audit committee size only is not adequate to moderate the relationship 
between executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in Nigerian listed 
financial companies positively as the executive directors that have devious 
characteristics may possibly manipulate the financial statement of a business to the level 
that only members with financial understanding may possibly find out. Another possible 
reason for this negative relationship is that executive directors may be so devious that 










5.4.4.3 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship 
between Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that non-executives’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. However, in 
Table 5.12, the result showed that the audit committee size interaction on the 
relationship between non-executive ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative 
and insignificant. Thus, it was established that the audit committee size did not moderate 
the relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in 
Nigerian registered financial companies. Hence, H6a3 was rejected. 
This finding contradicted the agency and resource dependence beliefs that big audit 
committees can help the non-executive shareholders of the firm in rectifying financial 
reporting irregularities which will reduce going-concern threats. The reason behind this 
contradiction is that the existence of big audit committees unaided by any independence 
and financial matters is not sufficient to moderate the relationship between non-
executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian listed financial 
companies, positively. Moreover, the non-executive directors of the Nigerian listed 
financial companies may not be familiar with some specific matters related to the firm's 
governance. This may happen because of an information asymmetry between the 
executive and non-executive directors which can weaken the non-executives in the 
performance of their monitoring and supervisory functions efficiently. Furthermore, as 









directors, it accounted for an average of 95.45% (see Table 5.7) there was the possibility 
of a lack of thorough checking amongst themselves.  
5.4.4.4 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship 
between Block Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that block ownership had a 
significant negative influence on a firm’s going-concern. However, in Table 5.12 it was 
shown that the audit committee size interaction on the relationship between block 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern was positive and significant. Thus, it was 
established that audit committee size positively moderated the relationship between 
block ownership and the going-concern of the quoted Nigerian financial firms. Hence, 
H6a4 was accepted. 
Hence, the presence of an audit committee with many members strengthens the 
relationship between block ownership and a firm’s going-concern. This finding supports 
the agency theorists’ claims that an audit committee with adequate members and 
resources can play an active overseeing role in curtailing agency conflicts between the 
block and minority shareholders. Correspondingly, these outcomes were in line with the 
agency and resource dependence philosophers who assert that the nomination of many 
audit committee members increases the internal control effectiveness and better going-









5.4.4.5 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship 
between Foreign Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that foreign ownership 
positively and significantly affected a firm’s going-concern. Consistent with that, in 
Table 5.12, the result showed that the audit committee size interaction on the 
relationship between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern was positive and 
significant. Thus, it was established that the audit committee size positively moderated 
the relationship between foreign ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian listed 
financial companies. Hence, H6a5 was accepted.  
Therefore, the presence of an audit committee with many members strengthens the 
relationship between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, this 
result was in accordance with both the agency and resource dependence notions which 
claim that the appointment of a lot of audit committee members enriches the internal 
control effectiveness and prevents a firm’s going-concern problems. This will 
consequently drive foreign financiers to finance and relocate more technologies and 
strategies to the companies which will boost the firms’ going-concern status. 
5.4.4.6 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship 
between Institutional Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that institutional ownership 









the result showed that the audit committee size interaction on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and significant. Thus, it 
was found that audit committee size negatively moderated the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian listed financial companies. 
Hence, H6a6 was accepted. 
Therefore, the existence of an audit committee with many members weakens the 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern. This 
result contradicted the agency and resource dependence notions that an audit committee 
with many members improves a firm’s going-concern. This is because an audit 
committee with many members, single-handedly and without the adequate financial 
knowledge and independence, will not be strong enough to moderate the relationship 
between institutional ownership and the going-concern in the Nigerian financial sector, 
positively.  
5.4.5 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the Relationship 
between Ownership Structure and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
As stated earlier, the relationship between the ownership structure variables and a firm’s 
going-concern is still mixed and inconclusive. Therefore, this study has hypothesised 
that these relationships can be strengthened or weakened by the audit committee 
independence. This is because previous researchers provide proof that audit committee 









Amin et al., 2018; Saleh et al., 2007; and Salleh & Haat, 2014). Thus, the influence of 
the ownership on going-concern could be an influence of the independence of the audit 
committee. Thus, this section examines the moderating effect of audit committee 
independence on the relationship between ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-
executive, block, foreign, and institution) and a firm’s going-concern. This offers an 
answer to the question of whether audit committee independence moderates the 
relationship between ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-executive, block, 
foreign, and institution) and a firm’s going-concern. 
Therefore, to examine this moderating effect, the following hierarchical regression 
equation was run: GCit = α0 + α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + 
α6IOit + α7ACIit+ α8COit * ACIit + α9EOit * ACIit + α10NOit * ACIit + α11BOit 
* ACIit + α12FOit * ACIit + α13IOit * ACIit + α14FSit + α15LLit + α16Tangit + 
ϵit. To overcome group-wise heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional 
dependence issues, adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors were applied. The 
hierarchical regression outcome of the moderating influence of audit committee 
independence on the relationship between ownership structure and a firm’s going-










Table 5.13  
Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on Ownership Structure and the 
Firm’s Going-Concern Regression with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
GC Coef. Drisc/Kraay Std. Err. T P 
CO 712.5089 162.8326 4.3800 0.0000 
EO -42.5034 20.3470 -2.0900 0.0230 
NO -10.6531 5.4891 -1.9400 0.0310 
BO 1.2315 4.3719 0.2800 0.3900 
FO 30.5434 11.5496 2.6400 0.0065 
IO -5.1913 4.1860 -1.2400 0.1125 
ACI -0.5843 2.4966 -0.2300 0.4085 
CO*ACI -708.0652 167.7978 -4.2200 0.0000 
EO*ACI 39.8677 26.2968 1.5200 0.0705 
NO*ACI 9.7639 5.4969 1.7800 0.0435 
BO*ACI -1.6820 5.0836 -0.3300 0.3715 
FO*ACI -31.7331 12.1225 -2.6200 0.0070 
IO*ACI 6.8365 4.6551 1.4700 0.0765 
FS -1.1352 0.1422 -7.9800 0.0000 
LL -1.6002 0.2783 -5.7500 0.0000 
Tang -18.3078 3.7497 -4.8800 0.0000 
Cons 28.8901 3.5769 8.0800 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6491 
Prob>F  0.0000 
GC = Firm’s going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-
Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign Ownership; IO = Institutional 
Ownership; ACI = Audit Committee Independence; FS = Firm Size; LL = Loss-Loss; Tang = Asset 
Tangibility. 
Established on the agency and resource dependence principles, it was expected that the 
dominance of non-executive members would help the companies to offer sufficient 
monitoring to safeguard owners from the opportunistic behaviours of managers which 
may improve performance and minimise the firms’ going-concern problems.  
Table 5.13 revealed the coefficient of determination (R2) value as 64.91%, indicating 
that the variables considered in the model accounted for about 64.91% of the change in 









may have been a result of other variables not addressed by this model. In Table 5.13, 
CEO ownership and foreign ownership had significant positive relationships with a 
firm’s going-concern at 1% significance levels. However, audit committee 
independence, the interaction of audit committee independence with foreign ownership, 
firm size, loss-loss, and asset tangibility had significant negative relationships with a 
firm’s going-concern at 1% significance levels. Whereas, the interaction of audit 
committee independence with non-executive directors’ ownership had a significant 
positive relationship with a firm’s going-concern at 5% significance level. On the other 
hand, executive directors’ ownership and non-executive directors’ ownership had 
significant negative relationships with a firm’s going-concern at 5% significance levels. 
On the other hand, the interaction of audit committee independence with executive 
directors’ ownership and the interaction of audit committee independence with 
institutional ownership were found to have significant positive effects at 10%. 
Conversely, block ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee independence, 
and the interaction of audit committee independence with block ownership were found 
to have insignificant relationships with a firm’s going-concern.  
5.4.5.1 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the 
Relationship between CEO Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that CEO ownership had a 
significant positive effect on a firm’s going-concern. In Table 5.13, the result showed 









ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and significant. Thus, it was 
established that audit committee independence negatively moderated the relationship 
between CEO ownership and the going-concern of the quoted Nigerian financial firms. 
Hence, H6b1 was accepted. 
Therefore, the presence of an audit committee with a high number of non-executive 
members weakens the effect of CEO ownership on a firm’s going-concern. Besides that, 
this finding was contrary to both the agency theory and the resource dependence theory 
which claim that the dominance of non-executive members in an audit committee helps 
the company to offer sufficient monitoring to safeguard the owners. However, this 
finding supported the entrenchment hypothesis that high CEO ownership increases the 
possibility for them to make the decision to serve their personal interests. Likewise, the 
social and political connections of the CEO may influence the appointment of members 
into different committees. Thus, the members that have been appointed to the audit 
committee due to the influence of a CEO may not monitor the activities of the CEO 
efficiently. Therefore, when audit committee members are informally connected to the 









5.4.5.2 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the 
Relationship between Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-
Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that the executive directors’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. However, in 
Table 5.13, it can be seen, clearly, that when audit committee independence was 
introduced as a moderator, this negative relationship was strengthened to become 
positive. It was revealed that audit committee independence positively moderated the 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian 
listed financial companies. Hence, H6b2 was accepted. 
Hence, the presence of an audit committee with many non-executive members 
strengthens the relationship between executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-
concern. Theoretically, this finding was in line with the agency theory’s claim that an 
audit committee with a high number of independent members can bring into line the 
interests of the owners and executives. Furthermore, this finding supported the agency 
and resource dependence theories which claim that an audit committee with many 
independent participants will monitor the executives of the firms efficiently. Moreover, 
this finding was consistent with the findings of Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015); Amin 
et al. (2018); and Saleh et al. (2007) who found that audit committee independence was 









5.4.5.3 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the 
Relationship Between Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-
Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that non-executive directors’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. However, in 
Table 5.13, it can be seen, clearly, that when audit committee independence was 
introduced as a moderator, this negative relationship was strengthened to become 
positive. It was revealed that audit committee independence positively moderated the 
relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern of the 
quoted Nigerian financial firms. Hence, H6b3 was accepted.y 
Hence, an audit committee with many independent members strengthens the relationship 
between non-executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, 
theoretically, this finding supported the agency theory claim that an independent audit 
committee can align the interests of non-executives and executives. Furthermore, this 
result was in line with the agency and resource dependence theories, which claim that an 
audit committee with many independent participants might efficiently monitor the 
executives of the firms. Similarly, this result supported the empirical findings of Al-
Rassas and Kamardin (2015); Amin et al. (2018); Feldmann and Schwarzkopf (2003); 
Garcia et al. (2012); Saleh et al. (2007); and Salleh and Haat (2014) who found that an 
independent audit committee was capable of aiding the non-executive directors in the 









5.4.5.4 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the 
Relationship between Block Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that block ownership had a 
significant negative impact on a firm’s going-concern. In Table 5.13, the result showed 
that the audit committee independence interaction on the relationship between block 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and insignificant. Thus, it was 
disclosed that audit committee independence did not moderate the relationship between 
block ownership and the going-concern of the quoted Nigerian financial firms. Hence, 
H6b4 was rejected. 
This finding was in line with the findings of Abdullah and Nasir (2004); Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006); and Ismail et al. (2010) who found an insignificant relationship between 
the independence of the audit committee and the going-concern. This was also consistent 
with the social and political connection argument that the appointment of non-executive 
directors into board committees may be based on their connections with the major 
shareholders. Therefore, when audit committee members are allied to the block 
shareholders, they cannot be strictly independent, and they cannot stop their 









5.4.5.5 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the 
Relationship between Foreign Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that foreign ownership had a 
significant positive effect on a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, in Table 5.13, the result 
showed that the audit committee independence interaction on the relationship between 
foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and significant. Thus, it was 
revealed that audit committee independence negatively moderated the relationship 
between foreign ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian listed financial 
companies. Hence, H6b5 was accepted.  
Therefore, an audit committee with many independent members weakens the 
relationship between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern. This result 
contradicted the agency and resource dependence theories which claim that an audit 
committee with many participants improves a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, this 
finding contradicted the active monitoring hypothesis which claims that foreign 
shareholders are more capable than domestic shareholders in monitoring the firm’s 
activities. However, it supported the transient hypothesis and information asymmetry 
hypothesis which claim that investments from foreigners are short-term in nature and 
foreign shareholders lack sufficient information to efficiently monitor the firm’s 
activities due to cultural, institutional, and geographical barriers. Therefore, due to this 









domestic counterparts to relate and communicate with audit committee members due to 
cultural, institutional, and geographical barriers.  
5.4.5.6 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the 
Relationship between Institutional Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that institutional ownership 
positively and significantly affected a firm’s going-concern. Similarly, consistent with 
that, in Table 5.13, the result showed that the audit committee independence interaction 
on the relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s firm going-concern was 
negative and significant. Thus, it was established that audit committee independence 
positively moderated the relationship between institutional ownership and the going-
concern of Nigerian listed financial companies. Hence, H6b6 was accepted.  
Hence, an audit committee with many independent members strengthens the relationship 
between institutional ownership and a firm’s going-concern. Likewise, this result was in 
line with the agency and resource dependence theorists’ views that an independent 
member on the audit committee may help them to efficiently and effectively monitor the 
financial activities of the firm which will attract and motivate other institutions to invest 
in the firm. Moreover, the synergy of active monitoring by both an audit committee with 
high independence and institutional shareholders will mitigate earnings manipulations 









5.4.6 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between Ownership Structure and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
As previously discussed, the relationships between the ownership structure variables and 
a firm’s going-concern have been found to be mixed and inconclusive. Therefore, this 
study had postulated that these relationships can be moderated by the members of the 
audit committee with financial expertise. Moreover, it has been claimed by some 
scholars that the financial knowledge of the audit committee members can reduce 
internal control weaknesses and the firm’s overall going-concern (Hotaish et al., 2009; 
Naike & Sharma, 2009; Rahmat, & Iskandar, 2009; Sallouma et al., 2014; and Zhang et 
al., 2007). Thus, the effect of ownership on going-concern could be an effect of the 
financial knowledge of the audit committee members.  
Hence, this section examines the moderating effect of audit committee financial 
expertise on the relationship between ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-
executive, block, foreign, and institution) and a firm’s going-concern. This section 
provides an answer to the question of whether audit committee financial expertise 
moderates the relationship between ownership structure (CEO, executive, non-executive, 
block, foreign, and institution) and a firm’s going-concern. 
Therefore, to investigate the moderating effect of audit committee financial expertise on 
the relationship between ownership structure and the going-concern of the Nigerian 









α1COit + α2EOit + α3NOit + α4BOit + α5FOit + α6IOit + α7ACEit+ α8COit * 
ACEit + α9EOit * ACEit + α10NOit * ACEit + α11BOit * ACEit + α12FOit * 
ACEit + α13IOit * ACEit + α14FSit + α15LLit + α16Tangit + ϵit. 
Based on the results of the Breusch and Pagan LM, Hausman specification, group-wise 
heteroscedasticity, Wooldridge (for autocorrelation), and cross-sectional dependence 
tests, adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors were produced. The Hierarchical 
regression outcome of the moderating effect of audit committee financial expertise on 
the relationship between ownership structure and a firm’s going-concern is offered in 
Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 
Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Ownership Structure and 





CO 97.1292 73.9138 1.3100 0.0995 
EO -80.9432 59.5216 -1.3600 0.0925 
NO -3.8482 2.2091 -1.7400 0.0460 
BO 4.2736 1.7958 2.3800 0.0120 
FO 0.5630 2.2809 0.2500 0.4035 
IO -1.5199 2.2344 -0.6800 0.2510 
ACE 1.9767 0.7367 2.6800 0.0060 
CO*ACE -130.8453 105.8590 -1.2400 0.1135 
EO*ACE 105.9196 91.0350 1.1600 0.1270 
NO*ACE 4.0705 3.2679 1.2500 0.1115 
BO*ACE -8.6507 2.3228 -3.7200 0.0005 
FO*ACE -0.7819 3.5037 -0.2200 0.4125 
IO*ACE 4.2309 3.7479 1.1300 0.1345 
FS -1.2016 0.1710 -7.0300 0.0000 
LL -1.8249 0.3608 -5.0600 0.0000 
Tang -16.1758 3.7582 -4.3000 0.0000 
Cons 28.7608 3.5146 8.1800 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6073 









GC = Firm’s going-concern; CO = CEO Ownership; EO = Executive Director Ownership; NO = Non-
Executive Director Ownership; BO = Block Ownership; FO = Foreign Ownership; IO = Institutional 
Ownership; ACE = Audit Committee Financial Expertise; FS = Firm Size; LL = Loss-Loss; Tang = Asset 
Tangibility. 
Stressing on the resource dependence theory, it claims that audit committees serve as the 
resource providers. They contribute skills and expertise to help companies benefit from 
high earnings quality. This will also help a firm to increase its performance and to 
minimise any financial distress, which would reduce a firm’s going-concern problems. 
Table 5.14 shows the results that disclosed the coefficient of determinants of the R2 
value of 60.73%, indicating that the variables considered in the model accounted for 
about 60.73% of the change in the dependent variable, which was going-concern, whilst 
about 39.27% of the change may have been because of other variables not addressed by 
this model. In Table 5.14, it can be seen that audit committee financial expertise had a 
significant positive relationship with a firm’s going-concern at a 1% significance level. 
However, the interaction of the audit committee financial expertise on block ownership, 
firm size, loss, and asset tangibility had significant negative relationships with a firm’s 
going-concern at 1% significance levels. Whereas, block ownership had a significant 
positive relationship with a firm’s going-concern at a 5% significance level. On the other 
hand, non-executive directors’ ownership had a significant negative relationship with a 
firm’s going-concern at a 5% significance level. On the other hand, CEO ownership was 
found to have a significant positive effect at 10%. Whereas, executive directors’ 
ownership was found to have a significant negative effect at 10%. In conclusion, foreign 









expertise on (CEO, executive, non-executive, foreign, and institutional) ownership were 
found to have insignificant relationships with a firm’s going-concern. 
5.4.6.1 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between CEO Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed from Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that CEO ownership had a 
significant positive effect on a firm’s going-concern. In Table 5.14, the result showed 
that the audit committee financial expertise interaction on the relationship between CEO 
ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and insignificant. Thus, it was found 
that audit committee financial expertise did not moderate the relationship between CEO 
ownership and the going-concern of the quoted Nigerian financial firms. Hence, H6c1 
was rejected. 
This finding contradicted the agency and resource dependence theories which claim that 
an audit committee with many financial experts could help the CEO in checking and 
enhancing the financial reporting quality, which would reduce the going-concern 
problems. Moreover, this finding contradicted the findings of Amin et al. (2018); Badara 
and Saidin (2014); Baxter and Cotter (2009); Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009); and 
Wan Ismail and Kamarudin (2012) who found that an audit committee participants’ 
financial expertise could improve the firm’s going-concern. However, this finding was 
consistent with Mohamad et al. (2012); Sallouma et al. (2014) who found insignificant 









supported Carcello et al. (2011) who claimed that high CEO influence in the selection of 
audit committee members would make them powerless to have an impact on monitoring 
the firm’s activities. Therefore, these reasons would make the audit committee members, 
despite their financial expertise, incapable of influencing the relationship between CEO 
ownership and the going-concern in Nigerian listed financial firms. 
5.4.6.2 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-
Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that the executive directors’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. In Table 5.14, the 
result showed that the audit committee financial expertise interaction on the relationship 
between executive ownership and a firm’s going-concern was positive and insignificant. 
Therefore, it was established that audit committee financial expertise did not moderate 
the relationship between executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern of 
Nigerian listed financial companies. Hence, H6c2 was rejected. 
This finding contradicted the agency and resource dependence theory arguments which 
claim that an audit committee with many financial experts could help executive directors 
in checking and enhancing active monitoring, and it could improve a firm’s going-
concern. Moreover, this finding contradicted the findings of Amin et al. (2018); Baxter 









committee participants’ financial expertise could improve a firm’s going-concern. 
However, this finding was consistent with the findings of Mohamad et al. (2012) and 
Sallouma et al. (2014) who found an insignificant influence of audit committee financial 
expertise on a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, consistent with the entrenchment effect 
hypothesis, the executive directors may not be aligned with the audit committee in 
monitoring a firm’s activities. Hence, these reasons would make the audit committee 
members, despite their financial knowledge, incapable of influencing the relationship 
between the executive directors’ ownership and the going-concern in Nigerian listed 
financial companies.  
5.4.6.3 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership and a Firm’s Going-
Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that non-executive directors’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. In Table 5.14, the 
result showed that the audit committee financial expertise interaction on the relationship 
between non-executive ownership and a firm’s going-concern was positive and 
insignificant. Thus, it was revealed that audit committee financial expertise did not 
moderate the relationship in relation to non-executive directors’ ownership and the 









This finding contradicted the agency and resource dependence theory arguments which 
claim that an audit committee members’ financial expertise could support non-executive 
directors in monitoring the firm’s financial activities. Furthermore, this also contradicted 
the findings of Amin et al. (2018); Baxter and Cotter (2009); and Wan Ismail and 
Kamarudin (2012) who found that an audit committee participants’ financial expertise 
can improve a firm’s going-concern. However, this finding was consistent with the 
findings of Mohamad et al. (2012) and Sallouma et al. (2014) who found an insignificant 
influence of audit committee financial expertise on a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, 
consistent with the information asymmetry argument, non-executive directors rely on the 
information prepared by management and such information may not be complete. This 
will hinder them from undertaking their monitoring roles efficiently. Therefore, due to a 
lack of sufficient information about a firm’s activities by the non-executive 
shareholders, an audit committee, despite its financial expertise, may not be capable of 
influencing their impacts on a firm’s going-concern. 
5.4.6.4 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between Block Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that block ownership had a 
significant negative effect on a firm’s going-concern. Correspondingly, in Table 5.14, 
the result showed that the audit committee financial expertise interaction on the 
relationship between executive ownership and a firm’s going-concern was negative and 









the relationship between block ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian registered 
financial institutions, negatively. Hence, H6c4 was accepted. 
Therefore, this indicated that an audit committee with financial experts weakens the 
relationship between block ownership and a firm’s going-concern. This finding 
contradicted the agency and resource dependence theories which claim that an audit 
committee with financial experts improves a firm’s going-concern. Furthermore, this 
contradicted the findings of Amin et al. (2018); Baxter and Cotter (2009); and Wan 
Ismail and Kamarudin (2012) who found that audit committee participants’ financial 
expertise could improve a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, it was consistent with the 
entrenchment effect hypothesis which claims that block shareholders may not be aligned 
with the audit committee in monitoring the firm’s activities. Hence, this would make the 
audit committee members, despite their financial knowledge, incapable of influencing 
the relationship between the block ownership and the going-concern in Nigerian listed 
financial companies.  
5.4.6.5 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between Foreign Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that foreign ownership had a 
significant positive effect on a firm’s going-concern. In Table 5.14, the result showed 
that the audit committee financial expertise interaction on the relationship between 









it was established that audit committee financial expertise did not moderate the 
relationship between foreign ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian listed 
financial institutions. Hence, H6c5 was rejected.  
This finding contradicted the agency and resource dependence theory arguments which 
claim that audit committee members’ financial expertise could support foreign 
shareholders in monitoring the firm’s financial activities. Furthermore, this also 
contradicted the findings of Amin et al. (2018); Baxter and Cotter (2009); and Wan 
Ismail and Kamarudin (2012) who found that audit committee participants’ financial 
expertise could improve the firm’s going-concern. However, this finding was consistent 
with Mohamad et al. (2012) and Sallouma et al. (2014) who found an insignificant 
influence of audit committee financial expertise on a firm’s going-concern. Moreover, 
consistent with the transient hypothesis, the foreign shareholders may not have sufficient 
incentives to help the audit committee in monitoring the firm’s activities. Hence, these 
reasons would make the audit committee members, irrespective of their financial 
expertise, incapable of moderating the relationship between the foreign shareholders and 
the going-concern in the Nigerian listed financial companies. 
5.4.6.6 The Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between Institutional Ownership and a Firm’s Going-Concern 
It had been revealed in Table 5.11 (the direct effect model) that institutional ownership 









that, the audit committee financial expertise interaction on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and a firm’s going-concern was positive and insignificant. 
Therefore, it was found that audit committee financial expertise did not moderate the 
relationship between institutional ownership and the going-concern of Nigerian listed 
financial companies. Hence, H6c6 was rejected. 
This finding contradicted the agency and resource dependence theories’ arguments that 
audit committee members’ financial expertise could support institutional shareholders in 
the active monitoring of the firm’s financial activities. Moreover, this finding also 
contradicted the findings of Amin et al. (2018); Baxter and Cotter (2009); and Wan 
Ismail and Kamarudin (2012) who found that the audit committee participants’ financial 
expertise can improve the firm’s going-concern. However, this finding was consistent 
with Mohamad et al. (2012) and Sallouma et al. (2014) who found an insignificant 
influence of audit committee financial expertise on the firm’s going-concern. Moreover, 
consistent with the hands-off passivity hypothesis, the institutional shareholders may not 
have sufficient incentives to help the audit committee in monitoring the firm’s activities. 
Hence, these reasons will make the audit committee members, regardless of their 
financial expertise, unable to influence the relationship between the institutional 









5.5 Additional Analysis 
This section presents the additional analysis performed to make the main findings of the 
study robust.  
5.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Firm’s Going-Concern Measurement 
Going by literature, the bankruptcy Z-score was used to measure a firm’s going-concern 
(See Altman et al., 2017; Zureigat et al., 2014a,b). Likewise, the return on assets (ROA) 
was used to measure the firm’s going-concern (See Mohammad, 2012; Ogega, 2014; 
and Sanda et al., 2005). Similarly, the discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) was 
used to measure the firm’s going-concern (See Bushman & Williams, 2012; Beatty & 
Liao, 2011; and Norden & Stoian, 2013). To make the results robust, an individual 
regression was run on each of the three firm’s going-concern measurements, which were 
the Altman 2017 bankruptcy Z-score, discretionary loan loss provisions, and return on 
assets, to confirm that the results are in line with the expectations. It was expected that 
the direction of the Z-score and ROA models would be in a similar direction to that of 
the overall firm’s going-concern model as they were expected to make positive 
contributions to a firm’s going-concern. Whereas, the direction of the DLLP was 
expected to be in the opposite direction to that of the overall firm’s going-concern model 
as it was expected to have a negative contribution to a firm’s going-concern. The first 









respectively. The regression results for each are presented in Table 5.15 using adjusted 
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
Table 5.15  
Results of Ownership Structure on each of the Firm’s Going-Concern Measurements 
with the Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors  
  ZSCORE DLLP ROA GC 
GC Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P 
CO 13.8032 0.0755 0.1678 0.2545 0.4214 0.0330 13.9489 0.0715 
EO -9.7960 0.0490 0.2615 0.0170 0.2590 0.1420 -10.0168 0.0470 
NO -1.6630 0.0015 -0.0413 0.1090 -0.0182 0.0640 -1.6402 0.0020 
BO -1.4214 0.0615 -0.0104 0.3890 0.0810 0.0330 -1.3542 0.0650 
FO 1.0849 0.0690 -0.0332 0.1525 -0.0375 0.0990 1.1109 0.0570 
IO 0.8468 0.0640 0.0513 0.0025 -0.0446 0.0505 0.7740 0.0860 
ACS -0.5778 0.0010 -0.0169 0.0130 -0.0108 0.0405 -0.5610 0.0015 
ACI -2.4639 0.0205 -0.0609 0.0115 -0.0077 0.3960 -2.4962 0.0215 
ACE 0.7922 0.0020 -0.0307 0.0260 0.0489 0.0065 0.8245 0.0020 
FS -1.1831 0.0000 -0.0167 0.0000 -0.0030 0.1890 -1.1676 0.0000 
LL -1.5751 0.0000 -0.0011 0.4475 -0.1028 0.0000 -1.6933 0.0000 
Tang -16.0674 0.0000 -0.1494 0.0595 0.1269 0.1070 -15.8933 0.0000 
Cons 34.9274 0.0000 0.5342 0.0000 0.1042 0.0470 34.5227 0.0000 
R-squared: 0.6188 0.3892 0.3831 0.6154 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
As expected and presented in Table 5.15, it can be seen that the coefficients and 
significance levels of all the explanatory variables using the Z-score as the only 
determinant of a firm’s going-concern were in similar directions to the overall firm’s 
going-concern model. As presented in Table 5.15, audit committee financial expertise 
had a significant positive relationship with the Z-score at a 1% significance level. 
However, non-executive directors’ ownership, audit committee size, firm size, loss-loss, 









significance levels. In the same direction, the executive directors’ ownership and audit 
committee independence had significant negative relationships with the Z-score at 5% 
significance levels. Whereas, CEO ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional 
ownership were found to have significant positive effects at 10%. Conversely, block 
ownership was found to have a significant negative relationship with the Z-score at a 
10% significance level. 
As for the DLLP model, In Table 5.15, the coefficients and significance levels of all the 
explanatory variables using the DLLP as the sole basis of a firm’s going-concern can be 
clearly seen. Institutional ownership and executive directors’ ownership had significant 
positive relationships with the DLLP. However, audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, audit committee financial expertise, firm size, and asset tangibility had 
significant negative relationships with the DLLP. 
Whereas for the ROA model, Table 5.15 presents, clearly, the coefficients and 
significance levels of all the explanatory variables using the ROA as the sole basis of a 
firm’s going-concern. CEO ownership, block ownership, and audit committee financial 
expertise had significant positive relationships with the ROA. However, non-executive 
directors’ ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee size, 









The second regression equation was re-run using each of the determinants of a firm’s 
going-concern, respectively. The regression results for each are presented in Table 5.16 
using adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
Table 5.16  
Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on Ownership Structure and each of the 
Firm’s Going-Concern Regressions with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
  ZSCORE DLLP ROA GC 
GC Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P 
CO -881.1173 0.0000 3.7801 0.1745 -19.4657 0.0825 -887.2623 0.0000 
EO 259.0830 0.0655 -10.3115 0.0360 16.8502 0.0820 269.8290 0.0570 
NO 0.2777 0.4185 -0.0287 0.4340 0.1246 0.1415 0.4271 0.3740 
BO -18.7405 0.0000 0.4623 0.0525 1.0748 0.0580 -19.1044 0.0000 
FO -5.1755 0.1205 -0.1617 0.1835 0.0016 0.4965 -5.1380 0.1125 
IO 6.0539 0.0080 -0.4524 0.0005 -0.9727 0.0605 6.4766 0.0045 
ACS -2.1059 0.0000 -0.0305 0.1595 0.0051 0.2485 -2.0705 0.0000 
CO*ACS 149.2729 0.0000 -0.6005 0.1970 3.3062 0.0765 150.3086 0.0000 
EO*ACS -44.4474 0.0555 1.7637 0.0330 -2.7595 0.0835 -46.2653 0.0480 
NO*ACS -0.2807 0.1250 -0.0013 0.4800 -0.0250 0.1015 -0.3033 0.1025 
BO*ACS 2.9053 0.0000 -0.0801 0.0345 -0.1653 0.0635 2.9772 0.0000 
FO*ACS 1.0402 0.0950 0.0243 0.2095 -0.0039 0.4515 1.0369 0.0865 
IO*ACS -0.8640 0.0305 0.0822 0.0000 0.1548 0.0650 -0.9447 0.0190 
FS -1.2057 0.0000 -0.0179 0.0000 -0.0012 0.3925 -1.1911 0.0000 
LL -1.6701 0.0000 -0.0019 0.4165 -0.1012 0.0000 -1.7880 0.0000 
Tang -16.5974 0.0000 -0.1599 0.0770 0.1500 0.1200 -16.4524 0.0000 
Cons 42.5569 0.0000 0.5663 0.0040 -0.0057 0.4750 42.0448 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6337 0.3971 0.4023 0.6301 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
As expected and presented in Table 5.16, CEO ownership and foreign ownership had 
significant positive relationships with the Z-score at 1% significance levels. However, 
audit committee independence, the interaction of audit committee independence with 
foreign ownership, firm size, loss-loss, and asset tangibility had significant negative 









committee independence with non-executive directors’ ownership had a significant 
positive relationship with the Z-score at a 5% significance level. On the other hand, 
executive directors’ ownership and non-executive directors’ ownership had significant 
negative relationships with the Z-score at 5% significance levels. On the other hand, the 
interaction of audit committee independence with executive directors’ ownership and the 
interaction of audit committee independence with institutional ownership were found to 
have significant positive effects on the Z-score at 10%. Conversely, block ownership, 
institutional ownership, audit committee independence, and the interaction of audit 
committee independence with block ownership were found to show insignificant 
relationships with the Z-score.  
Whilst, for the DLLP model, Table 5.16 presents, clearly, the coefficients and 
significance levels of all the explanatory variables using the DLLP as the sole basis of a 
firm’s going-concern. Block ownership, the interaction of audit committee size with 
executive directors’ ownership, and the interaction of audit committee size with 
institutional ownership had significant positive relationships with the DLLP. However, 
executive directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, the interaction of audit 
committee size with block ownership, firm size, and asset tangibility had significant 
negative relationships with the DLLP. 
However, for the ROA model, the coefficients and significance levels of all the 
explanatory variables using the ROA as the sole basis of a firm’s going-concern can be 









interaction of audit committee size with CEO ownership and the interaction of audit 
committee size with institutional ownership had significant positive relationships with 
the ROA. However, CEO ownership, institutional ownership, the interaction of audit 
committee size with executive directors’ ownership, the interaction of audit committee 
size with block ownership, and loss-loss had significant negative relationships with the 
ROA.  
The third regression equation was re-run using each of the determinants of a firm’s 
going-concern, respectively. The regression results for each are presented in Table 5.17 









Table 5.17  
Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on Ownership Structure and each 
of the Firm’s Going-Concern Regressions with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors  
  ZSCORE DLLP ROA GC 
GC Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P 
CO 714.1604 0.0000 15.3636 0.0000 13.7106 0.0085 712.5089 0.0000 
EO -40.8990 0.0270 1.3221 0.1670 -0.2823 0.3705 -42.5034 0.0230 
NO -10.6950 0.0305 -0.1802 0.2525 -0.1382 0.1770 -10.6531 0.0310 
BO 1.9610 0.3205 0.7689 0.0060 0.0395 0.4390 1.2315 0.3900 
FO 30.8047 0.0065 0.5373 0.0180 0.2759 0.0075 30.5434 0.0065 
IO -5.5973 0.1050 -0.4973 0.0680 -0.0915 0.3905 -5.1913 0.1125 
ACI -0.3817 0.4390 0.1407 0.0825 -0.0618 0.1400 -0.5843 0.4085 
CO*ACI -709.8793 0.0000 -15.3225 0.0000 -13.5064 0.0095 -708.0652 0.0000 
EO*ACI 38.4922 0.0760 -1.0008 0.2430 0.3746 0.3345 39.8677 0.0705 
NO*ACI 9.7808 0.0430 0.1466 0.2935 0.1296 0.1965 9.7639 0.0435 
BO*ACI -2.5281 0.3030 -0.8134 0.0045 0.0326 0.4600 -1.6820 0.3715 
FO*ACI -32.0373 0.0070 -0.6031 0.0130 -0.2989 0.0045 -31.7331 0.0070 
IO*ACI 7.3640 0.0695 0.5989 0.0460 0.0716 0.4230 6.8365 0.0765 
FS -1.1521 0.0000 -0.0171 0.0000 -0.0002 0.4765 -1.1352 0.0000 
LL -1.4836 0.0000 0.0009 0.4585 -0.1157 0.0000 -1.6002 0.0000 
Tang -18.4979 0.0000 -0.1861 0.0310 0.0041 0.4800 -18.3078 0.0000 
Cons 29.0351 0.0000 0.2221 0.0060 0.0771 0.2260 28.8901 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6516 0.3981 0.4162 0.6491 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
In Table 5.17, CEO ownership and foreign ownership had significant positive 
relationships with the Z-score at 1% significance levels. However, audit committee 
independence, the interaction of audit committee independence with foreign ownership, 
firm size, loss-loss, and asset tangibility had significant negative relationships with the 
Z-score at 1% significance levels. Whereas, the interaction of audit committee 
independence with non-executive directors’ ownership had a significant positive 
relationship with the Z-score at a 5% significance level. On the other hand, executive 









relationships with the Z-score at 5% significance levels. On the other hand, the 
interaction of audit committee independence with executive directors’ ownership and the 
interaction of audit committee independence with institutional ownership were found to 
have significant positive effects on the Z-score at 10%. Conversely, block ownership, 
institutional ownership, audit committee independence, and the interaction of audit 
committee independence with block ownership were found to have insignificant 
relationships with the Z-score.  
Even though for the DLLP model, it can be clearly seen from Table 5.17that, the 
coefficients and significance levels of all the explanatory variables using the DLLP as 
the exclusive basis of a firm’s going-concern with CEO ownership, block ownership, 
foreign ownership, audit committee independence, and the interaction of audit 
committee independence with institutional ownership had significant positive 
relationships. However, institutional ownership, the interaction of audit committee 
independence with CEO ownership, the interaction of audit committee independence 
with block ownership, the interaction of audit committee independence with foreign 
ownership, firm size, and asset tangibility had significant negative relationships with the 
DLLP. 
On the other hand, for the ROA model, it can be seen clearly from Table 5.17 that, the 
coefficients and significance levels of all the explanatory variables using the ROA as the 
sole basis of a firm’s going-concern with CEO ownership and foreign ownership had 









independence with CEO ownership, the interaction of audit committee independence 
with foreign ownership, and loss-loss had significant negative relationships with the 
ROA.  
The third regression equation was re-run using each of the determinants of a firm’s 
going-concern, respectively. The regression results for each are presented in Table 5.18 
using adjusted Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
Table 5.18  
Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Ownership Structure and 
each of the Firm’s Going-Concern Regressions with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors  
  ZSCORE DLLP ROA GC 
GC Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P 
CO 95.7625 0.1065 2.0854 0.1495 2.4343 0.0520 97.1292 0.0995 
EO -79.6898 0.1010 -1.6590 0.1620 -2.3093 0.0660 -80.9432 0.0925 
NO -4.0658 0.0375 -0.2378 0.0025 -0.1131 0.0255 -3.8482 0.0460 
BO 4.1788 0.0135 0.0713 0.1000 -0.0046 0.4845 4.2736 0.0120 
FO 0.3419 0.4405 -0.1387 0.0040 0.0023 0.4810 0.5630 0.4035 
IO -1.2930 0.2805 0.1115 0.0005 0.1121 0.0985 -1.5199 0.2510 
ACE 1.9393 0.0070 -0.0197 0.2080 0.0576 0.0050 1.9767 0.0060 
CO*ACE -129.0732 0.1195 -2.9809 0.1425 -2.5967 0.1330 -130.8453 0.1135 
EO*ACE 104.4221 0.1355 2.8989 0.1240 3.8720 0.0450 105.9196 0.1270 
NO*ACE 4.3619 0.0975 0.3180 0.0010 0.1874 0.0330 4.0705 0.1115 
BO*ACE -8.6069 0.0005 -0.1351 0.0800 0.0894 0.2845 -8.6507 0.0005 
FO*ACE -0.5107 0.4415 0.1107 0.0555 -0.0486 0.2235 -0.7819 0.4125 
IO*ACE 4.0394 0.1405 -0.0474 0.1390 -0.2203 0.0520 4.2309 0.1345 
FS -1.2176 0.0000 -0.0179 0.0000 -0.0038 0.1245 -1.2016 0.0000 
LL -1.7140 0.0000 -0.0072 0.1695 -0.1019 0.0000 -1.8249 0.0000 
Tang -16.3168 0.0000 -0.1335 0.0210 0.1330 0.0640 -16.1758 0.0000 
Cons 29.1049 0.0000 0.3887 0.0000 0.0418 0.2535 28.7608 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6106 0.4038 0.4002 0.6073 









Similar to the firm’s going-concern model from Table 5.18, audit committee financial 
expertise had a significant positive relationship with the Z-score at a 1% significance 
level. However, the interaction of the audit committee financial expertise with block 
ownership, firm size, loss-loss, and asset tangibility had a significant negative 
relationship with the Z-score at a 1% significance level. Whereas, block ownership had a 
significant positive relationship with the Z-score at a 5% significance level. On the other 
hand, non-executive directors’ ownership had a significant negative relationship with the 
Z-score at a 5% significance level. On the other hand, CEO ownership was found to 
have a significant positive effect at 10%. Whereas, executive directors’ ownership was 
found to have a significant negative effect on the Z-score at 10%. Conversely, foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership, the interaction of audit committee financial expertise 
with CEO ownership, the interaction of audit committee financial expertise with 
executive directors’ ownership, the interaction of audit committee financial expertise 
with non-executive directors’ ownership, the interaction of audit committee financial 
expertise with foreign ownership, and the interaction of audit committee financial 
expertise with institutional ownership were all found to have insignificant relationships 
with the Z-score. 
Whereas, for the DLLP model, the coefficients and the significance levels of all the 
explanatory variables using the DLLP as the exclusive basis of a firm’s going-concern 
can be seen clearly in Table 5.18. The interaction of audit committee financial expertise 









expertise with foreign ownership had significant positive relationships with the DLLP. 
However, non-executive directors’ ownership, foreign ownership, the interaction of 
audit committee financial expertise with block ownership, firm size, and asset tangibility 
had significant negative relationships with the DLLP. 
In contrast to the DLLP model, Table 5.18 clearly presented the coefficients and the 
significance levels of all the explanatory variables using the ROA as the sole basis of a 
firm’s going-concern. CEO ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee 
financial expertise, the interaction of audit committee financial expertise with executive 
directors’ ownership, and the interaction of audit committee financial expertise with 
non-executive directors’ ownership had significant positive relationships with the ROA. 
However, executive directors’ ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, the 
interaction of audit committee financial expertise with institutional ownership, loss-loss, 
and asset tangibility had significant negative relationships with the ROA.  
5.5.2 Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Independence 
In the primary analysis, audit committee independence had been tested as the percentage 
of the independent members of the total audit committee members. In this sensitivity 
test, audit committee independence was redefined as the total number of independent 
members of the audit committee. The key differences between the main measurement 
and the alternative measurement were that the main measurement compared the strength 









the audit committee. It also measured the variability of the independent members in the 
audit committee to the total number of the audit committee members. However, the 
alternative measurement reflected the total number of independent members in the audit 











Table 5.19  
Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Independence on Ownership Structure and 
the Firm’s Going-Concern Direct Regression with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors  
  Alternative ACI Main Model 
GC Coef. P Coef. P 
CO 14.4211 0.0695 13.9489 0.0715 
EO -10.3658 0.0405 -10.0168 0.0470 
NO -1.6315 0.0020 -1.6402 0.0020 
BO -1.3234 0.0695 -1.3542 0.0650 
FO 1.1099 0.0540 1.1109 0.0570 
IO 0.7592 0.0915 0.7740 0.0860 
ACS -0.1028 0.3525 -0.5610 0.0015 
ACI -0.4966 0.0100 -2.4962 0.0215 
ACE 0.7892 0.0025 0.8245 0.0020 
FS -1.1578 0.0000 -1.1676 0.0000 
LL -1.6827 0.0000 -1.6933 0.0000 
Tang -15.7921 0.0000 -15.8933 0.0000 
Cons 32.0636 0.0000 34.5227 0.0000 
R-squared: 0.6168 0.6154 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 
In the primary analysis, from the linear regression, it was revealed that, when the criteria 
percentage of the independent members over the total audit committee members was 
considered, it was found that audit committee independence showed a negative 
relationship with a firm’s going-concern. Likewise, the findings show that, when the 
‘total number of independent members of the audit committee’ was considered as a 
measurement for audit committee independence, the relationship remained negative and 
significant with a firm’s going-concern. Table 5.20, below, presents the regression 











Table 5.20  
Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Independence on Ownership Structure and 
the Firm’s Going-Concern Hierarchical Regression with the Driscoll-Kraay Standard 
Errors  
  Alternative ACI Main Model 
GC Coef. P Coef. P 
CO 96.7888 0.2780 712.5089 0.0000 
EO -108.9042 0.0000 -42.5034 0.0230 
NO -6.3541 0.0175 -10.6531 0.0310 
BO -8.8958 0.0000 1.2315 0.3900 
FO 5.6272 0.0675 30.5434 0.0065 
IO 0.4446 0.4525 -5.1913 0.1125 
ACI -1.4975 0.0040 -0.5843 0.4085 
CO*ACI -14.7737 0.3055 -708.0652 0.0000 
EO*ACI 17.4172 0.0000 39.8677 0.0705 
NO*ACI 0.8794 0.0395 9.7639 0.0435 
BO*ACI 1.4064 0.0000 -1.6820 0.3715 
FO*ACI -0.9502 0.0600 -31.7331 0.0070 
IO*ACI 0.0979 0.4425 6.8365 0.0765 
FS -1.0989 0.0000 -1.1352 0.0000 
LL -1.7193 0.0000 -1.6002 0.0000 
Tang -14.9673 0.0000 -18.3078 0.0000 
Cons 36.4219 0.0000 28.8901 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6274 0.6491 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 
Furthermore, from the hierarchical regression, it was found that the primary analysis 
showed that, the percentage of the audit committee independence moderated the 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern, 
negatively. Similarly, when the total number of independent members of the audit 
committee was used as a measurement, audit committee independence moderated the 
relationship between executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern, 









relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern, 
positively. Similarly, when the total number of independent members of the audit 
committee was used as a measurement, audit committee independence moderated the 
relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership and a firm’s going-concern, 
positively. Furthermore, the percentage of the audit committee independence moderated 
the relationship between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern, negatively. 
Similarly, when the total number of independent members of the audit committee was 
used as a measurement, audit committee independence moderated the relationship 
between foreign ownership and a firm’s going-concern, negatively. 
However, it has been established that the percentage of the audit committee 
independence moderated the relationship between CEO ownership and a firm’s going-
concern, negatively. However, when the total number of independent members of the 
audit committee was used as a measurement, audit committee independence did not 
moderate the relationship between CEO ownership and a firm’s going-concern. 
Moreover, audit committee independence was not able to moderate the relationship 
between block ownership and a firm’s going-concern. However, when the total number 
of independent members of the audit committee was used as a measurement, audit 
committee independence moderated the relationship between block ownership and a 
firm’s going-concern, positively. Whereas, the percentage of the audit committee 
independence moderated the relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s 









the audit committee was used as a measurement, audit committee independence did not 
moderate the relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s going-concern.  
5.5.3 Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
In the primary analysis, audit committee Financial Expertise had been tested as the 
percentage of financial expert members over the total audit committee members. In the 
sensitivity test, audit committee financial expertise was redefined as the total number of 
financial experts of the audit committee. The key difference between the primary 
measurement and the alternative measurement was that the primary measurement 
compared the strength and influence of audit committee financial experts with other 
members in the audit committee. It also measured the variability of the financial experts 
in the audit committee to the total number of the audit committee members. Whereas, 
the alternative measurement reflected the total number of financial experts in the audit 
committee without considering the variability of the total number of committee 
members. Table 5.21, below, presents the regression results of the moderating audit 










Table 5.21  
Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Ownership 
Structure and each of the Firm’s Going-Concern Direct Regressions with the Driscoll-
Kraay Standard Errors  
  Alternative ACE Main Model 
GC Coef. P Coef. P 
CO 14.0736 0.0705 13.9489 0.0715 
EO -10.2542 0.0460 -10.0168 0.0470 
NO -1.6261 0.0020 -1.6402 0.0020 
BO -1.3432 0.0670 -1.3542 0.0650 
FO 1.1535 0.0435 1.1109 0.0570 
IO 0.7214 0.1095 0.7740 0.0860 
ACS -0.6631 0.0005 -0.5610 0.0015 
ACI -2.4560 0.0215 -2.4962 0.0215 
ACE 0.1665 0.0005 0.8245 0.0020 
FS -1.1661 0.0000 -1.1676 0.0000 
LL -1.6952 0.0000 -1.6933 0.0000 
Tang -15.8112 0.0000 -15.8933 0.0000 
Cons 34.9730 0.0000 34.5227 0.0000 
R-squared: 0.6160 0.6154 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 
In the primary analysis, from the linear regression, it was revealed that, when the criteria 
percentage of financial experts over the total audit committee members was considered, 
it was found that audit committee financial experts displayed a positive relationship with 
a firm’s going-concern. Similarly, the findings show that, when the ‘total number of 
audit committee members with finance-related qualifications’ was considered as a 
measurement of audit committee financial expertise, the relationship remained positive 










Table 5.22  
Alternative Measurement of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Ownership 
Structure and the Firm’s going-concern Hierarchical Regression with the Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors  
  Alternative ACE Main Model 
GC Coef. P Coef. P 
CO -18.5455 0.3785 97.1292 0.0995 
EO 22.0756 0.3600 -80.9432 0.0925 
NO -2.7427 0.1565 -3.8482 0.0460 
BO 5.9042 0.0005 4.2736 0.0120 
FO 1.3900 0.0915 0.5630 0.4035 
IO -1.6750 0.1955 -1.5199 0.2510 
ACE 0.4331 0.0145 1.9767 0.0060 
CO*ACE 6.9873 0.3185 -130.8453 0.1135 
EO*ACE -7.5578 0.3080 105.9196 0.1270 
NO*ACE 0.3860 0.2805 4.0705 0.1115 
BO*ACE -1.8119 0.0000 -8.6507 0.0005 
FO*ACE -0.4083 0.1040 -0.7819 0.4125 
IO*ACE 0.6851 0.1185 4.2309 0.1345 
FS -1.1774 0.0000 -1.2016 0.0000 
LL -1.8158 0.0000 -1.8249 0.0000 
Tang -16.3132 0.0000 -16.1758 0.0000 
Cons 27.9278 0.0000 28.7608 0.0000 
R-squared 0.6055 0.6491 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 
Furthermore, from the hierarchical regression, it was found in the primary analysis that, 
the percentage of audit committee financial expertise moderated only the relationship 
between block ownership and a firm’s going-concern, negatively. Similarly, when the 
total number of financial experts of the audit committee was used as a measurement, 
audit committee financial expertise moderated the relationship between block ownership 
and a firm’s going-concern, negatively. However, it was close to the earlier findings that 









CEO, executive, non-executive, foreign, and institutional ownerships with a firm’s 
going-concern. Similarly, when the total number of financial experts of the audit 
committee was used as a measurement, audit committee financial expertise did not 
moderate the relationships between CEO, executive, non-executive, foreign, and 
institutional ownerships with a firm’s going-concern.  
5.6 Summary of the Findings 
There were six specific objectives of this study. Firstly, examining the impact of 
managerial ownership on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
The study provides evidence that CEO ownership has a significant positive influence on 
a firm’s going-concern as expected. However, executive ownership has a significant 
negative influence on a firm’s going-concern. Secondly, examining the impact of non-
executive directors’ ownership on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions, the study provides evidence that non-executive directors’ ownership has a 
significant negative influence on a firm’s going-concern. Thirdly, examining the effects 
of block ownership on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions, the 
study provides evidence that block ownership has a significant negative influence on a 
firm’s going-concern. 
Furthermore, examining the relationship between foreign ownership and going-concern 
in the quoted Nigerian financial companies, the study provides evidence that foreign 









So, also, examining the relationship between institutional ownership and the going-
concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions, this study provides evidence that 
institutional ownership has a significant positive influence on a firm’s going-concern as 
expected.  
Finally, investigating whether audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and 
financial expertise) moderate the relationship between ownership structure and the 
going-concern in the Nigeria financial institutions, it is found that audit committee 
financial expertise has a significant positive relationship with a firm’s going-concern as 
expected. On the contrary, audit committee size and independence were found to have 
significant negative relationships with a firm’s going-concern. 
Furthermore, audit committee size was found to moderate the CEO, block, and foreign 
ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern, positively and significantly. 
Nevertheless, audit committee size was found to moderate the executive and institution 
ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern, significantly and negatively. 
Conversely, audit committee size was not able to moderate the non-executive directors’ 
ownership relationship with a firm’s going-concern.  
Moreover, audit committee independence was found to moderate the executive, non-
executive, and institution ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern, 
positively and significantly. However, audit committee independence was found to 









negatively and significantly. Conversely, audit committee independence was not able to 
moderate the block ownership relationship with a firm’s going-concern.  
Likewise, audit committee financial expertise was found to moderate the block 
ownership relationship with a firm’s going-concern, negatively and significantly. 
Conversely, audit committee expertise was not able to moderate the CEO, executive, 
non-executive, foreign, and institutional ownership relationship with a firm’s going-











Table 5.23  






H1a Ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
relationship between CEO ownership 
and firm going-concern in the listed 
Nigerian financial institutions.  
+ + Yes Supported 
H1b  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
relationship between executive 
directors’ ownership and firm going-
concern in the listed Nigerian 
financial institutions.  
+ - Yes Not 
Supported 
H2  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
relationship between non-executive 
directors’ ownership and firm going-
concern in the listed Nigerian 
financial institutions.  
+ - Yes Not 
Supported 
H3 Ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
relationship between block 
ownership and firm going-concern in 
the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
+ - Yes Not 
Supported 
H4 Ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm going-concern in 
the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
+ + Yes Supported 
H5 Ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm going-concern in 
the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 











Table 5.24  
Summary of Hypotheses Testing for the Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size 
Hypotheses Significant Findings 
H6a1 Audit committee size moderates the relationship 
between CEO ownership and firm going-
concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated  
H6a2 Audit committee size moderates the relationship 
between executive director ownership and firm 
going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
Yes Moderated 
H6a3  Audit committee size moderates the relationship 
between non-executive director ownership and 




H6a4 Audit committee size moderates the relationship 
between block ownership and firm going-
concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated  
H6a5 Audit committee size moderates the relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm going-
concern in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated  
H6a6 Audit committee size moderates the relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm going-












Table 5.25  
Summary of Hypotheses Testing for the Moderating Effect of Audit Committee 
Independence 
Hypotheses Significant Findings 
H6b1 Audit committee independence moderates 
the relationship between CEO ownership 
and firm going-concern in listed Nigerian 
financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated 
H6b2 Audit committee independence moderates 
the relationship between executive director 
ownership and firm going-concern in listed 
Nigerian financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated  
H6b3 Audit committee independence moderates 
the relationship between non-executive 
director ownership and firm going-concern 
in listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated  
H6b4 Audit committee independence moderates 
the relationship between block ownership 




H6b5 Audit committee independence moderates 
the relationship between foreign ownership 
and firm going-concern in listed Nigerian 
financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated 
H6b6 Audit committee independence moderates 
the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm going-concern in listed 
Nigerian financial institutions. 











Table 5.26  
Summary of Hypotheses Testing for the Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial 
expertise 
Hypotheses Significant Findings 
H6c1 Audit committee financial expertise moderates 
the relationship between CEO ownership and 




H6c2 Audit committee financial expertise moderates 
the relationship between executive director 
ownership and firm going-concern in listed 
Nigerian financial institutions. 
Not Not 
Moderated 
H6c3 Audit committee financial expertise moderates 
the relationship between non-executive director 
ownership and firm going-concern in listed 
Nigerian financial institutions. 
Not Not 
Moderated 
H6c4 Audit committee financial expertise moderates 
the relationship between block ownership and 
firm going-concern in listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. 
Yes Moderated 
H6c5 Audit committee financial expertise moderates 
the relationship between foreign ownership and 




H6c6 Audit committee financial expertise moderates 
the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm going-concern in listed Nigerian 
financial institutions. 
Yes Moderated  
5.7 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter presented the findings and the interpretations of the interactive roles of the 
audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) on the 
relationship relating to ownership structure and the going-concern of the quoted 
Nigerian financial institutions. This chapter, firstly, reviewed the descriptive statistics of 









tested, which was proceeded by the panel data assumptions’ analysis. Based on the 
output of the tests, an estimation was used with Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors. It 
further examined whether CEO, executive, non-executive, institutional, foreign, and 
block ownerships had any effects on the going-concern of the listed financial institutions 
in Nigeria.  
The F-values for all of the regression models were significant, implying that the 
regression models fit the data. The empirical results were explained by the direct effect 
of the independent variables and then, for the moderating effect of the audit committee 
characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between 
ownership structure and the going-concern of Nigerian registered financial companies. 
The study provides evidence that CEO ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional 
ownership have a significant positive influence on a firm’s going-concern as expected. 
However, executive directors’ ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, and block 
ownership were found to have a significant negative influence on a firm’s going-
concern. With regards to the audit committee, audit committee financial expertise has a 
significant positive relationship with a firm’s going-concern as expected. On the 
contrary, audit committee size and independence were found to have a significant 
negative relationship with a firm’s going-concern. 
Furthermore, audit committee size was found to moderate the CEO, block, and foreign 
ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern positively and significantly. 









ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern, negatively and significantly. On 
the other hand, the audit committee size was not able to moderate the non-executive 
directors’ ownership relationship with a firm’s going-concern. Furthermore, audit 
committee independence was found to moderate the executive, non-executive, and 
institution ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern, positively and 
significantly. However, audit committee independence was found to moderate the CEO 
and foreign ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern, negatively and 
significantly. Conversely, audit committee independence was not able to moderate the 
block ownership relationship with a firm’s going-concern. Likewise, audit committee 
financial expertise was found to moderate the block ownership relationship with a firm’s 
going-concern, negatively and significantly. Conversely, audit committee independence 
was not able to moderate the CEO, executive, non-executive, foreign, and institutional 
ownership relationships with a firm’s going-concern. 
Finally, to open wide the results, an individual regression was run on each of the three 
firm’s going-concern measurements, which were the Altman 2017 bankruptcy Z-score, 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP), and return on assets (ROA) to confirm that 
the results were in line with the expectations. Likewise, to cross-check the results, 
alternative measurements for audit committee independence and financial expertise have 










DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the results, the contributions, and 
limitations of this study in addition to suggestions for future research. Section 6.2 offers 
a synopsis of the study. Section 6.3 gives a recap of the study findings. Whereas, Section 
6.4 describes the possible implications of the study. Section 6.5 discourses the research 
limitations and Section 6.6 offers possible recommendations for future study. Lastly, 6.7 
concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Overview of the Study 
The primary objective of this study has been to examine the indirect influence of audit 
committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) on the 
relationship between ownership structure variables and the going-concern of Nigerian 
registered financial firms, as quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2015. 
In other parts, this study has identified the issues connected to the conflicts of interest 
concerning the shareholders and management, audit committee, and the going-concern 
assessment in Nigeria. Therefore, to decrease these conflicts of interest and reduce the 
agency cost, this study has developed a combination of ownership structures variables 
that are related to the going-concern issue to limit such conflicts. This combination of 









directors, block, foreign, and institutional, and which are all the means that have been 
formed to resolve such conflicts in the study.  
The chapter one starts with an explanation of the background to the study by providing a 
synopsis of the present state of the ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern, 
globally, along with the Nigerian financial sector, specifically. Subsequently, the chapter 
discusses the problem statement, which is highlighted and deliberated in relation to 
previous studies. Research gaps were derived from the existing gaps in the past studies. 
Consequently, corresponding to the identified problems, research questions were 
generated. As well, consistent with each research question, the objectives of the study 
were identified on a head-to-head basis. It is then proceeded by the significance of the 
study that comprises the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications. It has 
been explained that, generally, the whole problem of corporate governance regarding the 
firms going-concern has been brought about by the corporate humiliations of the twenty-
first century, which led to the downfall of prominent businesses in both the advanced 
and emerging nations.  
Moreover, it has been discussed that conflicts of interest regarding owners and 
management of the businesses arise due to the managers’ control of the business 
resources but who, commonly, do not have a significant equity share in the firms. As a 
result of these conflicts, key companies have collapsed. These conflicts may not be 
solved completely over settlements for the reason that they are outrageous. Thus, in a 









the companies to protect their funds to assure the firm’s going-concern. This study has 
selected a mixture of different ownership structures (CEO, executive directors, non-
executive directors, institutional, foreign, and block ownerships) to support the 
businesses’ in their strength by controlling the conflicts amongst the owners and 
management to reduce the firm’s going-concern threats. These variables have been 
chosen because of their importance in the Nigerian ownerships structure. However, other 
ownership structure variables like family ownership have not been considered due to the 
limited or lack of disclosure in Nigerian listed firms. 
The influence of ownership structure on the firm’s going-concern is a broadly 
deliberated issue. Various scholars have claimed that ownership structure variables 
contribute positively to better the firms’ performances, which, sequentially, increases a 
better going-concern situation for the firms. Conversely, some scholars advocate that 
ownership structure variables negatively affect the business’s going-concern position. 
Because of these inconsistent findings in the direct relationship between ownership 
structure and the firm’s going-concern variables, and similarly, the importance of the 
audit committee monitoring role in assuring the firm’s quality accounting reporting and 
accountability, therefore, the audit committee has been introduced as a moderating 
variable. Similarly, an audit committee’s size, independence, and expertise were are 
used as the moderators that influence the relationship between the combination of 
ownership structures and the going-concern. Therefore, this study is an attempt to fill 









committee characteristics on the relationship between the ownership structure variables 
and the going-concern of the Nigerian registered financial companies. 
In chapter two, it defined the firm’s going-concern and discussed the concepts of the 
firm’s going-concern. Also, it discussed the usage of the statistical model in predicting 
the firm’s going-concern. Grounded on the revised comprehensive models, this work has 
adopted the Altman 2017 Model as a measure of a firm’s going-concern evaluation, as it 
is attested that the Altman 2017 Model is suitable for financial institutions. Then, this 
was followed by a definition of corporate governance and a discussion of the concepts of 
corporate governance, as well as a discussion on the relevant code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Furthermore, the concept of ownership structure, as well as the 
related provisions for the audit committee in Nigeria, were also discussed.  
In chapter three, the research framework, as well as the hypotheses, was developed 
based on the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. These 
relationships were comprised of managerial ownership and the firm’s going-concern, 
non-executive directors’ ownership and the firm’s going-concern, block ownership and 
the firm’s going-concern, institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern, and 
foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern. Whereas, the audit committee 










Whereas, chapter four deliberated on the processes used in gathering the data, along with 
the research design and techniques for the empirical analysis of the data. Firstly, the 
study discussed the use of the positivism  school of taught in data collection and the 
empirical analysis. The data were gathered from some specific sources, which were the 
Nigeria Stock Exchange, data-stream of Thomson Reuters Worldscope database, and 
websites of the respective financial institutions. For the data analysis process, four 
models were constructed. These models were analysed using descriptive statistics, 
Pearson correlation coefficient, and linear panel-data analysis. These analyses were run 
using the statistical software of STATA 14.  
Furthermore, chapter five presented the findings and the interpretations of the interactive 
roles of the audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) 
on the relationship between ownership structure and the going-concern of the quoted 
Nigerian financial firms. The descriptive statistics of the examined variables were 
presented. Similarly, the multivariate and panel data analysis assumptions were 
discussed and tested. Based on the output of the tests, the random-effects estimation was 
used with Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors. It further examined whether CEO, 
executive directors, non-executive directors, institutional, foreign, and block ownerships 









6.3 Discussion of the Findings  
The main aim of this study was to examine the moderating effect of audit committee 
characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise) on the relationship between 
ownership structure and the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Therefore, the following section discusses further the relationships of each ownership 
structure variable with the firm’s going-concern, and the moderator effect of audit 
committee characteristics in these relationships. 
6.3.1 Relationship between the Managerial Ownership and the Firm’s Going-
Concern 
Prior studies have established that managerial ownership is related to the firm’s going-
concern. Therefore, to establish whether this situation is similar to the Nigerian listed 
financial institution context, research question three was raised to find an answer to 
research question one regarding whether there is any relationship between managerial 
ownership and the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. Therefore, 
this study examined the impact of managerial ownership on the going-concern in the 
listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
This study found managerial ownership (CEO and executives directors) with an average 
of 1.4% for the period under review. This was above the range reported by Adebiyi and 
Olowookere (2016) which was 0.5% for Nigerian banks (2005-2013). However, this was 









Alves (2012) with 5.6% in Portugal; Parker et al. (2005) with 33.42% in the USA; and 
Ittonen (2011) with 38.95% in Finland. Likewise, it was quite low if compared with the 
Malaysian studies reported by scholars such as Amran and Ahmad (2013) with 44.63%; 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) with 34.53%; and Said et al. (2009) with 9.95%. This result 
indicated a lack of sufficient financial commitment in terms of equity holdings by the 
management of the sampled firms. It may be quite difficult to align their interests with 
other shareholders. Theoretically, the alignment of interest hypothesis claims that high 
managerial ownership can align the interests between executives and shareholders. 
Hence, it will reduce the total agency costs and, ultimately, increasing the firm’s 
performance and its going-concern status.  
Therefore, based on this objective hypothesis, H1a and H1b were tested to examine the 
impact of managerial ownership on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. The relationship between the first part of the managerial ownership, which 
was CEO ownership and the firm’s going-concern, had been examined. Previous studies 
have revealed that CEO ownership improved the firm’s going-concern and limited 
managerial financial manipulation (Alves, 2012 Gong & Li, 2013; Hazarika et al., 2012; 
and Zhang et al., 2008). The empirical result of the CEO ownership supports the 
hypothesised positive relationship between CEO ownership and the firm’s going-
concern. Theoretically, this finding supports the alignment of interest argument and the 
resource dependence theory which claims that CEO ownership enhances the firm’s 









problem. This is because, once the CEO has become part of the business holders, he 
must relate with other owners having a high degree of inspiration. Such CEOs will 
probably not take risks that will be unsafe for the owners. 
The second item of managerial ownership was the executive directors’ ownership. The 
result of this study found that the executive directors’ ownership had a negative impact 
on the firm’s going-concern. Empirically, this was consistent with the findings of 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Amran and Ahmad (2013), Ahmed and Hadi (2017), 
Iskandar et al. (2017), and Patel (2018) who found a negative relationship between 
executive directors’ ownership and the firm’s going-concern. Theoretically, this finding 
supports the entrenchment effect argument which claims that high executive ownership 
may increase the firm’s going-concern problems. This is because, executives with a high 
share ownership may possibly be so influential that they do not have to consider the 
interest of other shareholders. The possible clarification for this finding in the Nigerian 
financial sector is that the levels of executive directors’ ownership is very little 
compared to those from some developed or emerging markets. Therefore, having too 
little equity being possessed by executive directors may make them enrich themselves 










6.3.2 Relationship between the Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership and the 
Firm’s Going-Concern 
Prior studies have established that non-executive directors’ ownership is related to the 
firm’s going-concern. Therefore, to establish whether there is a similar relationship in 
the Nigerian financial institution setting, research question three was raised to respond to 
research question two whether there is a relationship between the non-executive 
directors’ ownership of listed Nigerian financial institutions and the firm’s going-
concern. This study examined the impact of the non-executive directors’ ownership on 
the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
The study found that the non-executive directors’ ownership had an average of 15.64% 
for the period under review. This was above the range reported by Alzoubi (2016) with 
4% in Jordan. Similarly, it was quite above the range reported from the Malaysian 
studies, such as Ali et al. (2008) with 1.96%; Hashim and Devi (2008) with 0.29%; and 
Hashim (2009) with 0.31%. This result indicates sufficient financial commitment in 
terms of equity holdings by the non-executive directors of the sampled firms.  
Theoretically, the monitoring and alignment of interest hypothesis claims that high non-
executive directors’ ownership can align the interest between executives and 
shareholders; hence, reducing the total agency costs and the firm’s going-concern 
problem. Moreover, most of the previous studies found that the non-executive directors’ 









2008; Hashim & Devi, 2008; and Hashim, 2009). This will mitigate the management 
from engaging in earnings management which will improve firm performance and the 
going-concern position. 
However, based on the tested hypothesis (H2), it was found that non-executive directors’ 
ownership was negatively related to the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions. This finding is consistent with the information asymmetry argument which 
states that information asymmetry between the executive and non-executive directors 
can weaken the non-executives in accomplishing their monitoring and supervisory roles 
effectively. Similarly, this finding was in line with Alzoubi (2016) which found that 
non-executive directors’ ownership was unable to lessen the earnings management 
practices in Jordan.  
The possible reason for this finding in the Nigerian financial sector is that the level of 
non-executive director ownership was quite higher than the levels found in other 
emerging economies like Malaysia and Jordan. And, consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis, a high ownership by non-executive directors might enable them to make 
decisions which will serve a personal benefit to the detriment of the companies. 
6.3.3 Relationship between the Block Ownership and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
Previous studies have established that there is a relationship between block ownership 
and the firm’s going-concern in some countries. Therefore, to establish whether this 









three. That is whether there is any relationship between block ownership in the listed 
Nigerian financial institutions and the firm going-concern. Hence, this study examined 
the impact of block ownership on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions.  
This study found an average of 34.64% of the shareholdings of the sample firms as a 
block ownership for the period under review. This was above the range reported by 
Parker et al. (2005) with 15.74% in the case of the USA; and Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 
(2014) with 29.40% in the case of five Latin American countries. However, this was 
below the range reported by Alves (2012) with 68.50% in the case of Portugal; Yasser 
and Al Mamun (2017) with 78.80% in the case of Pakistan; and Paik and Koh (2014) 
with 36.48% in the case of Korea. Similarly, this was quite below the range reported in 
the case of Malaysia as indicated by studies such as Said et al. (2009) with 63.52% and 
Nor & Ku Ismail (2017) with 63.52%. These results indicate that the range of block 
ownership was within the range reported in some European and emerging markets.  
Theoretically, the monitoring argument claims that the existence of block ownership 
could alleviate the agency problem and reduce the firm’s going-concern problems. 
Furthermore, previous studies have claimed that high block ownership was associated 
with high monitoring which enhanced firm performance and going-concern (see Alves, 
2012; Gonzalez & Garcia-Meca, 2014; Paik and Koh, 2014; Parker et al., 2005; and 
Ramadan, 2016). However, based on the tested hypothesis (H3), this study found that 









instructions. This result, theoretically, is consistent with the entrenchment effect 
argument which claims that due to high voting and control power, block shareholders 
use the firm’s resources to maximise their own welfare at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. In addition, previous studies have found similar results (see Bao and 
Lewellyn, 2017; Farooq & El Jai, 2012; Gulzar & Wang, 2011; Park et al., 2016; and 
Waweru & Riro, 2013). Again, Shan and Gong (2017) claimed that the block ownership 
would actually decrease the firm’s performance. As time goes on, the negative impact 
will slowly but surely vanish and possibly turn to even have a positive effect on the 
firm’s performance. Moreover, the issue of expropriation might be another likely reason 
for this negative relationship. This is because the high level of block ownership enables 
them to make decisions that will benefit them to the detriment of the firms. 
Moreover, in Nigeria, block ownership is a tradition, and it is an essential mechanism to 
improve corporate governance and transparency. This may be because, controlling 
shareholders and the regulators (personnel of government agencies) make it difficult to 
implement sufficient checks and balances. 
6.3.4 Relationship between the Foreign Ownership and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
The effect of foreign ownership on the firm’s going-concern determinants has long been 
an issue that has attracted researchers and policy-makers. Especially, that previous 
studies have established that foreign ownership has influenced the firm’s going-concern. 









institutions, research question four emerged. That is, whether there is any relationship 
between foreign ownership in the listed Nigerian financial institutions and the firm’s 
going-concern. Hence, this study examined the impact of foreign ownership on the 
going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
This study found that foreign investors owned an average of 11.78% of the 
shareholdings of the sampled firms. This was above the range reported by Zureigat et al. 
(2014a) with 8.92% and Zureigat (2015) with 11.06% in the case of Jordan;  and Guo et 
al. (2015) with 8.10% in the case of Japan; as well as Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) with 
6.90% in the case of Pakistan. Likewise, it was above the range reported in the case of 
the Malaysian studies as indicated in studies such as Ali et al. (2008) with 5.40% and 
Said et al. (2009) with 6.31%. However, it was below the range reported by Alzoubi 
(2016) with15.10% in the case of Jordan and Paik and Koh (2014) with 23.28% in the 
case of Korea. This result indicates that the range of foreign ownership was within the 
range reported in some developed and emerging markets.  
Furthermore, based on the tested hypothesis (H4), this study found that foreign 
ownership had a positive effect on the going-concern in the Nigerian financial 
instructions. Theoretically, this agrees with the resource dependence theory argument 
that foreign ownership offers essential resources to the invested firms. These resources 
may include finance, knowledge, and technological transmission. Furthermore, this is in 
line with the active monitoring argument that the existence of foreign ownership could 









some previous studies that claimed foreign ownership was related with active 
monitoring which enhanced firm performance and going-concern (see Ali et al., 2008; 
Alzoubi, 2016; Kim, 2015; Yasser and Al Mamun, 2017; and Zureigat et al., 2014a). 
Moreover, this study denies the transient hypothesis argument that foreign investors do 
not have adequate incentives to become effective monitoring for the firms’ going-
concern. Likewise, this study contradicts the findings of those scholars who argued that 
foreign ownership increased the firm’s going-concern problem (Aksu et al., 2013; Guo 
& Ma, 2015; Paik & Koh, 2014; and Zureigat, 2015). 
6.3.5 Relationship between the Institutional Ownership and the Firm’s Going-
Concern 
Previous studies have established that institutional ownership influences the firm’s 
going-concern. Therefore, to investigate whether this relationship exists in the Nigerian 
financial institution setting, research question five was raised. That is, whether there is 
any relationship between institutional ownership in the listed Nigerian financial 
institutions and the firm’s going-concern. Hence, this study examined the impact of 
institutional ownership on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions.  
This study found that institutional investors owned an average of 36.30% of the 
shareholdings of the sampled firms. This was above the range reported by Ali et al. 
(2008) with 6.32% in the case of Malaysia; Alzoubi (2016) with 7.6% and Zureigat 









Japan; Yasser and Al Mamun (2017) with 10.9% in the case of Pakistan; and Lemma et 
al. (2018) with 16.5% from 41 countries. However, it was below the range reported by 
Alves (2012) with 64.2% in the case of Portugal; Cornett et al. (2007) with 59.40% in 
the USA;,  Zureigat et al. (2014b) with 79.47% in the case of Jordan; and Agyei and 
Owusu (2014) with 80.35% in the case of Ghana. This result indicates the range of 
institutional ownership which was within the range reported in some developed and 
emerging markets.  
Moreover, based on the tested hypothesis (H5), this study found that institutional 
ownership had a positive effect on the going-concern in the Nigerian financial 
institutions. Theoretically, this supports the active monitoring argument that institutional 
investors have sufficient capabilities, expertise, and resources to monitor the 
managements’ attitudes which could lower the agency and going-concern problems of 
the firms. This is because institutional investors can provide active monitoring which 
may be too costly for non-institutional investors. Moreover, previous studies claimed 
that institutional ownership was related to active monitoring which enhanced firm 
performance and going-concern (see Iskandar et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2009; Yasser & 
Al Mamun, 2017; and Zureigat et al., 2014b). Moreover, this study contradicts the 
hands-off passivity argument that investors focus on the short-term performance of the 
business, thereby ignoring long-term expectations. Likewise, this study contradicts the 









going-concern problem (Alves, 2012; Agyei & Owusu, 2014; Lin & Manowan, 2012; 
and Lemma et al., 2018).  
6.3.6 Moderating Effect of the Audit Committee Characteristics on the 
Relationship between the Ownership Structure and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
With regard to questions relating to the moderating effect of the audit committee 
characteristics (size, independence, and financial expertise), this study reveals that audit 
committee characteristics served as a moderator for the respective relationships of some 
ownership structure variables and the firm’s going-concern.  
As hypothesised, audit committee size moderated the direct influence of all of the 
ownership structure variables with the exception of the non-executive directors’ 
ownership on the firm’s going-concern. Likewise, audit committee independence 
moderated the direct influence of all of the ownership structure variables with the 
exception of block ownership on the firm’s going-concern. However, audit committee 
financial expertise moderated only the direct effect of foreign ownership on the firm’s 
going-concern. Discussions on the audit committee characteristics’ influence on the 
relationship of each ownership structure variable and the firm’s going-concern are 









6.3.6.1 Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Size on the Relationship between the 
Ownership Structure and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
From the research findings, the sampled firms had an average of six members in their 
audit committees. This was within the range of 3 to 6 members as reported by Al-Matari 
et al. (2014); Abdullah & Shukor (2017); Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015); Bala and 
Gugong (2015); Madawaki and Amran (2013); and Moses et al. (2016) in some 
European and emerging markets. Moreover, the size of the audit committee was in line 
with the CAMA 1990 recommendations that the firm’s audit committee should have 6 
members. The interaction of audit committee size and ownership structure was 
hypothesised to have a significant effect on the firm’s going-concern.  
Based on the findings, the result shows, statistically, that the interaction between audit 
committee size and CEO ownership had a significant positive effect on the firm’s going-
concern. This implies that a big audit committee size strengthens the influence of the 
CEO ownership on the firm’s going-concern positively. This result is consistent with 
both the resource dependence theory and agency theory arguments that a big audit 
committee enhances firm performance. This is because of the various skills and 
experiences that the larger audit committee members share amongst themselves. More 
so, the finding supports the alignment of interest hypothesis which suggests that as long 
as the CEO’s ownership increases, his/her interest aligns with the other shareholders. 









committee to achieve their monitoring role which will improve firm performance and 
mitigate the firm’s going-concern problem.  
Moreover, the interaction between audit committee size and executive directors’ 
ownership had a significant negative effect on the firm’s going-concern. This result 
means that a big audit committee size weakens the influence of the executive directors’ 
ownership on the firm’s going-concern positively. Likewise, a negative and significant 
influence was found in the direct relationship between the executive directors’ 
ownership and the firm’s going-concern. This result is consistent with the entrenchment 
effect hypothesis that a high level of executive directors’ ownership makes them exceed 
the incentive benefits. This is because, executives with high equity ownership will 
possibly be so influential that they do not have to consider the interest of other owners. 
Hence, this entrenchment behaviour of the executive directors may make it difficult for 
the audit committee members to actively monitor the firm’s financial activities.  
Furthermore, the interaction of the non-executive directors’ ownership and audit 
committee size was hypothesised to have a significant influence on the firm’s going-
concern. However, the results of the interaction between audit committee size and non-
executive directors’ ownership had no significant effect on the firm’s going-concern. 
This result means that a big audit committee size is unable to influence the effect of non-
executive directors’ ownership on the firm’s going-concern. The finding also contradicts 
the alignment of interest hypothesis, active monitoring hypothesis, and previous studies 









and aligns their interests with others shareholders’ interests. The likely reason for this 
contradiction may be due to information asymmetry between the executive and non-
executive directors which can weaken the non-executives performance of their 
monitoring and supervisory functions efficiently. This will make it difficult for the audit 
committee to influence them (non-executive directors) in overseeing the financial 
activities of the firm and influence the firm’s going-concern. 
Moreover, the interaction of block ownership and audit committee size was 
hypothesised to have a significant influence on the firm’s going-concern. Similarly, the 
results show, statistically, that the interaction between audit committee size and block 
ownership had a significant positive effect on the firm’s going-concern. This result 
means that a big audit committee size strengthens the influence of the block ownership 
on the firm’s going-concern. The findings also support the efficient monitoring 
hypothesis and previous studies which argued that high block shareholders have greater 
incentives to monitor the management as will as bear more loss than any other 
shareholders in the event of loss or bankruptcy. Therefore, the existence of the large 
audit committee will make the block shareholder more active in monitoring the firm’s 
activities which mitigates earnings management practices in the firm and enhances the 
firm performance as well as the overall going-concern of the firms. Moreover, as 
discussed on the direct relationship findings between block ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern, it was negative and significant. However, the presence of a big audit 









that a big audit committee positively strengthens the relationship of block ownership and 
the firm’s going-concern in Nigeria as hypothesised.  
Similarly, as hypothesised, the interaction of foreign ownership and audit committee size 
showed a significant positive effect on the firm’s going-concern. This means that a big 
audit committee size strengthens the influence of foreign ownership on the firm’s going-
concern. The findings support the efficient monitoring hypothesis and previous studies 
which contend that foreign shareholders have more skill, knowledge, and talent than 
domestic shareholders to monitor the firm’s activities. Moreover, as discussed on the 
direct relationship findings between foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern, it 
was significant and positive. This positive relationship was strengthened by the presence 
of a big audit committee in the firm. Therefore, the existence of the large audit 
committee will make the foreign shareholders more active in monitoring the firm’s 
activities which mitigates earnings management practices in the firm and, in turn, 
enhances the firm performance as well as the firm’s overall going-concern. Thus, this 
study confirms that a big audit committee positively strengthens the relationship 
between foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern in Nigeria as hypothesised.  
Moreover, as hypothesised, audit committee size moderated the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern. Similarly, it was found that the 
interaction of institutional ownership and audit committee size showed a significant 
negative effect on the firm’s going-concern. This implies that a big audit committee size 









The findings support the transient hypothesis and previous studies which argue that 
institutional shareholders are myopic and short-term minded about the firm’s future and 
performance. This short-term orientation makes them (institutional shareholders) neglect 
the audit committee in supporting it to achieve its monitoring role. Therefore, the 
existence of the large audit committee will make the institutional shareholders less 
active in monitoring the firm’s activities which may increase earnings management 
practices in the firm and, in return, decrease the firm performance as well as the firm’s 
overall going-concern. Thus, this study confirms that a big audit committee in a firm 
worsens the relationship between institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern 
in Nigeria. 
6.3.6.2 Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Independence on the Relationship 
between the Ownership Structure and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
From the findings of this research, the sampled firms had an audit committee with an 
average of 95.45% as independent members. This was within the range reported by Al-
Matari et al. (2014); Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015); Kibiya et al. (2016); Madawaki 
and Amran (2013); Moses et al. (2016); Sallouma; et al. (2014); and Abdullah and 
Shukor (2017) in some developed and developing markets. Moreover, this was in line 
with the recommendations of the CAMA and SEC (2014) codes of corporate governance 









In this study, audit committee independence has been hypothesised to moderate the 
relationship between ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern. Moreover, the 
regression result indicates that the interaction between audit committee independence 
and CEO ownership significantly and negatively influenced the firm’s going-concern. 
This result points out that audit committee independence weakens the influence of CEO 
ownership on the firm’s going-concern negatively. This result is consistent with the 
entrenchment hypothesis argument that high ownership by the CEOs increases the 
likelihood for them to make a decision in the firm to serve their personal benefits rather 
than the stakeholders’ interests. Moreover, the likely reason may be because some firm 
members are appointed into different committees based on the influences of the CEO. 
Therefore, the members that have been appointed to the audit committee will 
compromise their duties to actively monitor the firm’s financial activities. 
Furthermore, the interaction between audit committee independence and executive 
directors’ ownership had a significant positive effect on the firm’s going-concern. This 
result indicates that audit committee independence strengthens the influence of the 
executive directors’ ownership on the firm’s going-concern positively. This result is 
consistent with the agency theory claims that the audit committee with a high number of 
independent members can solve the firm’s agency problem. Furthermore, this finding 
corroborates the claim of the resource dependence theory that an audit committee with 
many independent participants will monitor the firm’s financial activities efficiently. 









studies which argue that high executive ownership can align the interests between the 
executives and the shareholders. This will reduce the agency’s costs and, eventually, 
increase the firm performance and going-concern status. Therefore, the interest 
alignment behaviour of the executives will make it easier for an independent audit 
committee to efficiently discharge its monitoring duty. This will also make the 
independent audit committee encourage and motivate the executive shareholders to 
reduce earnings manipulations and the firm’s going-concern problem. Hence, the 
relationship between the executive directors’ ownership and the firm’s going-concern is 
strengthened by the presence of an independent audit committee. 
Besides that, the interaction of the non-executive directors’ ownership and the audit 
committee independence was hypothesised to have a significant influence on the firm’s 
going-concern. Consistent with that, the regression result indicates that the interaction 
between audit committee independence and non-executive directors’ ownership had a 
significant positive effect on the firm’s going-concern. This was in line with both the 
agency and the resource dependence perspectives. The theories claim that the audit 
committee with a high number of independent members will monitor the firm’s financial 
activities efficiently and solve the firm’s agency conflicts amongst the stakeholders. 
Similarly, this result corroborates the alignment of interest hypothesis and works of 
some of the previous scholars which claim that high non-executive directors’ ownership 
may reduce agency conflicts. This can be achieved through active monitoring which will 









problem. Therefore, it will be easy for an independent audit committee to influence them 
(non-executive directors) in watching the financial activities of the firm and influence 
the firm’s going-concern. 
Furthermore, the interaction of the block ownership and audit committee independence 
was hypothesised to have a significant influence on the firm’s going-concern. However, 
it was found, statistically, that the interaction between audit committee independence 
and block ownership was insignificant on the firm’s going-concern. This result points 
out that an independent audit committee does not influence the relationship between 
block ownership and the firm’s going-concern. This was consistent with some studies 
where an insignificant relationship between the independence of the audit committee and 
the going-concern was found (see Abdullah & Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; 
and Ismail et al., 2010). The possible reason for this insignificant effect is that 
sometimes block shareholders have significant voting power. This makes them (block 
shareholders) have an influence on the appointment of the audit committee. Therefore, 
when audit committee members are appointed based on the influence of block 
shareholders, is difficult to be strictly independent (block shareholders), and the audit 
committee cannot stop their expropriation behaviours against the minority shareholders. 
 Moreover, the interaction of the foreign ownership and the audit committee 
independence on the firm’s going-concern has been hypothesised as significant. 
Similarly, this study found that the interaction of foreign ownership and audit committee 









means that the audit committee weakens the influence of foreign ownership on the 
firm’s going-concern. The result is consistent with the transient and information 
asymmetry hypotheses that foreign investors invest in the firm on the short-term plan. If 
anything happens to the firm, they simply dispose of their shares and move to another 
firm. Beside that, they may not have substantial incentives to effectively monitor the 
firms’ activities. Moreover, the cultural and geographical barrier can make it difficult for 
an independent audit committee to strengthen the influence of the foreign shareholders 
on the firm’s going-concern. Therefore, due to these reasons, an independent audit 
committee in a firm weakens the relationship between the foreign ownership and the 
firm’s going-concern in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, as hypothesised, the audit committee independence moderated the 
relationship between the institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern. Similarly, 
it was discovered that the interaction of the institutional ownership and the audit 
committee independence indicated a significant positive effect on the firm’s going-
concern. This result implies that the audit committee independence strengthens the 
influence of the institutional ownership on the firm’s going-concern.  
The findings support the active monitoring hypothesis and previous studies which claim 
that institutional shareholders have great abilities, expertise, and resources to monitor the 
managements’ attitudes. Therefore, this gives them a sufficient monitoring attitude. In 
addition, the presence of an independent audit committee will make the institutional 









will reduce earnings management practices in the firm and increase firm performance as 
well as the firm’s overall going-concern. Thus, this study confirms that an independent 
audit committee in a firm strengthens the relationship between the institutional 
ownership and the firm’s going-concern in Nigeria. 
6.3.6.3 Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the 
Relationship between the Ownership Structure and the Firm’s Going-Concern 
The findings of this research have indicated that the sampled firms had an audit 
committee with an average of 59.80% as members with financial qualifications. This 
was below the range reported by Moses et al. (2016) with 93.33%. However, it was 
above the range reported by Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015) with 47.5%; Bala and 
Gugong (2015) with 26.90%; Madawaki and Amran (2013) with 51%; and Abdullah and 
Shukor (2017) with54.20% in some developed and developing markets. Moreover, this 
was in line with the recommendations of the CAMA and SEC (2014) codes of corporate 
governance that the audit committee of companies should have members with financial 
knowledge.  
Audit committee financial expertise has been hypothesised to moderate the relationship 
between the ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern. Surprisingly, in this 
study, only the interaction between the block ownership and the audit committee 
financial expertise was found to be significant on the firm’s going-concern. Whereas, all 









structure (CEO, executive, non-executive, foreign, and institution) on the firm’s going-
concern was insignificant. The likely reason for these insignificant effects is that the 
average of 59.80% of the financial experts in the audit committee included both those 
with academic and professional finance related qualifications. This was based on the 
recommendation of both CAMA and SEC (2014). Whereas, there is an argument that 
finance-related academic qualifications alone, without professional membership, may 
not be sufficient enough to be up-to-date on practical financial issues. However, some of 
the members with academic finance-related qualifications can influence and resolve 
agency conflicts between the management and shareholders. Hence, this may be one of 
the likely reasons causing the insignificant effect on the relation of the moderating effect 
of the audit committee financial expertise. This also had an effect on the relationship 
between the ownership structure (CEO, executive, non- executive, foreign, and 
institution) and the going-concern in Nigerian listed financial institutions. 
Moreover, the regression result indicates that the interaction between the audit 
committee financial expertise and CEO ownership effect on the firm’s going-concern 
was insignificant and negative. This result points out that the audit committee financial 
expertise did not influence the relationship between the CEO ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern. This finding was consistent with Carcello et al. (2011); Mohamad et al. 
(2012); and Sallouma et al. (2014) who similarly found an insignificant effect of the 
audit committee financial expertise on the firm’s going-concern related variables. This is 









the audit committee members. Therefore, this will make the audit committee less 
effective in monitoring the CEO’s decisions on finance-related matters despite its 
expertise on financial matters.  
Furthermore, the interaction between the audit committee financial expertise and the 
executive directors’ ownership effect on the firm’s going-concern was insignificant and 
negative. This result indicates that the audit committee financial expertise did not 
influence the relationship between the executive directors’ ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern. This finding was also consistent with Mohamad et al. (2012) and 
Sallouma et al. (2014) who found an insignificant effect of the audit committee financial 
expertise on the firm’s going-concern. The possible reason for this is that some 
executive directors may not support the audit committee in monitoring the firm’s 
activities due to their expropriation behaviours. Hence, these reasons will make it 
difficult for the audit committee to influence the relationship between the executive 
directors’ ownership and the going-concern in the Nigerian listed financial firms despite 
their financial expertise. 
Similarly, the interaction between the audit committee financial expertise and the non-
executive directors’ ownership effect on the firm’s going-concern was insignificant and 
negative. This result indicates that the audit committee financial expertise did not 
influence the relationship between the non-executive directors’ ownership and the firm’s 
going-concern. This result was also consistent with Mohamad et al. (2012) and Sallouma 









on the firm’s going-concern. The more likely reason for this was that there may have 
been an information asymmetry between the non-executive and executive directors. 
Because the non-executive directors are forced to rely on the information provided to 
them by management. The implication is that such information may not be complete 
which will affect their monitoring role efficiency. Therefore, due to this information 
asymmetry, non-executive directors may lack sufficient information about the firm’s 
activities to discharge their monitoring duty. Hence, an audit committee, despite its 
financial expertise, may not be capable of influencing the relationship between the non-
executive directors’ ownership and the firm’s going-concern. 
Furthermore, the interaction of the block ownership and the audit committee financial 
expertise is hypothesised to have a significant influence on the firm’s going-concern. As 
predicted, it has been found, statistically, that the interaction between the audit 
committee financial expertise and the block ownership was significant and negative on 
the firm’s going-concern. This result indicates that an audit committee’s financial 
expertise weakens the relationship between the block ownership and the firm’s going-
concern. This is consistence with the entrenchment effect hypothesis which claims that, 
due to the outright expropriation behaviours of the block shareholders, it will be difficult 
for an audit committee to influence or reduce agency conflicts. Therefore, this outright 
expropriation behaviour will deny the audit committee members influence despite their 
financial knowledge on the relationship between the block ownership and the going-









Moreover, the interaction of the foreign ownership and the audit committee financial 
expertise on the firm’s going-concern had been hypothesised as significant. However, 
this study found that the interaction of the foreign ownership and audit committee 
financial expertise was insignificant on the firm’s going-concern. This result means that 
the audit committee financial expertise did not moderate the relationship between the 
foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern. In line with the transient hypothesis, 
the myopic behaviours of foreign investors may likely be one of the reasons behind this 
insignificant effect. If anything happens to the firm, they simply dispose of their shares 
and move to another firm. This is because, if a foreign shareholder is myopic in nature, it 
will be very difficult for an audit committee, in respect to its financial expertise, to 
effectively influence their myopic attitudes towards the firm. Hence, due to these 
reasons, the audit committees with financial expertise did not moderate the relationship 
between the foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, it is hypothesised that audit committee financial expertise moderates the 
relationship between the institutional ownership and the firm’s going-concern. However, 
it has been discovered that the interaction of the institutional ownership and the audit 
committee financial expertise had an insignificant positive effect on the firm’s going-
concern. This result implies that the audit committee financial expertise did not 










In line with the hands-off passivity hypothesis, institutional investors are short-term 
oriented and focus mainly on the firm’s current financial status rather than the long-term 
in their relationship with firms. This may make it very difficult for an audit committee, 
notwithstanding its financial expertise, to effectively influence their decisions easily. 
Hence, due to these reasons, the audit committees with financial expertise did not 
moderate the relationship between the institutional ownership and the going-concern in 
the Nigerian listed financial institutions. 
6.4 Implications of the Study 
This study has some theoretical, methodological, and practical implications which are 
discussed in the subsequent sub-sections.  
6.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study investigated the relationship between the ownership structure and the firm’s 
going-concern. In addition, this study specifically investigated the introduction of audit 
committee characteristics as moderators on the relationship between the ownership 
structure and the firm’s going-concern. In doing so, this study contributes to the existing 
literature and offers more evidence on the ownership structure’s and audit committee 
characteristics’ effects on the going-concern in the listed Nigerian financial institutions. 
Furthermore, this study used the agency theory and resource dependence theory in 









the ownership structure and going-concern. A series of studies deliberated on the 
importance of the agency theory in achieving the ownership structure (Alves, 2012; 
Alzoubi, 2016; Fitri et al., 2017; and Zureigat et al., 2014a, b) with fewer regards to the 
resource dependence theory (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Hillman et al., 2000). In line 
with the resource-dependency opinion, ownership structure is connected to a higher 
valuation for the reason that companies with better ownership structures have good 
contact with valuable resources. To put it another way, the agency opinion claims that a 
better ownership structure is connected to a higher valuation for the reason that many of 
the prospective values of the business are apprehended by its owners, instead of being 
taken out by the management or monitoring investors. Therefore, adopting these theories 
has provided a dynamic theoretical contribution.  
On the relationship between the ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern, the 
results of the direct effect showed that the CEO ownership positively affected the firm’s 
going-concern. This finding supports both the alignment of interest hypothesis and the 
resource dependence theory that, CEO ownership enhances firm performance, reducing 
earnings management practices and the firm’s going-concern problem. Furthermore, the 
result shows that the executive directors’ ownership negatively affected the firm’s 
going-concern. This has indicated that the entrenchment effect hypothesis was 
applicable to the executives’ ownership in the Nigerian financial sector as it increased 
the agency cost and the firms’ overall going-concern problems. Similarly, the direct 









firm’s going-concern indicates that the information asymmetry hypothesis was relevant 
to the listed Nigerian financial sector. Moreover, the findings on the relationship 
between the block ownership and the firm’s going-concern indicate that the 
entrenchment effect hypothesis was relevant to the block ownership in the Nigerian 
financial sector as it increased the agency conflict. Furthermore, it was found that the 
active monitoring argument and the resource dependence theory were applicable to the 
effects of both foreign and institutional ownership on the firm’s going-concern in the 
Nigerian financial sector.  
Furthermore, previous studies have either studied the relationship between the 
ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern or the audit committee characteristics 
(size, independence, and financial expertise) and the firm’s going-concern; none has 
examined the interaction between the audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) and the ownership structure on the firm’s going-
concern. Investigating such interactions is essential as the audit committee oversees the 
process of the external audit as well as the financial reporting quality mutually. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the body of existing knowledge by adding a 
moderating variable, which was audit committee, on the relationship between the 
ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern, which have been neglected by 
previous studies.  
It has been found that the audit committee size moderated the relationship between the 









ownership and the firm’s going-concern. Specifically, this study found that the agency 
theory and the resource dependence theory explained the influence of the audit 
committee size in strengthening the effect of the CEO, block, and foreign ownership on 
the going-concern in the listed companies in Nigerian financial sector. Likewise, it has 
also been found that the audit committee independence moderated the relationship 
between the ownership structure variables with the exception of the block ownership and 
the firm’s going-concern. More specifically, it was found that the agency theory and the 
resource dependence theory explained the influence of the audit committee 
independence in strengthening the effect of the executive, non-executive, and 
institutional ownerships on the firm’s going-concern in the Nigerian financial sector. 
However, the audit committee financial expertise moderated only the relationship 
between the foreign ownership and the firm’s going-concern.  
6.4.2 Methodological Implications 
Most of the studies on the relationship between the ownership structure and the firm’s 
going-concern problems focused on earnings management as the determinate of the 
firm’s going-concern status. However, this research is an attempt to study a combination 
of all three determinates of the firm’s going-concern problem (bankruptcy, earnings 
management, and profitability). 
Furthermore, even the previous studies that assessed the bankruptcy variable concerning 









very few using the Altman 1968 Bankruptcy Model which is only applicable to 
manufacturing firms (Zureigat et al., 2014a,b; Zureigat, 2015). Methodologically, this 
study has used the Altman 2017 Z-model as a proxy for bankruptcy, which is meant for 
financial firms (emerging economy model), to examine the moderating effect of the 
relationship between the ownership structure and the firm’s going-concern of the 
Nigerian financial sector. 
6.4.3 Practical and Policy Implications  
The results of this study may support the business management in creating more 
awareness of the significance of the firm’s going-concern. As discussed previously, the 
firm’s going-concern is regarded as an essential element usually used by the capital 
market participants in making vital decisions. Therefore, the results of this study will be 
relevant to the management as well as the financial analysts. The outcome can expose 
the issues that may affect the firm’s going-concern and assist in evaluating the financial 
information efficiently. 
The results indicate that all of the ownership structure variables had significant effects 
on the going-concern of the listed Nigerian financial institutions. Specifically, the CEO 
ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership had positive effects on a 
firm’s going-concern. Relying on this, it could be inferred that companies with higher 
CEO ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership are associated with a 









have substantial ownership in a company are unlikely to engage in any devious act that 
will lead to the firm’s going-concern problem.  
It has been discussed that in the developing countries like Nigeria, foreign investment 
assists in growing labour efficiency as well as strengthening foreign exchange reserves 
to overcome the current account deficit. Likewise, it is expected that foreign ownership 
offers funds, experiences, and knowledge to the management and organisation. 
Similarly, institutional shareholders may play an active observational role, which is very 
difficult for minority shareholders. This will help in minimising the firm’s going-
concern problem. It implies that the regulators should adopt policies that encourage 
companies to grow ownership by CEOs, foreign investors, and institutions, as they 
appear to improve the firm’s going-concern. The consequence is that the government 
needs to review its policy restricting the shareholders from holding a stake of more than 
10% without the approval of the CBN. It will easier for the CEO, foreign, and 
institutional investors to exercise control and enhance the going-concern of the firms. 
However, the executive directors’ ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, and 
block ownership were found to have negative effects on a firm’s going-concern. Based 
on this finding, it could be inferred that companies with a higher number of executives, 
non-executives, and block ownerships are associated with a firm’s poor going-concern 
status. Possibly, this is as a result of the fact that executive and non-executive directors’ 
ownership may seem weak in lessening agency conflicts if companies are strictly 









the shareholders and management is already abridged once the regulator plays its part in 
monitoring the management in accomplishing the objective of the owners. This is 
consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, where the increases in ownership by board 
members (executives and non-executives) might not maximise the owners’ values, but 
rather the executives’ private benefits.  
Correspondingly, even though there is a belief that block owners have more influence 
and sound reasons to ensure the going-concern of the company, the relationship between 
the block owners and the going-concern of a company is mysterious. Block ownership 
beyond a particular level may result in the owner-manager’s entrenchment that 
impounds the minority investors’ investment. This negative effect of the block 
ownership on the firm’s going-concern may happen when the block owners are more 
prone to dispose of their stakes in a company when the share value is high. This is in line 
with the opportunity cost hypothesis.  
Meanwhile, the audit committee size was found to strengthen the effects of the CEO, 
block, and foreign ownership relationships on the firm’s going-concern. Whereas, the 
audit committee size was found to weaken the effects of the executives’ and institutions’ 
ownerships on the firm’s going-concern. This means that the executives and institutional 
investors might use their influence on the audit committee to benefit themselves rather 
than the other shareholders. Conversely, the audit committee size was not able to 
moderate the non-executive directors’ ownership relationship with the firm’s going-









ways of facilitating the appointment of the audit committee. By the provision of the 
Nigerian code of corporate governance 2011, the audit committee members are subject 
to the main board which is largely dominated by the non-executive directors. Therefore, 
it may be difficult for the audit committee size to influence them if the non-executive 
directors have a significant share. Regulators have to enforce active systems to reduce 
the influence of the executives and institutional shareholders over the audit committee 
size to safeguard the safety of the minority shareholders. 
Moreover, the audit committee independence strengthens the effects of the executive, 
non-executive, and institutional ownerships on the firm’s going-concern. Whereas, the 
audit committee independence weakens the effect of the CEO and foreign ownership 
relationships on the firm’s going-concern. This means that the audit committee members 
in the Nigerian financial institutions may neglect the interests of foreign investors as an 
individual foreign shareholder is not permitted to own more than 10% of the financial 
institutions. Therefore, regulators should consider a means to motivate more foreign 
investment. In contrast, the audit committee independence did not moderate the 
relationship between the block ownership and the firm’s going-concern. This means that 
the audit committee members may  not have full independence from the block 
shareholders which makes it difficult to stop their expropriation behaviours against the 
minority stakeholders. This may be because, the major shareholders may have influence 









Likewise, the audit committee financial expertise weakens the effect of the block 
ownership on the firm’s going-concern. This result indicates an entrenchment effect on 
the stockholders possessing a high proportion and the potential risk of the minority 
shareholders’ exploitation. The reason is that, the CAMA 1990 is too sacrosanct to the 
voting rights of the shareholders in favour of the block shareholders, which encourages 
the manipulation of corporate governance in relation to the majority and minority 
shareholders. Therefore, it is advisable that the regulators should motivate minority 
shareholder activism through the creation of minority shareholder associations as has 
been achieved in the USA, the UK, China, and Malaysia. Consequently, this will 
safeguard the minority and other stakeholders’ interests, since the current code of 
corporate governance is ineffective in regulating the exploitation effect which has a 
negative influence on a firm’s going-concern. It would also be remarkable to think about 
the possible effects of the code of practice that supports the control mechanisms in the 
firms where the level of block ownership is very high.  
Conversely, the audit committee financial experts were not able to moderate the effects 
of the CEO, executive, non-executive, foreign, and institutional ownerships on the firm’s 
going-concern. To improve these relationships, the regulators should ensure that the 
members of the audit committee have an academic qualification before their 
appointment, but not necessarily a mandatory accounting qualification. Also, there 
should be mechanisms introduced for the mandatory continuing education of the audit 









financial knowledge literacy and be capable of observing the management more 
efficiently. Thus, decreasing the risk related to the ownership structure and management 
rights which, in turn, affect a firm’s going-concern favourably. 
6.5 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Studies 
Like every study, this study had certain limitations that should be revealed to make sure 
that the outcomes were objectively deduced. Even though the data of this study offered 
an in-depth understanding of this study, the generalisation of the findings should be 
cautiously made because of the numerous economic and practice, as well as regulation 
issues. Hence, this study is bound by specific limitations such as: 
1. The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) varies from other international markets 
regarding the listed firms’ numbers as well as market valuations. Nevertheless, 
the results and policy suggestions of this study may be applied to other 
economies where there are diverse ownership categories and may be more 
exposed to the audit committee characteristics. 
2. The secondary data were collected from the listed Nigerian financial institutions, 
which were covered by 29 firms that were involved in the study process from the 
2006 to 2015 financial years. This study was restricted to the information of the 
listed Nigerian financial institutions after 2006; in other words, after it had come 
to be imperative for the listed Nigerian financial institutions to apply the rules of 









2015 for the reason that the time of the study had not published the financial 
reports of the listed Nigerian financial institutions after 2015. However, three 
firms were also found to be below the listing standards, some companies were 
under reformation courses, and some companies were short on whole data, 
respectively. 
3. This study employed only six essential variables of the ownership structure, 
namely, the CEO, executive, non-executive, block, institutional, and foreign 
ownerships. It is likely that other ownership structure variables, such as family 
ownership not incorporated in this study, are also affecting the going-concern. 
Similarly, splitting block ownership into institutional and individual block 
ownership may also contribute to the practices of going-concern. Likewise, this 
study employed three crucial audit committee variables, specifically, the audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, and audit committee members’ 
financial expertise. It is possible that other audit committee variables, such as 
audit committee meeting frequency, audit committee member tenure not 
included in this study, also contribute to the practices of going-concern. 
6.5.1 Suggestions for Future Research 
As stated, this study has paid attention to the relationship between the ownership 
structure and the going-concern in Nigeria. Similarly, this study examined the 
moderating effects of the audit committee on this relationship. This study has 









independence, and financial expertise), and the going-concern for the listed financial 
companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. It will prove to be worthwhile for future 
research in drawing a comparative analysis between Nigeria and other nations.  
This study considered the moderating effects of the audit committee on the relationship 
between the ownership structure and the going-concern for the financial companies 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Increasing the sample to comprise other sectors 
from the Nigerian Stock Exchange would prove to be useful to support further or oppose 
the results of this study. The study can also further examine the effect of additional 
variables besides the ownership structure, audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise), and going-concern on the reliance judgment, 
such as credit risk management characteristics, family ownership, political influence, 
transparency and disclosure, shareholders’ rights, and audit committee meetings. 
Replacing the listed companies with the non-listed financial companies in Nigeria and 
comparing the outcomes with the findings of this study would be valuable to appreciate 
the variance between the two sets. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Unlike previous studies that have examined the direct relationship between ownership 
structure and the firm’s going-concern, this study examined the moderating effects of the 
audit committee on the relationship between the ownership structure and the going-









the audit committee, ownership structure, and going-concern, and also based on the 
researcher's knowledge, this research is the first that studied the moderating effects of 
the audit committee on the relationship between the ownership structure and the firm’s 
going-concern. 
Furthermore, financial statement users have to recognise the business’s going-concern 
matter, which is related to their anticipations and interests. Users need to be capable of 
assessing the going-concern of the companies from the financial statements in order to 
face and solve these challenges and bring up to date every suspicion that may threaten 
the business's going-concern. In achieving this, the study investigated the influence of 
the audit committee on the relationship between the ownership structure and going-
concern. Moreover, the linear regression analyses show that the going-concern had a 
positive relationship with the CEO ownership, foreign ownership, and institutional 
ownership. However, they show a negative relationship between the executive directors’ 
ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, and block ownership with the going-
concern.  
Furthermore, the audit committee size was found to moderate the CEO, block, and 
foreign ownerships’ relations with the firm’s going-concern positively. Conversely, the 
audit committee size was found to moderate the executive and institution ownership 
relationships with the firm’s going-concern negatively. Moreover, the audit committee 
independence was found to moderate the executive, non-executive, and institution 









However, the audit committee independence was found to moderate the foreign 
ownership relationship with the firm’s going-concern negatively. Likewise, the audit 
committee financial expertise was found to moderate the block ownership relationship 
with the firm’s going-concern negatively. Based on that, the findings of this research are 
essential, both practically and theoretically. Likewise, there was a prospect to validate 
the research models that were formed for this research. The models can be used as 
explanatory models for the financial statement users in evaluating the business's going-
concern. 
Moreover, results from this research display valuable understanding and awareness not 
only with regards to the moderating effect of the audit committee characteristics (size, 
independence, and financial expertise) on the relationships between the ownership 
structure and the going-concern, but also to the different dynamics and significance of 
the ownership structure, audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and 
financial expertise) and going-concern, which results in the accounting information 
quality. Finally, the limitations and recommendations for prospective studies have, as 
well, been revealed in this chapter. 
Overall, this research has contributed to the field of accounting, mainly going-concern. 
This research is the first extensive study that has investigated the issue of going-concern 
from the perspective of ownership structure as well as the audit committee in a 









develop many opportunities for other forthcoming research on the firm’s going-concern, 
not only in Nigeria but also in other countries where this field of study is missing. 
Moreover, it unlocks prospects and offers opportunities for further thorough research 
connected to audit committee characteristics (size, independence, and financial 
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